



Blood, Sweat, and Tears 






Robin Jan Hamilton-Coates 
 
 
Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 















Blood, Sweat, and Tears: 
Documenting Thai Citizenship 
 




How has Thailand kept track of citizens and outsiders?  Thailand (Siam) has transformed 
ancient methods of keeping track of subjects, and adopted modern legislative principles 
using documentary evidence to discriminate between citizens and outsiders.  In the 
process, it has shaped a complex hierarchical structure with differentiated overlapping 
layers of citizenship, where some groups exist beyond any legal space.  At the same time, 
Thailand has evolved from a society where subjects paid tribute to sovereigns, into a 
democratic polity where entitlement is determined through identity documentation.   
 
In seeking to explain how Thailand documents citizenship, we must first consider the 
historical methods employed by Siamese sovereigns to keep track of subjects, including 
practices like tattooing, slavery, and bondage.  The introduction of foreign ideas like 
territorial sovereignty and nationality superseded, but did not completely replace, all of 
these former practices.  The interplay between these different ideas, and the aftermath of 
social changes caused by migration and conflict, established the boundaries of modern 
Thai citizenship.   This thesis explores these issues by investigating attitudes to 
citizenship and access to social services in the Tai Yai1 (ไทยใหญ่), or Shan, community in 
Chiang Mai, to illustrate how methods of documentary surveillance impact on citizenship 
rights, and confirm the establishment of a differentiated citizenship model in Thailand.     
  
                                                 
1 A note on transliteration of the Thai language: Thai (ภาษาไทย) is the national and official language of 
Thailand.  It has its own script, which is derived from a number of ancient regional languages.  There is no 
universal standard for transcribing Thai into the Latin alphabet.  The Royal Thai General System of 
Transcription (RTGS) is the official system for rendering Thai script, and is widely used. ISO 11940 is 
another international standard for transcribing Thai.  The researcher has attempted to comply with the 
principles in ISO11940, but where words are copied from other texts, the original spelling was retained.  
Any transcription errors are the researcher’s responsibility.     
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1. Introduction: Thai Citizenship, Past, Present and Future 
 
 
This thesis explores the historical origins and changing nature of citizenship in Thailand.  
It contributes to existing knowledge by explaining how Thailand has established a 
complex model of differentiated citizenship to document and distinguish between various 
groups of citizens and outsiders.  The research offers a unique insight into the historical 
development of Thai citizenship, nationality law, and identity documents.  The key 
question explored in the thesis is:  How has Thailand kept track of citizens and outsiders?   
 
In responding to this question, it is important to acknowledge that Thailand has 
transformed ancient methods of keeping track of subjects, and adopted modern legislative 
principles using documentary evidence to discriminate between citizens and outsiders.  In 
the process, it has shaped a new hierarchy with differentiated layers of citizenship, where 
some groups exist beyond legal space.  At the same time, Thailand (Siam) has evolved 
from a society where subjects paid tribute to sovereigns, into a diverse democratic polity 
where entitlement to citizenship is dependent on possession of identity documents.   
 
In seeking to explain how Thailand documents citizenship, we must first consider the 
historical methods employed by Siamese sovereigns to keep track of subjects, including 
practices like tattooing, slavery, patronage and bondage.  The introduction of foreign 
ideas like territorial sovereignty and nationality superseded, but did not completely 
replace all of these former practices.  The interplay between different ideas, and the 
aftermath of social changes caused by migration and conflict have established the 
boundaries of modern Thai citizenship.   This thesis explores these issues using the 
contemporary experience of the Tai Yai  (ไทยใหญ่), or Shan, as one case study, to illustrate 
how documentary surveillance (such as identification cards) has impacted on entitlement.     
 
It might make more sense, in seeking to determine who is eligible to become a citizen to 
turn the equation upside down on its head and examine the parameters for exclusion. 
Engin Isin, for example, reminds us that images of citizenship are bequeathed "from the 
victors: those who were able to constitute themselves as a group, confer rights and 
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obligations on each other, institute rituals of belonging and rites of passage, and, above 
all, differentiate themselves from others, constructing an identity and an alterity 
simultaneously.”2  States determine who is eligible for citizenship by first deciding who 
should be excluded.  Thailand is not unique in this regard. 
 
This thesis adopts a broad definition of citizenship as a measure of inclusion in political, 
social, and economic activity.  Citizenship is generally available to the descendants of 
settlers capable of assimilating successfully in the host society.  For the purpose of this 
thesis, citizenship is considered through simple entitlements such as the ability to travel 
freely, and the degree of access to basic social services such as education and health 
facilities.  Nationality, on the other hand, is the legal process whereby citizenship is 
recorded and documented according to law.  States protect sovereignty by limiting access 
to citizenship and nationality according to certain pre-determined criteria to include or 
exclude certain groups.  Migration of people across borders indicates that citizenship is 
not only a set of rights, but a “mechanism of closure that sharply demarcates the 
boundaries of states3.”   
 
Chinese migrants, for example, have settled in the geographical area now recognized as 
Thailand for at least six centuries4.  Other ethnic groups have lived within and beyond 
Thailand’s current boundaries long before they were established through relations with 
colonial powers.  This has resulted in deep ambiguity about belonging and citizenship, 
and at various stages violent conflict has erupted where attempts have been made to 
repatriate migrants and refugees.  Injustice and inequality result from the differentiated 
treatment assigned to different groups.  Assimilation and acquisition of citizenship are 
both social and legal processes defined by increasing social intercourse, “first public and 
then private and intimate; and by self-identification in an ever larger proportion of social 
situations.”5  Some groups of migrants have successfully achieved acculturation, 
                                                 
2 Isin, 2002, p. 2. 
3 Joppke, 1999, p. 1. 
4 Skinner, 1957, p. 237.   
5 Skinner, 1957, p. 237. 
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assimilation, and citizenship, while some native inhabitants remain excluded from the 
national polity.  Citizenship implies rights and obligations, but also membership.    
 
The central proposition in this thesis is that Thailand has developed a hierarchical, 
differentiated, structure of identity documents and nationality legislation to preserve 
national sovereignty.  Unfortunately, this system has resulted in discrimination against 
individuals and groups of people, many of whom have resided inside Thailand’s present-
day borders centuries before they were established.  Some groups and individuals suffer 
ongoing exploitation and statelessness.  The problem is complicated by conflict between 
and within neighboring countries6.  Out of 1.4 million alien workers registered with the 
Labor Ministry, for example, “only 800,000 had completed the process of applying for a 
work permit.”7  Many migrants, refugees and their descendants residing in Thailand for 
generations do not hold identity documents.  They are ‘illegal’ or ‘undocumented’ 
migrant workers.  In some cases, these individuals remain stateless.         
 
The objective of this research is to encourage broader understanding of the contemporary 
challenges associated with citizenship, nationality, illegal and undocumented migration, 
people trafficking and smuggling, and refugee flows in Thailand.  What internal and 
external events have guided the development of nationality law? What is the current 
situation, and what are the implications of these changes for different groups?  How can 
Thailand improve controls to allow access to persecuted individuals, maintain the rights 
of migrant workers, and protect sovereignty?  What barriers do attitudes to citizenship 
present on these issues?  What role has the development of nationality law and identity 
documentation played in reinforcing or discouraging discrimination?     
 
The issues raised in this thesis are relevant both to Thailand, and other similar countries 
with large groups of refugees, settlers, and migrant labourers.   This research is also 
important for the normative solutions presented on citizenship struggles, migration 
                                                 
6 Bangkok Post, 30 September 2011, Stricter ID Process for Migrants.  The article quotes Surapong 
Kongchantuk, Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Lawyers’ Council of Thailand at a seminar 
on the registration and rights of migrant workers in Thailand on 29 September 2011.    
7 Bangkok Post, 30 September 2011, Stricter ID Process for Migrants. 
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practices, human rights (including access to social, economic and political rights), and 
innovative settlement options throughout the world.  Each geographical area and ethnic 
group offers different explanations and possible solutions.  Economic factors, historical 
relationships, and international influences also play a part in determining policy 
outcomes.  Thailand faces many challenges in implementing an inclusive citizenship 
policy.  Education on citizenship and human rights is critical to raise awareness at all 
levels to ensure victims know their rights, and society becomes more tolerant.  Ignorance 
and prejudice inevitably bring about much conflict and discrimination, as always.    
 
This research, drawing from decades of research and observation in the field working on 
related issues, attempts to navigate the web of overlapping citizenship and nationality 
rights in Thailand and surrounding countries.  The thesis explores some relevant history 
of Thailand’s near neighbours, China, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, and 
Vietnam.  Certain political and economic factors have contributed to migration and 
dispossession.  Thailand has long been a refuge for those fleeing persecution, as well as a 
destination for those seeking their fortune in a prosperous market economy.    
 
Taking into account the diverse population, porous borders, the large numbers of migrant 
workers and asylum seekers from neighbouring countries, and the history of people 
trafficking in the region, Thailand would be advised to investigate more inclusive 
citizenship models.  This would provide a measure of inclusion for the many different 
groups that have migrated there over the last century, and reduce the potential for conflict 
with neighbours, as well as potentially enhancing trade and investment through informal 
ties.  There are entire generations of families living on Thai soil without documentation, 
unable to travel outside a limited area or access social services.  As the interviews 
conducted in this thesis demonstration, the existing citizenship model discriminates on 
the basis of access to certain types of identity documentation, which are either difficult or 
almost impossible to acquire legitimately. 
 
This thesis begins in Bangkok, a poly-ethnic megalopolis of over ten million inhabitants, 
and the porous border regions beyond the capital.  What does the Thai State do with 
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people who don’t meet the definition of a ‘citizen?’  How does it account for and keep 
track of people who live on the fringe of society, as labourers, refugees, settlers, or 
sojourners?  What does the law say about who is able to reside legally within Thailand, 
and how can people seeking refuge or employment ensure they comply?   
 
The Immigration Detention Centre (IDC) in Soi Suan Plu off busy Sathorn Road in 
downtown Bangkok is a central holding area for illegal or undocumented migrants.  The 
detainees are mostly migrant workers, who are arrested, processed, and repatriated once 
transport and documents can be arranged.  It is essentially a small prison that can hold 
several thousand people, but was never intended or built for the purpose of holding 
people for long periods of time.  In the IDC there are large numbers of Burmese and Lao 
migrants, many of them victims of people traffickers, (also North Koreans)8 stranded in a 
byzantine legal purgatory.  It is a revolving door that a number of people may pass 
through several times; others might stay there for several years rather than be repatriated.   
 
The researcher visited the (IDC) in Bangkok as an administrator almost every week 
(sometimes several times a week) for over four years9.   One of the officials charged with 
managing the IDC confided that this was an enormous responsibility he took very 
seriously, as “nobody there had committed a crime.”10  It was important, he said, to 
reinforce this point to prevent inhumane treatment of detainees.  Several hundred women 
were placed in one room with barely enough space to sit down, fluorescent lights turned 
on day and night, and CCTV cameras monitored the room constantly for safety reasons.  
There was a psychologically disturbed man with a blue helmet (like UN soldiers wear) 
                                                 
8 On 4 September 2003, in scenes reminiscent of the incident in Shenyang, China in May 2002 where 
asylum seekers tried (and failed) to enter the Japanese Consulate, a group of 4 North Koreans claimed 
political asylum in Thailand.  The UNHCR office in Bangkok issued 64 'Person of Concern' cards to North 
Koreans seeking asylum.  Ten of these asylum seekers departed in August 2003 after taking refuge for 
almost two months in the Japanese Embassy in Bangkok. Thailand is used as a transit point for Koreans 
from the DPRK assisted by missionaries and other groups.  There is a quota to accept DPRK citizens as 
refugees in South Korea.  This issue is worthy of further study and research. 
9 From 1993-2010, the researcher was a government employee (Consular official) responsible for issuing 
identity documents and providing protection to Australians (including deportees detained in the IDC). 
10 Interview with Thai Immigration Official, 2004. 
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and a military uniform, who had apparently been there for years and saluted all visitors 
when they visited his cell.  The Nigerian Government chartered aircraft to repatriate 
nationals.  Other foreigners just needed a ticket and a travel document to escape.   
 
This research draws from extensive experience with citizenship and migration cases in 
Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, Ghana, Japan, and Cambodia.  In some tragic cases, 
ambiguous citizenship status resulted in statelessness, where families (most often 
children) were detained and deported, or live without access to basic services, as they 
were ineligible to obtain citizenship documentation.  The researcher resolved people 
smuggling and trafficking cases, and trained law enforcement and airline officials on 
document fraud issues in capacity building projects in several developing countries.      
 
Thai detention facilities are overcrowded; full of thousands of migrants awaiting 
deportation, only to return again seeking employment in a vicious cycle of exploitation 
and misery. Debt bondage, people smuggling, trafficking, and statelessness, are the 
inevitable result of chronic poverty and inequality.  Thai authorities simply wait until 
they have enough detainees to fill big black metal cages on large trucks, pile the people 
in, and drop them at various border crossings11.  The detainees inevitably return to 
Thailand to seek economic opportunities.  Thus continues the self-perpetuating merry-go-
round of human misery.  Thai prisons, particularly near border regions, are also 
overflowing with migrants from neighbouring countries serving sentences for illegal 
entry and other apparently minor offences.  Movement is restricted and controlled. 
 
The critical theme of this thesis is to consider how Thailand has kept track of citizens and 
outsiders. This thesis explores this question by examining historical records and 
exploring the methods of surveillance employed by the Thai State to keep track of 
outsiders, and by outlining the experience of several outsiders in a series of interviews.  
                                                 
11 The researcher witnessed this practice from October 2004 to December 2008 and spoke to many officials 
and detainees regarding this method of repatriation.  Migrants said they turned around at the border and 
came back again.  The process was designed to satisfy the need to keep people out of detention while at the 
same time applying the law to ensure illegal migrants were detained and deported.  From time to time, Thai 
authorities introduced longer periods of detention as a deterrent to undocumented or illegal migrants.  This 
practice clogged up prisons with foreigners completely innocent of any serious crime.     
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The interviews presented in this thesis are not intended to provide an empirical or 
exhaustive analysis of the circumstances of the Shan, they are included to supplement 
other sources to highlight contemporary attitudes to citizenship and discrimination in 
Thai society.  The normative objective of the thesis is to explore issues surrounding 
citizenship and identity documentation to develop recommendations on how Thailand 
might objectively improve policy in these areas to promote a more harmonious society.       
 
In separate chapters, the thesis compares and contrasts historical and contemporary 
debates on citizenship and nationality, and chronologically examines the introduction of 
documentary evidence of nationality marked by key events in Thai history.  The abolition 
of slavery and the corresponding decay in traditional methods of social stratification; the 
influx of large numbers of Chinese; relations with colonial powers; Thai nationalism and 
the reasons behind the change from Siam to Thailand; conflict and refugee crises; and 
finally Thailand's emergence as a regional labour and migration hub set the scene for the 
contemporary citizenship struggles and debates12. 
  
                                                 





2. Review of Literature on Thai Citizenship 
 
This chapter acknowledges and places in perspective existing knowledge and previous 
studies on Thai citizenship issues by examining the available literature.  In subsequent 
chapters, the thesis shows how Thailand fits within a broader international discourse 
about citizenship and migration, the circumstances of specific groups, attitudes about 
citizenship, why Thailand has adopted a differentiated citizenship model, how this is 
creating conflict, and how things might be improved to create a more inclusive society. 
 
The diversity of literature and different approaches to this field is testimony to its 
complexity.  The primary objective of this thesis, however, was to focus on contemporary 
attitudes to citizenship and how this impacts on how Thailand keeps track of access to 
social services.  It became necessary to narrow the avenue of enquiry from an initial 
project concept encompassing the collective experiences of all migrant labourers and 
ethnic groups in Thailand, to a targeted analysis of the evolution of nationality law in a 
Thai context, with a few case studies situated around the experience of Shan migrants.   
 
This group was selected as it is ethnically and linguistically close to Thai, and has long 
been considered part of the broader Siamese-Thai nationalistic realm.  This has not 
provided unfettered access to citizenship rights, however, and the Shan people remain on 
the fringes of society in Northern Thailand, where they make up the majority of unskilled 
labourers.  The Shan, for their part, don’t consider themselves Thai any more than they 
consider themselves Burmese, even though technically they might hold the citizenship of 
that country if they have documents at all.  They are trapped, like many other groups 
(Mon, Hmong) in a limbo beyond national boundaries.  The youth, however, are growing 
up in a new country with stronger connections and identify more with Thailand.      
 
The objective of analysis was redefined to focus more closely on contested perceptions of 
citizenship, and the documentary methods employed by the state to differentiate between 
categories of Thai and non-citizens.  Many scholars writing about migration in South East 
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Asia, for example, only refer to Thailand in passing or as a source country for labourers 
travelling to the Middle East, Taiwan, Singapore, or Japan13.  The reality is that Thailand 
has historically been both an important source and destination country for labour and 
migration.    
 
There is a wealth of material on Chinese migration to Thailand, primarily because 
Thailand hosts the largest ethnic Chinese community in South East Asia14.  The 
combination of technological advancement (the invention of the steamship), and 
historical events in China contributed to the mass migration of millions of Chinese, 
permanently changing the demographic nature of the polity and introducing new 
challenges for the Siamese State and society.  Chinese migration contributed to future 
conflict through ethnic stratification and the progressive differentiation of citizenship.  
While ethnic Chinese were at various stages excluded from Thai citizenship and society 
on legal and other terms, they now constitute an elite group capable of redefining a new 
model of citizenship.  Political unrest in 2009 and 2010 could perhaps be linked to this 
struggle to redefine Thai society through new elites and conflicting power bases.           
 
Documentary evidence on the scale of the problem is scarce, however, and it is difficult 
to determine accurately how many migrants reside in Thailand.  Anecdotal evidence is 
available, however, in frequent news articles about the experience of migrant workers in 
Thailand, many of which have been cited in this thesis.  Other useful evidence in 
mapping out historical decision-making processes, include instructional handbooks of on 
nationality legislation produced by the Department of Administration15.  These 
handbooks or manuals describe the process of deciding who is eligible for citizenship.   
 
Periodic political pressure from certain groups at different stages to expel unregistered 
migrants highlighted the sense of urgency in coming to terms with the nature of the 
problem.  In July 2004, for example, following a pattern of threats probably intended to 
                                                 
13 Athurkorala, 1999, p.175, and Castles, 1998, p. 153. 
14 Skinner, 1957).  
 
15 Department of Local Administration, 1999. (, 
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bolster the registration program, former Prime Minister Thaksin announced that all 
unregistered migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos would be deported. 
Thaksin also challenged the UNHCR over registration and possible forced relocation and 
repatriation of refugees, and in a contentious move that had ramifications for other groups 
stirred up unrest in southern Thailand by threatening to cancel the Thai citizenship of 
dual citizens in border areas16. This decision proved to be impractical, impossible to 
implement, and was subsequently never comprehensively enforced.   
 
The National Library in Canberra boasts an excellent collection of Thai language 
material.   The library holds useful evidence of Siam’s first population census conducted 
in 1910 (coinciding with the introduction of Thailand's first nationality law).  The census 
data and categorization of ethnic groups is indicative of the racial schematics prevalent in 
that era.   The census data was also particularly interesting as a snapshot of Siam’s early 
dependency on opium taxation as the most significant sector of the economy.  Census 
data, however, must be sensitively interpreted, as different criteria and definitions have 
been used to measure ethnicity over time.   In 1970 and 1980 some attempt was made to 
measure ethnicity by asking about ‘languages spoken at home’ and a rather problematic 
category designated ‘country of nationality17.’  Arrival and departure records, an 
indicator of general migration trends, also provide poor evidence of residency, as they do 
not adequately take into account people routinely crossing borders and exclude 
undocumented migrants or refugees.  The objective of examining this evidence was to 
situate the current circumstances in the context of historical census data. Census records 
highlighted that different terminology has influenced ethnic categorization over time.  
But the same groups appear to remain on the periphery. 
 
The census record for registered aliens by nationality in 1973, for example, records a 
handful of European, American, and African ‘aliens,’ and in a bizarre twist there are two 
separate categories for ‘Australian’ and ‘other Australian18.’  Entirely different 
registration processes were adopted for minorities such as the ‘Highlanders’ (Hmong, 
                                                 
16 The Nation, 25 July 2004,  Migrants to be Deported. 
17 National Statistics Office, 2002. 
18 Ministry of Interior, 1980. 
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Akha, etc). The first national survey of upland minorities was apparently only conducted 
in 197919.  These groups are subject to discrimination through opaque legislation 
detailing inconsistent and sporadic access and a differentiated entitlement to citizenship.   
 
Census records offer useful evidence of the changing official attitude to outsiders at 
different times. Census data shows how definitions of nationality and citizenship have 
changed and indicates when historical changes have taken place.  In legal terms, 
according to the Nationality Act and census data, a Thai person is simply one “who has 
Thai citizenship,” and an alien “is any person who is not of Thai nationality under the 
Nationality Act.”20  These definitions will be examined in further detail, as they are 
relevant to the language selected by the Thai State to delineate status and introduce 
complex social boundaries, effectively institutionalizing historical discrimination.   
 
Census records did not provide accurate or detailed historical data on the number of 
migrants from surrounding countries entering and residing in Thailand.  It appears that 
nobody in Thailand, neither the National Statistics Office (NSO), nor the Immigration 
Bureau, can accurately confirm at any time how many outsiders remain unregistered 
beyond the formal state-defined boundaries of citizenship.  The scale and shape of the 
hierarchical differentiated model of citizenship therefore remains unclear. 
 
Thai language sources consulted were very useful, particularly theoretical work on the 
origins of Thai nationality and citizenship, as well as practical legal handbooks on 
citizenship and identity documents.  There is considerable interest in this topic in the Thai 
media, occasionally presented in a jingoistic and confrontational tone, but there is a 
significant gap in the quality and quantity of analytical Thai scholarship on citizenship.   
 
Following an examination of available literature on this topic, there appears to have been 
limited effort by Thai scholars or policy makers to consider in depth the long-term 
implications of migration and citizenship for Thailand.  There has also been limited 
                                                 
19 Department of Local Administration, 1999. 
20 Ministry of Interior, 1980, p. 125. 
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access to influence the results of study and research.  This has resulted in the absence of a 
cohesive citizenship policy taking into account the multi-ethnic origins of the Thai State.  
On the whole, the evidence confirms that citizenship policy in Thailand has most often 
been formulated in a reactive fashion following tragic events or conflict.  Prejudice, 
politics, religion, and porous borders have contributed to the problem.  Fortunately, there 
are also helpful indications that more attention could be devoted in future to address the 
issues associated with the millions of refugees and migrant workers in Thailand. 
 
Thai authorities appear to view citizenship issues in the context of security implications. 
There is considerable pressure placed upon Thailand as a first asylum country accepting 
large number of refugees from conflict in neighboring countries.  But this does not 
discount the need for Thailand to urgently develop humane policies to deal with the very 
large number of migrant labourers and ethnic minorities residing along and within border 
regions with a stake in the country’s future.   
 
The National Security Council has historically played a prominent role in decisions 
affecting migrants and refugees in Thailand, which have inevitably been perceived 
through the prism of regional conflict and border security.  Where security and 
citizenship issues are intertwined with porous and ill-defined border regions, drug 
trafficking and insurgency, the Security Council and the military will continue to play a 
prominent role on committees and commentary about citizenship in Thailand. There is 
strong evidence, however, of a relatively recent shift towards a broader administrative 
democratic and socially-focused overview of citizenship, nationality and the rights of 
migrants where this has become the domain of the Department of Public 
Administration21.  The issues arising from migrant labour and citizenship in Thailand 
require greater attention from a humanitarian and socio-economic viewpoint. 
 
The Department of Public Administration promulgated useful handbooks intended to 
assist practitioners at the district level making decisions about citizenship and nationality 
by providing wider access to legislation and instructions.  This research dissected the 
                                                 
21 Department of Public Administration, 1991,  p.5. 
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nationality guidelines in several volumes of these handbooks, with particular attention to 
the minute changes in historical legislation at various key junctions, hinting at specific 
shifts of emphasis by the administration on different principles of law (the inclusion of 
women, for example).  In reality, however, practical administration can be hampered by 
the vested interests of certain officials and the perceptions of who should be included or 
excluded from the national polity, regardless of long-term residency or practical access to 
the benefits of citizenship, such as education, health, and so on.  Serious analysis or 
scholarship on the hazards and challenges to society from retaining a large segment of the 
population with limited rights and access to citizenship was not easily available.  Some 
Thai scholars, mostly those writing from abroad, were more lucid and philosophical. 
 
Thongchai Winichakul has presented a comprehensive and wonderfully subversive 
account of the history of Thai nationhood.   He informs us that Siamese peoples were 
labeled according to a predetermined set of Western colonial ethnographic criteria.  
Through a process of ’ethno-spatial ordering,’ the Siamese adopted a differentiated social 
structure with the ‘superior space of Bangkok’ overseeing “the others within”: the chao 
pa, or forest dwellers, and the chao ban nork, or villagers.”22   
 
The Siamese elite claimed a superior place at the top of the pyramid, ordering their 
subjects in a new “linear cosmic order called civilization.”23  The distinction between 
subjects and outsiders was thus predicated upon anthropological distinctions between 
occupants of a ‘civilised’ world (chao muang) and those subjects inhabiting the wild 
expanses beyond (chao pa).  These same attitudes exist today and direct much of the 
debate and enquiry on access to citizenship.  The word ‘Thai,’ which has been adopted as 
a description of the inhabitants of the territorially bounded space now recognised as 
‘Thailand,’ became “a homogenous and homogenising term, an essential identity… a 
national trans-historic agency” drawing together disparate groups into a national whole 
and uniting them in sovereignty24.   
 
                                                 
22  Winichakul, 1994, p. 41. 
23  Winichakul, 1994, p. 41. 
24 Turton, 2000, p. 12. 
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Thongchai Winichakul accurately sets the scene for the emergence of Thai citizenship 
through the transformation of the Kingdom of Siam.  He shows how Siam evolved into 
Thailand through the application of Western scientific knowledge and the corresponding 
fixation of territorial geographic boundaries at the end of the 19th century and the 
beginning of the 20th century. He describes the tension inherent between the “discourse 
of nationhood” in establishing the identity of a nation and its opposition to ‘others’ not 
included inside the immediate circle25.  
 
Thongchai Winichakul emphasises the importance of Khwampenthai (or Thainess) as an 
abstract marker of virtue to differentiate between positive and negative criteria deciding 
the parameters of inclusion and exclusion within the national project that has now 
become Thailand.  Any invocation of Thainess inevitably stirs emotional images, 
historical battles, and tales of ancient victories against neighboring foes (particularly 
Myanmar, but also Vietnam and to a lesser extent Laos and Cambodia for different 
reasons).  Winichakul suggests that a Thai “self” was created in opposition to the ‘others’ 
by the introduction of geographical boundaries across ethnic identities.  The construction 
of a seemingly homogenous Thai State has emerged from a poly-ethnic quilt, and the new 
hierarchy is based on historical (and often hysterical) assessments of past conflict.   
 
Similarly, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, in his book, A Plastic Nation, on Thai –Burmese 
relations, is scathing about the influence and abuse of the notion of “khwampenthai.”26 
The Thai State deliberately fosters ambiguity over what it means to be Thai, or 
“Thainess,” for its own ends to reinforce social hierarchy and the cycle of discrimination:   
 
Dominated by its shifting hegemony, the Thais comply with this variable 
nationhood and perceive it as though it is a part of their chit winyan or ‘spirit.’  
This is why they never look beyond the boundaries of Thai nationhood, and why 
it always remains predominant, ultimate and supremacist.  The Thai power 
holders realise this potential of khwampenthai, and employ it to gain public trust 
                                                 
25 Winichakul, 1994, p. 3-4. 
26 Chachalpongpun,  2005, p.24. 
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(in whatever policy and activity they make), public agreement and public 
legitimacy.  The changing attitude towards Myanmar has been carried out under 
these conditions. The supremacist nature of Thainess as an expression of 
dominance makes Thai people less aware of how their leaders only pretend to be 
Thai even though their real actions are illegitimate.  Khwampenthai has been 
loosely adopted by the Thai power holders as a thin veneer over the repulsiveness 
of local politics which is also domestically glossed as Thai.27   
 
Pavin Chachavalpongpun claims that “Thainess and otherness were without substantive 
definition and thus malleable.”28  So the ambiguity, deliberate or unintended, about what 
constitutes Thainess has contributed to broader confusion about Thai citizenship and 
identity.  The ambiguity is exploited to support and maintain the differentiated hierarchy.   
 
Somchai Prichasilapakul from the University of Chiang Mai takes a similar approach, 
drawing largely from David Streckfuss’s analysis of the historical origins of Thai 
citizenship.29  Like David Streckfuss, Somchai Prichasilapakul introduces key issues in 
the historical evolution of Thai citizenship, focusing primarily on the history of French 
efforts to annex Siamese territory and subjects.   These events effectively resulted in the 
establishment by the French of the entity known as ‘Indochina.’ His analysis is more or 
less accessible, but simplistically defines citizenship in traditional nationalistic terms, 
without any effort to apply inclusive approaches to the Thai context. He appears satisfied 
to accept existing definitions without a thought for the implications of this model for 
millions of migrant workers, refugees, and disenfranchised minorities in Thailand. 
 
Kritaya Archavanitkul, from Mahidol University, on the other hand, investigates the 
status of various categories of outsiders in Thailand with a statistical assessment of the 
changing demographics, especially the circumstances of migrant workers in a changing 
economic environment.30  Kritaya Archavanitkul correctly identifies the need for 
                                                 
27 Chachalpongpun, 2005, p.24. 
28 Chachalpongpun, 2005, p. 29. 
29 Prichasilapakul, 2002. 
30 Krung Thep Turakit (in Thai), 5 July 2004,. 
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examination of the citizenship dilemma through assessment of the status of different 
categories for 2.43 million foreigners, and advocates the establishment of a national 
organisation to identify major problems and suggest suitable steps to create a more 
inclusive citizenship model.   
 
Several years after these positive suggestions, there has unfortunately been no sincere 
attempt to establish a dedicated national body to work through the citizenship question.  
The issues continue to be dealt with on a reactive and piecemeal basis.  There has been 
some limited improvement, however, in processes for registration of migrant workers.  
NGOs are active in some areas, particularly in Northern Thailand.  The establishment of a 
national body to investigate citizenship education and access to social services for 
migrants on a humanitarian basis appears, sadly, to be a distant objective.  So while 
employers and the nation as a whole benefit from the labour of migrant workers and 
refugees living on Thai soil, there does not appear to have been consistent application of 
rules or humanitarian principles in determining a more inclusive citizenship model.   
 
Aihwa Ong suggests newly industrial regimes like Thailand develop systems of 
“graduated sovereignty” or “flexible citizenship.”   In order to “meet capitalist 
requirements, citizens in zones that are differently articulated to global production and 
financial circuits are subjected to different kinds of surveillance and in practice enjoy 
different sets of civil, political and economic rights .”  By “calibrating control over 
sovereignty to the challenges of global capital,” the state has developed a system of 
“graduated zones” to protect against “pockets of social unrest.”   
 
Sukchai Jaroenwongse examines some of the citizenship and other issues confronting 
Thailand's ‘forgotten’ ‘Highland’ minorities (the so-called ‘hill-tribes’).31  Resource 
scarcity, and increasing competition for available agricultural land, he points out, have 
exacerbated ethnic rivalries in Northern Thailand.  A critical outcome of this unresolved 
struggle is a reassessment of the status of various ethnic minorities residing within 
                                                 




Thailand's borders.  Sukchai Jaroenwongse identifies the ‘bureaucratic labeling of ethnic 
identities’ as a fundamental source of confusion associated with access to citizenship 
rights.  He confirms the assessment in this thesis that ‘the devil is in the detail’ of the 
definition of various groups.  The dilemma for the Thai State lies in differentiating 
between recently arrived migrants, and those who have resided within Thailand’s current 
geographical space for decades or even centuries.  This is now achieved through 
legislation and documentary evidence of identification.      
 
Citizenship can be granted to aliens provided they meet certain legal requirements, but 
the category of citizenship entitles them to an identity document links to a certain group 
with a defined (limited) status.  This process of ethnic categorisation, or differentiation, 
places restrictions on participation as full members or ‘citizens’ of the community, such 
as restrictions on travel, access to education, health services, employment and political 
participation.  The house registration may identify citizenship (sunchat) as ‘Thai,’ but the 
next field is ‘race or ethnicity’ (cheuachat) and identifies them as Chinese, Burmans32, 
highlanders, Vietnamese and so on.  These terms are not widely understood, or 
understood differently by different people and agencies.  There is also perhaps a cultural 
content and different understanding between ‘Western’ and Thai appreciation of 
‘ethnicity’ and ‘citizenship.’ The researcher conducted ten interviews in this thesis for the 
purposes of illustrating various attitudes to citizenship in a Thai and Shan context.   
 
Discrimination stems from unequal access to social services based on ethnicity.   
Thailand's differentiated citizenship model discriminates on ethnic origins.  So while 
someone may have been granted Thai nationality (or citizenship) in a legal document, 
they can’t go to school, travel outside a certain radius, purchase or inherit land, go to 
hospital, or participate freely in political decisions.  
 
                                                 
32 Most ethnic groups in Thailand from the geographical identity known as Myanmar are not ‘Burmese’ (a 
description of an ethnic group inside Myanmar) and would perhaps be insulted by this identification.  
Karen, Mon, Shan, Arakanese, and others proudly identify with their own cultural origins and ethnic 
identity, no matter whether they were born in Thailand or Myanmar.  This becomes problematic as the Thai 
State recognizes them as ‘Burmese’ (or ‘Burmans’) in official dealings, even though they may not speak a 
word of Burmese and may have never set foot inside Myanmar. 
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Analysis of Thai newspapers over the past decade on illegal and migrant labour, 
citizenship, registration and nationality, highlights the extent of the problem and the level 
of community debate surrounding citizenship issues.   This thesis draws from detailed 
analysis of The Nation and Bangkok Post (English language), Thai Rath, Daily News, 
Matichon (Thai language).  A key theme emerging from these sources is that the number 
of labourers arriving in Thailand is steadily increasing. Regional conflict contributes to a 
continuous flow of refugees from neighboring countries. Myanmar is the largest source 
of both migrant labour and refugees.  These issues are raised periodically by certain 
actors, including politicians and welfare groups, with little coordinated effort to tackle 
root causes of migration and displacement, or introduce inclusive citizenship policy. 
 
The Thai State at different times haphazardly applies different standards and measures to 
groups and individuals seeking access to citizenship as decision makers have reacted to 
specific social and political events, conflict, and other challenges.  While recognizing the 
right of States to protect sovereignty, a broader, more objective, and positive approach to 
citizenship and nationality is required for the protection of human rights in Thailand. 
 
Contemporary developments in this field of public policy are generally characterized by a 
combination of prejudice, intolerance, racism, a lack of appreciation of the benefits of 
diversity (both economic and social) and “compassion fatigue.”33  The willingness of and 
capacity for developed countries (like Thailand) to accept larger numbers of permanent 
migrants is dwindling.  Social pressures highlight problems linked to migration and 
access to dual citizenship (strain on public utilities - especially health services and 
education, crime, poverty and unemployment).  The associated move towards stricter 
border controls and myriad methods of surveillance to cope with the (potential, 
perceived, and real) security, social, and economic threats encouraged by large-scale 
migration practices is evidence of the level of concern shared by policy makers in dealing 
with these challenges.  These are very real concerns, and the principles are important.   
 
                                                 
33 Shawcross, 1984, p. 405. 
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Ironically, however, the reluctance to deal effectively with issues associated with large-
scale migration is matched by a corresponding competitive global demand for flexible 
and cheap labour.  This is especially acute in unskilled sectors in developing countries.  
Poverty, conflict, income disparity, labour migration, and people smuggling and 
trafficking networks encourage movement across boundaries.  Thailand is surrounded on 
all sides by land and navigable sea and riverine borders.  Labourers and other migrants, 
including refugees fleeing conflict in neighboring Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam are able to simply walk into Thailand and reside there permanently without 
documentation.  This is becoming more difficult as the Thai authorities improve border 
and movement controls through regular checkpoints, but it is still possible to enter 
Thailand as an undocumented migrant and engage in paid employment.   The global 
market for migration has responded to economic imperatives that require sources of 
labour that might not be available in some areas.  Workers move across international 
boundaries in search of better economic prospects and to meet the demand for specific 
shortages.  Some may return to their place of origin, while others may seek to settle 
permanently in their destination.  This is a global phenomenon with little 
acknowledgement or recognition in the legal framework of international sovereign states.   
 
This brief review of literature demonstrates that the evolution of discourse within and 
beyond Thailand on substantive issues surrounding citizenship and labour migration is 
developing in a positive direction, particularly in relation to international norms.  
Thailand is receptive and can respond to external criticism because it has democratic 
institutions and sufficient freedom of speech, compared to its nearest neighbors, to enable 
meaningful discussion to take place.  There will continue to be problems, however, 
associated with classification of migrants, acceptance of the burdens caused by illegal 
and undocumented migration, and complex regional relationships. The next chapter 
examines the methodology used in this thesis to investigate the parameters of Thai 
citizenship and the means used by the Thai State to keep track of citizens and outsiders.  
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3. Methodology: How does Thailand Differentiate? 
 
 
The methodology adopted in this thesis includes an analytical and critical review of 
literature and other sources, particularly news and reporting on migration and citizenship 
issues, to identify historical patterns and contemporary discourse on citizenship and 
migration. To identify important influences over time, it was useful to develop a 
chronology of key events that impacted on the development of citizenship and nationality 
law in Thailand and internationally.  It was helpful to unpack a significantly detailed 
conceptual and theoretical framework, juxtaposing and reconciling contemporary 
(Western) citizenship theory against the historical establishment of Thai nationhood, 
especially in relation to the ambitions of colonial powers versus the traditional methods 
of subjugation used by the Siamese State.  Thailand’s geographical and political position 
in relation to China’s overwhelming influence and large population, particularly through 
important political events, and the introduction of the steamship, are explored in detail for 
the critical importance these events bring to the narration surrounding the evolution of 
contemporary Thai society and citizenship.  The language of citizenship is important.     
 
Different actors also perceive citizenship and nationality differently, even within 
apparently unified government agencies or entities.  This can limit or prohibit rational 
advancement of clear policy objectives in determining administrative procedures on 
citizenship and nationality law.  Citizenship is often confused, sometimes due to the 
selection of key terms in translation, as relating to possession of identity documents, 
rather than the broader inclusion of people within society based on rights, obligations, 
and privileges.  This confusion is a perennial issue for any discussion of citizenship, and 
can limit access for certain groups of people where authorities deliberately, unwittingly 
or accidentally, obscure the more positive social benefits of tolerance and acceptance.  
 
In this thesis, the differentiation of citizenship is defined as the process of dividing and 
documenting different groups and allocating a hierarchy of social rights.  Differentiation, 
placed in another context, can also apply to a brand or relationship between entities. 
Social differentiation examines “economic, political, and normatively defined relations 
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that underlie the construction of social categories.” It confirms that differentiation is 
“embedded in inequalities of power, status, wealth, and prestige, affects life chances of 
individuals as well as the allocation of resources and opportunities.”34  Specific strands of 
differentiation resulting to inequality include gender, age, race/ethnicity, and locality. 
 
This thesis demonstrates through analysis of historical and contemporary examples drawn 
from the researcher’s own experience, media articles, official reporting, and select 
interviews, that Thailand has established a complex hierarchical structure of 
differentiated citizenship, delineated both by ethnicity, but also by class.  It is difficult to 
breach the barriers of citizenship as the Thai State has implemented a complex web of 
modern forms of documentary evidence, such as identification cards, to replace more 
traditional methods, such as tattoos, of keeping track of citizens and outsiders.  The 
research outlines the history of the development of nationality law and census data in 
Siam and Thailand to show how labeling and ordering of subjects and citizens brought 
about the modern equation of Thai citizenship, and the exploitation and exclusion of 
millions of people living in close proximity to their ethnic origins. 
 
In exploring modern methods of keeping track of citizens and outsiders, and to set the 
context for the Thai-State’s nationalistic approach to maintaining a misguided and 
questionable attempt at racial purity, it was necessary to briefly open the historical record 
in relation to Siam’s defeat by Burma and later conquest of neighbouring city-states 
(Angkor and Vientiane).  Thailand, like many countries, is the product of conflict, 
conquest, and migration.  The prevailing evidence in the literature strongly suggests that 
is completely unrealistic to propose any pure racial definition of citizenship in Thailand, 
as the population is simply too diverse and arguably always has been.  Any efforts to 
introduce and justify a purist racial ordering of society are therefore dubious or subject to 
a modicum of self interest from certain groups. At the same time, certain individuals or 
groups were able to gain access to documentary evidence of citizenship through political 
or economic means.  Thailand is continuing to experience violent conflict based on 
factors related to geographical, ethnic, and class boundaries, and the resulting inequality.  
                                                 




To clearly illustrate the concept of differentiation in the context of Thai citizenship, in 
relation to the exclusion of certain groups from access to social services (medical 
treatment and education, but also freedom of movement), the researcher conducted a 
series of informal interviews to contrast contemporary attitudes to citizenship.  Subjects 
often readily verified the simple proposition that differentiation and hierarchy define 
contemporary citizenship models in Thailand through their experience as migrants, or 
efforts to obtain identity documents to enable access to social services (or simply avoid 
being locked up by police). This exercise in interviewing a range of migrants, officials, 
and ordninary Thai people on attitudes about access to citizenship was successful in 
confirming that stereotypes and informal barriers, such as a lack of information or 
confusion over entitlements, limit access to basic services and citizenship rights, even for 
people who have resided in Thailand for generations and their offspring.           
 
Most participants in these interviews were born in Thailand or had lived in Thailand for 
most of their lives, but many still did not consider they were Thai citizens, and explained 
that they did not consider themselves eligible for citizenship in their understanding of the 
term.  The project was almost exclusively limited to Shan migrants, as this group 
constitutes a significant majority of the undocumented or illegal workers in Northern 
Thailand.  This group was also relevant because Tai Yai (‘Big Thai’) or (ไทยใหญ่) are 
culturally similar to Thai notions of Thainess, perhaps also for political or strategic 
purposes.  They are ‘outsiders within.’ They are ‘almost Thai,’ and closer linguistically 
than other ethnic groups residing in Thailand, but many do not have the identity 
documents to participate fully in Thai society as Thai citizens.   
  
Prior to the interviews the project was explained, and consent forms were provided to 
participants.  Interviews were therefore conducted with the prior informed consent of all 
participants in accordance with the ethical guidelines for research set out by Deakin 
University and the Australian National University.  The ethical issues and potential risks 
of conducting interviews on this topic were considered carefully and the interview 
proposal was approved through Deakin University’s Human Research Ethics Committee.  
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Participants were not identified in the interviews or documentation to protect them 
against possible retribution for any comments against the interests of the Thai State.  
Nonetheless, it could be concluded that any negative comments were limited and 
moderated by the fact that this is a ‘taboo’ subject and would require a greater level of 
trust between the interviewer and the subject to obtain a more accurate sample response.  
A more comprehensive research project incorporating a larger group would be likely to 
identify a broader range of attitudes and issues on citizenship.  The purpose of the 
interviews in this thesis was to not to provide an empirical set of statistics to measure 
citizenship or participation, but to supplement the analysis with an indicative sample of 
attitudes on citizenship in the Shan community.            
 
Subjects were approached through, and included university students and migrant 
labourers and their families in the Northern Thai province Chiang Mai, to obtain a cross 
section of views where people had different experiences of citizenship and access to 
social services or Thai society.  Other informal interviews were conducted in Nong Khai 
(near the Lao border) and in Bangkok in the Immigration Detention Centre (IDC).  These 
locations were selected for different reasons.  Chiang Mai was selected due to the 
presence of a large number of Shan migrant labourers and residents.  Chiang Mai is a hub 
for migration in Thailand’s Northern region and home to a diverse ethnic population.  In 
the case of Nong Khai, it is an important transit border location with the Lao PDR and 
Thailand, where there is a large proportion of Vietnamese settlers and Lao migrants.    
 
Questions were open ended, and further ‘follow up’ questions were asked where 
interviewees were interested in certain aspects of the research or volunteered additional 
information.  In some cases interviewees did not answer some questions, generally 
because the questions were not relevant to their individual circumstances.   In some cases, 
participants appeared to misunderstand questions, or provided meandering incoherent 
responses.  As the objective of the study was to determine attitudes about citizenship, this 
was not moderated and answers were accepted at face value.  In other words, no effort 




In many respects the answers themselves demonstrated a variety of views about 
citizenship and the level of misunderstanding, apprehension, and confusion in the 
community.  The responses were useful as the objective was to show how attitudes about 
citizenship impact on access to rights.  Many respondents did not understand the law (or 
could not be expected to), but most had views about persecution or discrimination.   
 
Other informal interviews were conducted in Nong Khai, Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai, 
but as the context was very different, particularly in regard to the Vietnamese experience 
in Nong Khai, the interviews were not recorded in this study.  The results from all the 
interviews, however, overwhelmingly supported the contention that Thailand has adopted 
a differentiated citizenship model where various groups have more or less access to 
citizenship and social services dependent on their identity documents. 
  
The interviews were conducted on the basis of informed consent, most participants 
declined to provide their personal details, and most participants were pleased to 
contribute.  The questions were intended to open the discussion to elicit views on 
citizenship and highlight the contemporary issues faced by migrant workers.  Participants 
were encouraged to elaborate and explain their views about citizenship and access to 
social resources, and outline why they thought different groups should or shouldn’t have 
access to identity documentation.   
 
The questions (provided to participants in Thai language) were as follows:  
 
Are you a Thai citizen?  If not, would you like to get Thai citizenship? 
 
 
Why do people need citizenship?  
 
 
What do you get from Thai citizenship?  
 
 
Do you think Thai citizens should have equal access to education, health and other 









How does nationality (racial or ethnic origin) affect citizenship? 
 
  
What criteria should demonstrate who should be eligible for Thai citizenship; a person 
born in Thailand, long-term residency, or someone born to Thai mother or father? 
 
 
Participants selected included migrant labourers, university students at the University of 
Chiang Mai, and members of their families in 2010 and 2011, with a focus on Shan 
respondents.  Several Thai citizens were also interviewed for comparative purposes.  All 
participants were provided with information about the research project and were able to 
make informed decisions regarding the extent of their participation.  Other interviews 
were conducted by the researcher on an ad hoc basis with officials and migrants to gain a 
broader view of the attitudes about citizenship and challenges in meeting standards.  To 
protect identities and encourage open debate, participants’ personal details were not 
recorded during the survey.  All participants were very positive about participating in the 
research project and many others were interested.  A much larger project on attitudes and 
barriers to citizenship and access to identity documentation would be a valuable exercise 
to demonstrate the boundaries of prejudice and contemporary climate of exclusion.  
 
The next chapter examines the theoretical basis for citizenship and nationality in an 
international context, and moves towards a more detailed discussion regarding the 
historical issues that have contributed to the unique set of circumstances in Thailand.  We 
are now starting to unpack the key concepts and terms associated with citizenship and 
nationality to introduce more detailed case studies and situations facing people in 
Thailand, so we might consider how these issues impact on resolution of problems 
associated with granting citizenship to people fleeing conflict, or seeking economic 
opportunity.  There is also a need to carefully consider the implications of this research 
for people trafficked to Thailand as labourers or enforced sex workers, and how the Thai 
authorities might best respond to resolving these cases in a humanitarian way.  
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Unfortunately, as the examples explored in this thesis demonstrate, the record has been 
damaged by human rights violations and discrimination, often resulting in violence.   
 
The method employed in this thesis is to contrast the contemporary theoretical debate on 
citizenship, particularly from a Western viewpoint, against the actual experience and 
attitudes of refugees and migrant workers in Thailand. This approach aims to demonstrate 
how to the Thai State has managed to maintain a differentiated approach to keeping track 
of citizens and outsiders.  The analysis now moves from an international viewpoint to a 
more specific study of how surveillance and citizenship have evolved in a Thai context.  
The historical foundations of citizenship are very detailed, as we shall see in the 
following pages, and the meaning of citizenship can prove to be highly contested.  The 
language of citizenship, and the way it is applied in different countries, is not uniform, 
and this has contributed to misunderstanding and cultural application of alien concepts.  
Thailand has adopted documentary evidence (house registrations and identity cards) so it 
can label and order subjects, citizens, and denizens within a linear space extending 
beyond its historical and present-day borders.  Imagined communities extending beyond 
existing boundaries are a consistent factor of irredentist nationalistic politics, and this 
practice has unfortunately also informed the stratification of citizenship into a layered 





4. Theoretical Analysis: What are Citizenship and Nationality?   
 
 
This chapter links the theoretical thread of the thesis by defining contested terms such as 
citizenship and nationality.  The objective is to situate the scope of the research within the 
broader contemporary discourse on citizenship to establish a framework for analysis of 
the facts about Thai citizenship.  Citizenship implies much more than just nationality or 
allegiance.  It includes certain social rights, such as access to education and medical care, 
as well as political participation.  Many people in Thailand do not have identity 
documents.  They are stateless; unable to go to school, seek medical care, travel, or make 
representations on their condition.  They are subject to arbitrary arrest and detention, 
exploitation, and in the more serious cases on the record, torture and even murder and 
sexual abuse.  Attitudes about, and awareness and understanding of citizenship are 
important, as these terms ultimately guide public policy responses, and can limit the 
choices available for migrants and others through interpretation in law.   
 
There is an emotional public policy debate in Thailand associated with granting 
citizenship to the large numbers of second and third generation migrants that have settled 
in Thailand from surrounding countries, bringing with them different cultures, 
allegiances, languages and ways of life.  The response to date has been to issue various 
identity documents or informal permission granting differentiated rights to some groups 
depending on the circumstances.  Documents and identities can be bought and sold, and 
different groups face discrimination in different ways.  Some of this prejudice is 
historical and difficult to resolve, but there is also a vested interest in perpetuating the 
economic exploitation of migrant workers on an enormous scale to fuel development. 
 
The definition and understanding of citizenship in Thailand evolved through the 
establishment of Thai nationhood in context of French colonial expansion.  The Kingdom 
of Siam was replaced by the Thai Empire, or Thai-Land.  To compete with the French, 
Siam developed a new vocabulary or infused old terms, such as the 1902 word for 
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government, ratthabaan, or the word for nation, chaat35.  Traditionally, the meaning of 
chaat was ‘lineage.’  However, during this key period, the word assumed its modern 
meanings: citizenship, ethnicity/race, nation, naturalization, and so on36.  Armed with a 
language “capable of expressing precise formulations of the legal status of persons, and 
possessing a racialist consciousness,” the Thai elite could challenge French domination of 
the people placed under French control.37  So the language of citizenship and nationality, 
introduced by the colonial powers, established the boundaries of legal status for 
individuals, and defined the space where various groups were included or excluded. 
Language determined eligibility and the new documentary evidence codified citizens.  
 
Different groups still perceive citizenship in different ways today, contributing to some 
confusion over entitlements and rights.  According to a 2011 study by the United Nations 
International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Office for Asia and the Pacific, for example, 
most Thai people would offer only “limited support” for the rights of migrant workers.38  
Tragically, 84 per cent of Thai people interviewed for the ILO survey believed migrants 
had “broken the law” and “could not expect any rights.”39  Considering migrant workers 
comprise about only five per cent of the population, such attitudes confirm the depth of 
the problem in perception created by the use and abuse of language on legal status.    
 
Thailand is now, more than ever, a vibrant multi-ethnic political entity.  Akha, Hmong40, 
Mon, Malay, Lao, Lisu, Lue, Khmer, Karen, Shan, Wa, and other groups, co-exist within 
its borders.  Migrant labour has become absolutely essential to the Thai economy, and 
many migrants contribute meaningfully as citizens (in the moral, if not the legal sense) of 
Thailand, even if they might not have access to Thai nationality.  The large factories 
established in border towns (particularly in Mae Sai and Mae Sot) employing hundreds of 
                                                 
35 Streckfuss, 1993, p. 140. 
36 Streckfuss, 1993, p. 140. 
37 Streckfuss, 1993, p. 140. 
38 ILO, 2011, viewed 10 April 2013, http://www.ilo.org/asia/info/WCMS_159851/lang--en/index.htm 
39 ILO, 2011, http://www.ilo.org/asia/info/WCMS_159851/lang--en/index.htm 
40 Between 2006 and 2009, approximately 8,000 Hmong people were forcibly repatriated from Thailand 
and resettled by the Lao Government. Concerns regarding living conditions and access to fundamental 
human rights have been raised by Amnesty International (2009) and Human Rights Watch (2011).  It is 
believed a number of Hmong people remain internally displaced, fearing persecution (IDMC 2012). 
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thousands of migrant workers are testimony to this fact.  Systems to register and classify 
people along ethnic origins through identification cards have introduced discrimination, 
conflict and tension.  Access to citizenship is not equally available to all, and citizenship 
can be interpreted differently – or differentiated - to deny access to basic rights.   
 
The modern discourse of citizenship has established a complex vocabulary to 
discriminate between and categorise human beings according to a hierarchy of perceived 
social status.  We may be labelled citizens, denizens, subjects, (temporary and 
permanent) residents, dual-citizens, non-citizens, aliens, foreigners, outsiders, guest-
workers, illegal and irregular migrants, seasonal migrants, slaves, indentured-labourers, 
refugees and so on.  The individual is essentially a citizen, and each individual should 
have access to citizenship rights.  This is the basis of modern democracy and the 
international system of sovereign states, where citizens are divided into ‘nationalities.’   
 
Some people and groups exist in a space straddling several of these categories 
simultaneously, and others carry multiple identities beyond national boundaries.  The 
criteria for inclusion in society and the state are becoming increasingly complex.  The 
idea of citizenship can mean different things to different people, and, more importantly, it 
is also understood differently from place to place.  Citizenship can also be interpreted 
differently, often with disastrous consequences, by states and officials tasked with 
implementing policy such as registering migrants.  The problem is different people have 
different understandings of and racialist or class-based attitudes about what constitute 
citizenship and nationality.  This can become even more complex when social, cultural 
and linguistic interpretations of these terms become tangled with historical and ethnic 
categorisation.  Terms like ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ further complicate efforts to define 
citizenship and nationality within geographical boundaries, particularly when translated 
into other languages with older meanings.  Possibly the most widely understood element 




States have a legal “sovereign right” to devise nationality laws and immigration 
requirements as they see fit41.  People may be categorised by receiving States as nationals 
(citizens); legal aliens (foreigners legally in the State under its immigration laws); illegal 
aliens; stateless persons (with no state of nationality); asylum-seekers; and refugees.  
Some of the people in these categories may have more than one nationality. The full 
advantages of citizenship, including right of entry and access to the full range of public 
benefits and services, are usually accorded only to nationals.  Nationality, on the other 
hand, (a completely separate but related concept not to be conflated with citizenship), 
signifies the terms of the legal relationship between an individual and a State. It marks 
the legal link between the individual and the State.  Nationality is the legal categorisation 
of citizens allowing them to reside and identify themselves as members of a State.   
 
Nationals are also entitled to State protection, which is of increasing significance in the 
globalizing world with its large-scale movements of people. States have a corresponding 
duty, in international law, to admit their own nationals and allow them to reside in their 
territory.  These principles become blurred, however, where nationality can be ceded on 
departure without ‘proper’ notification.42 The unqualified right to hold the passport of the 
State is also a function of nationality.  Some states, however, restrict movement by 
denying access to a passport, or making it difficult to obtain one.   
 
Nationality is the legal basis for the exercise of citizenship. Although frequently used 
interchangeably with nationality, the term citizenship has a broader meaning, and denotes 
a status bestowed on full members of a community.  In most countries, access to civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights is predicated on nationality.  Nationality 
determines whether individuals are entitled to participate fully in the political process, 
including through voting, and to exercise the right to work, the right to education and the 
                                                 
41 United Nations, 2003, p.2. 
42 The Lao PDR has an inconvenient clause in its nationality legislation, which insists that a person who 
departs the country without permission is no longer a Lao citizen.  In practice, however, this is often 
overlooked, especially when repatriating undocumented labour migrants from Thailand.  Some other States 
(DPRK) automatically remove nationality, and others never withdraw nationality (Lebanon etc) no matter 
the circumstances.  This often creates consular problems with conscription and national service obligations.   
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right to health services.  And the right to access these services, and fulfil one’s 
obligations as a member of society, is where the boundaries of modern citizenship begin. 
 
Citizenship is about participation, membership, belonging and identity.  It implies access 
to a set of rights and privileges as well as obligations and duties.  Confusion arises when 
we compare citizenship as a legal status; membership of a political or ‘national’ 
community (or nationality); and citizenship as a normative process; a desirable activity; a 
model of how individuals conduct themselves in society.  Citizenship gives us the right to 
contribute to society as an equal partner, not as a labourer forced to perform a function.   
 
Citizenship in a global context, is a “mechanism of closure,” a legal and ideological basis 
for an enormous “filing system,” distributing human beings among nation states.43  The 
criterion for inclusion or exclusion is not always black and white.  It is the shades of grey 
where citizenship is not clear and the consequences can become a matter of life or death 
that are most problematic.  These shades may be highly personal, linked to an individual, 
a single family, or a particular group or groups, and may distinguish between people in a 
single family unit.  The better we understand the problems associated with access to 
citizenship, acknowledge their complexity, and act from a position of fundamentally 
protecting the rights of citizens within a broader framework of rights and obligations, the 
better equipped we are to introduce policy in the long-term interests of society. 
 
Ethnicity and race, the most oft-cited criteria for exclusion from a nation-state, are highly 
contested.  Weber, for example, dubbed racial identity a “particularly problematic source 
of social action” and highlighted the inevitable political association in determining 
common “inherited and inheritable traits” that actually derive from common descent.44  
Members of a ‘race’ need to consciously identify themselves subjectively as a group on 
the basis of shared political goals or actions, while outsiders who are “obviously 
different” are despised or “viewed with suspicious awe.”45  Physical differences are only 
one marker of social exclusion.  Cultural and linguistic differences are also significant.  
                                                 
43 Joppke, 1999, p. 629. 
44 Weber, 1997, p.15. 
45 Weber, 1997, p.15. 
36  
 
Thailand encompasses many different ethnic groups, and distinguishes and differentiates 
between them on the basis of race, occasionally on an arbitrary and restrictive basis.   
 
Prem Rajaram takes the modern notion of the outsider one step further in relation to the 
perceived harsh treatment and arbitrary detention of refugees by Thailand, labeling 
irregular migrants homo sacer, a legal term of ancient Roman origin employed to 
describe a condition or form of life that is essentially ‘bare’ or destitute.46  Rajaram likens 
the encounter between irregular migrants and sovereign states as one between the detritus 
(or refuse) and the ‘interiorised’ (of humanity).  He perceives refugees as not only a 
product of the international nation-state system, but an integral part of it.47  It is 
impossible to look at these terms and issues in isolation.  Nationality, ethnicity, race, 
citizenship, and class, are all inextricably linked, but not interchangeable.       
 
John Torpey coined the useful phrase “a monopoly on the legitimate means of 
movement” to describe how, in just a few centuries, states “successfully usurped” the 
right to restrict travel and habitation rights from rival claimants such as lords, monarchs, 
churches and private enterprises.48  These developments enabled states to claim control 
over the identity of their inhabitants, and place restrictions upon outsiders.  The 
introduction of documentary evidence, such as passport and immigration controls, 
dramatically altered the allocation of group identification within societies and across the 
globe.  Nation-states were handed unprecedented control over regulating the movement 
and identity of their subjects.  This is how Thailand and the modern international system 
of sovereign states maintains track of citizens and outsiders.  The provision of documents 
such as identity cards and passports has been the cause of much conflict in the previous 
century (South Africa’s pass system is a case in point), and some States disallow travel 
within boundaries without documentation (China and North Korea spring to mind).     
 
There is a growing field of literature, prompted by the increasing security and 
administration requirements imposed by states on their citizens, on the subject of 
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surveillance and the technological means of monitoring individual identity. John Torpey 
shows how the need for identification of individuals evolved rapidly during the French 
Revolution when passports and certificates of residence were introduced and eventually 
became “a way of life.”49  Then, as now, such systems were linked to an intricate register 
of births, residency, and State administration. Such documents were originally intended 
to restrict the travel of peasants into the cities, and up until recently this was still the case 
in modern China.  Debates continued in the context of the revolution about the 
“individual liberty” of each citizen to move about “within and outside the kingdom, 
without permission, passports or other formalitie.”50 The screws were quickly tightened 
by the revolutionaries following the flight of the French king in June 1791 when he 
escaped using a single passport covering the entire entourage of a noble.  The resulting 
anger, exacerbated by fears he might rally his followers to seize control of the fledgling 
state prompted the introduction of a strict regime of documentary identity, passport, and 
border controls in order to control movement. From these humble beginnings we 
inherited the modern passport system. 
 
Torpey coined the useful phrase; “a monopoly on the legitimate means of movement” to 
describe how, over the course of a few centuries, states have “successfully usurped” the 
right to restrict travel and residency rights from “rival claimants such as Lords, 
Monarchs, churches, and private enterprise.”51  These documents and developments 
enabled states to claim control through new methods of surveillance over the identity and 
movement of their inhabitants, and importantly place restrictions upon the entry of 
outsiders. The introduction of documentary evidence, such as passport and immigration 
controls, dramatically altered the allocation of group identification within societies and 
across the nation system throughout the globe.  Nation-states were handed unprecedented 
control over regulating the movement and identity of their subjects.   
 
The key message derived from these texts is the shifting emphasis by the state, in 
response to various stimuli of socio economic factors and events at various times, in 
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seeking to limit and restrict the movement of insiders and outsiders.  Whether or not this 
has been successful, or if we can place a value judgement on the benefits of surveillance 
to society or the State, depends on an analysis of specific historical events. But I would 
argue that despite the best efforts of nation-states to restrict travel and movement by 
documenting individual identity, nothing has prevented further migration where such a 
strategy meets the needs of individuals, or the economic needs of the State. 
 
The principle behind the practice of documenting individual identity is perhaps not 
entirely new. The tattoo, for example, has been employed for centuries to document 
ownership and allegiance. As Jane Caplan illustrated, the practice of “writing on the 
body” at one stage occupied “a kind of boundary status on the skin.”52  This practice has 
been used in Siam and many other countries as a means of surveillance and to ensure that 
slaves and subjects performed service.  Tattooing slaves was an important ritual; “an 
affair of State.”53  The means of surveillance has changed from ink and needles towards 
modern documentary evidence like identification cards, but the principle in denominating 
inclusion and exclusion from a polity, or denoting a certain status in a differentiated 
social stratification, remains roughly the same.  States continue to document identity in 
innovative methods to keep track of citizens and outsiders. 
 
Aside from a marker of exclusion, however, citizenship has an important social context. 
It is also about participation, membership, belonging and identity. Further difficulties 
emerge where modern nation-states are formed in the coalescence of competing loyalties 
and rival identities.  There are nation-states formed through struggle and social revolution 
(China), religion (Israel, Bangladesh and Pakistan), and political entities hewn from the 
map by colonial powers with scant regard for ethnic and cultural orientation (India, 
Myanmar, Indonesia, and much of Africa).  Citizenship boundaries are as diverse as the 
cultures and countries they represent.  Defining citizenship, and migration, in 
nationalistic and sovereign-territorial terms tends to exacerbate the sense of confusion, 
and the modern nationalist historiography highlighting the sovereignty of an international 
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system of nation-states contributes to the problem.  It is difficult to ascertain if historical, 
social, and political events have influenced the foundation and development of nationality 
legislation, or the other way around.  Either way, we have developed complex methods of 
surveillance for keeping track of citizens, dividing residents, and excluding settlers. 
 
Access to citizenship therefore implies much more than possession of documentary 
evidence of a nationality; an identification card, or a passport.  It determines eligibility to 
access a range of economic, social and political rights.  It provides people with the 
necessary credentials to participate as members of society and dictates the conditions 
under which that participation takes place.  Citizenship confers rights to access legal and 
social services; it can make it possible to send our children to school, to move about 
freely as we wish, and to participate in politics.  Citizenship is therefore a multi-
dimensional concept which guarantees the liberty of individuals to enjoy access to 
democratic processes as equal partners with a stake in the future of the collective.  It 
provides the basis for an equitable and stable socity.  More research is needed on the 
impact of the imposition of citizenship over traditional social systems to develop 
solutions to problems associated with statelessness and dispossession.   
 
Citizenship is almost universally acknowledged as a benchmark for admission not only to 
these national communities, but also to an intimately interconnected framework of 
sovereign states. Attempts at emancipation and unification by codifying ‘universal’ 
citizenship have normally resulted in criticism of a “lowest common denominator” 
approach, “an enforced homogeneity of citizens.”54  The very idea of what constitutes a 
citizen and citizenship is not universally understood or applied.  It is therefore subject to 
cultural and other interpretation.   
 
Defining citizenship, and migration, in purely nationalistic, ethno-racial, and sovereign-
territorial terms tends to exacerbate this sense of confusion.  The nationalist 
historiography has contributed to the problem.  Anthropologists acknowledge the 
existence of somewhere between 5,000 and 8,000 so-called ethnic groups around the 
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world.  Most states are shared by “more than one ethnic group and often by dozens.”55  
States were often formed, or have evolved, over the past few centuries for strategic 
reasons with little concern for traditional ethnic origins or practical boundaries. 
 
Two key legal principles guide citizenship entitlements: jus sanguinis (or blood law), and 
jus soli (or law of the soil).  In some countries - Germany for example – citizenship status 
is determined by blood (by descent or jus sanguinis).  In France, for a range of historical 
reasons, factors such as length of residency and being born within the state’s territory are 
more important (the right of territory or jus soli).  Other countries, especially migrant-
settler societies like Australia and the United States for example, legislate between 
citizens and aliens using a combination of both principles, the adoption of cultural criteria 
such as language, and the utterance of an oath of allegiance.    
 
Citizenship, therefore, implies more than nationality, race, or ethnicity.  It cuts through 
class, culture and identity as a marker of inclusion, a ticket for admission to a dominant 
group.  This group or groups determines who is eligible for citizenship, and who is a 
foreigner: an alien, by applying legal, racial, social, cultural, economic, political, 
historical, religious or ideological benchmarks.  The difficulty is situated in the existence 
of multiple pluralistic societies and modern nation-states formed in the coalescence of 
competing loyalties and rival identities.  There are nation-states formed through struggle 
and social revolution (China), religious identity (Israel, Bangladesh and Pakistan), and 
political entities hewn from the map by colonial powers with scant regard for ethnic 
composition (India, Myanmar, Indonesia etc.).  Citizenship boundaries are as diverse as 
cultures and countries.   
 
The notion, therefore, of what constitutes ‘ethnic groups,’  ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ is 
thoroughly contested.56  Globalisation, conflict, disaster, and the exodus of greater 
numbers of people across international boundaries, facilitated by quantum leaps in 
communication and technology, have virtually eroded the myth of the unitary sovereign 
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nation-state based on a pure ethnic or racial schema.  As nation-states seek to maximise 
comparative advantage in a global economy, differentiated associations of convenience 
imitate citizenship for some groups; the boundaries between citizens and denizens,57 
outsiders and aliens,58 have become blurred.  At the same time the universal adoption of 
an international system of ‘national’ enclaves requiring documentary evidence of 
citizenship has accentuated the gap between citizens and aliens.59 
 
States are therefore seeking to devise new methods to identify citizens and protect 
national borders through revitalised migration and citizenship policies.  DNA testing, bio-
recognition technology, holograms, ultra-violet symbols, magnetic strips and watermarks 
are soon to become the standard rather than the exception.  States and governments alike 
are concerned with the practical and theoretical challenges posed by dual and multiple 
citizenship, ‘refugees’ fleeing persecution and conflict, people trafficking, labourers and 
so-called ‘economic’ migrants.  These problems are not new, conflict and disaster having 
been a constant factor in the human condition, but the dimensions and the scale of the 
problem have changed.   
 
One of the most commonly advanced principles of international law by states is the 
'sovereign' right to restrict entry to all but their own citizens: the principle of sovereign 
inviolability.60  But the reality of global migration in the 21st century ensures that this 
principle, and the states that espouse it, are constantly confronted with hundreds of 
millions of people seeking residency or asylum every year.61  States ultimately determine 
who is eligible to enter, just as societies or football clubs, in theory at least, determine 
eligibility criteria for inclusion and exclusion.  On what basis do we decide who has a 
right to become a citizen and who should be excluded?   
 
Citizenship models have traditionally followed a template emphasising the centrality of 
                                                 
57 Denizens are persons who dwell within a country, as opposed to foreigners who reside outside its limits, 
who may have similar, but not the same, rights, obligations and privileges as citizens.  
58 Aliens are outsiders in the strictest sense, belonging to a foreign nation, allegiance or place. 
59 Torpey, 2000. 
60 Plender, 1988 p. 1.  
61 IOM, 2003. 
42  
 
the sovereign nation-state.  Individuals and groups balancing on the edge of national 
boundaries are therefore dependent on the political will and capacity of states to either 
include them, or leave them to wander unrestricted.  States, for their part, seek to adopt 
and adapt citizenship rhetoric to cope with the demands of ethnically heterogeneous, 
multicultural societies and a correspondingly pluralistic landscape.  In the past, borders, 
states, and nationalities were not strictly defined.  The problem is not so much the 
international system of sovereign nation-states, but the misguided perception and conceit 
that this present geographical model always existed and will exist throughout eternity.   
 
Ethnic minorities, women, the poor and disadvantaged, migrants, refugees, and their 
offspring are all, in theory at least, as human beings, inherently and inalienably, entitled 
to dignity, freedom, equal rights and justice under international law.62  In practice, 
however, human existence is bound within hierarchies of rights, locally, nationally and 
internationally.  The government of citizens within states and the governing of states are 
connected.  Citizenship is affected by global as well as local standards.63  Despite 
vigorous efforts to assert ideals like 'universal' citizenship and 'human' rights, there has 
only ever been partial agreement on how this might be achieved.  In assessing the 
complexity of these arguments, it is important to contrast the cultural and political 
differences between individuals, groups, and states.  Consider the right (or restriction) to 
have children, access safe abortion, the abhorrence of corporal and capital punishment, 
torture and arbitrary imprisonment, forced labour, slavery and so on.  Traditional 
methods of organising society and defining citizenship have impinged upon modern 
attempts to classify citizens where we opt to disagree on the forms and boundaries of 
inclusion.  But the politics of exclusion by the victors of conflict and control over the 
historical record of inclusion by the State sets the standards for restrictions on nationality.   
 
Citizenship is about participation, membership, belonging and identity.  One of the first 
hazards for researchers in attempting to analyse citizenship is the potentially enormous, 
even limitless, scope of the equation.  Debates about ‘citizenship theory’ can prove to be 
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immeasurably vast, because almost every political issue inevitably involves some 
assessment of the relations between individuals and society, citizens and the State.64  The 
second danger is the tendency to conflate two interrelated, and yet separate, aspects of 
citizenship: citizenship as a legal status, membership of a political or ‘national’ 
community (nationality); and citizenship as a normative process; a desirable activity; a 
model of how individuals conduct themselves in society.  Aside from a measure of who is 
accepted in or rejected by a country (or countries), citizenship also implies membership 
of a political community with expectations and obligations of participation.   
 
Nationality and citizenship are often uttered in the same breath as if synonymous, but 
they are in fact closely related ideas that should not necessarily be conflated.  Put simply, 
'nationality' refers to an individual’s legal status in relation to any given society, and 
'citizenship' to social status and the level of participation in, and membership of, a 
community.  Herein lies one dilemma in defining and debating citizenship.  Nationality, it 
seems, implies little more than possession of a passport and the utterance of an oath of 
allegiance.  It has become a choice of convenience for many people seeking to improve 
their personal circumstances by pledging multiple allegiances, while for others it remains 
a matter of life and death.   
 
Citizenship, on the other hand, implies the existence of a notion of all that is good about 
society: political participation, unity, shared obligations, and communitarian values.  
Citizenship is a normative concept - a utopian ideal - a set of criteria for inclusion in a 
model society.  The most important element for this research project is the grey area 
where citizenship cannot readily be determined: the gap between humanity and the 
human condition, those groups for whom the rules do not apply.  States make these 
definitions in isolation and apply them by using forms of surveillance and documentation 
like identity cards and passports.  States therefore determine who is eligible for 
citizenship and the documentation needed to differentiate between citizens and outsiders.   
 
The popular move by some states in the late twentieth century towards ‘e-citizenship,’ or 
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maintaining individual records electronically using bio-data implants, smart cards, 
computer records, DNA, face, and biological recognition checks, has exemplified the 
latest technological attempts by modern states to limit fraud, define national identity and 
‘nationality’ in legalistic terms, and ensure the exclusion of unwanted outsiders and 
aliens.  The more sophisticated the system, the more open it is to compromise by those 
determined to circumvent regulations.  This notion would appear to be supported by the 
evidence.  People smuggling and identity fraud have become an international growth 
industry parallel only to the drug trade and the illicit trade in flora and fauna.  Passports 
(and therefore citizenship) from Belize, Nauru, the Dominican Republic, and other 
fledgling states are available on the market for those who can afford them.65  The black-
market system, like the legal channels for obtaining citizenship, often does not 
differentiate between legitimate asylum-seekers, so-called ‘economic migrants,’ 
terrorists, criminals, and identity-shoppers.   
 
Citizenship, like most political ideas, is therefore a 'cultural construct' and there are many 
different conceptions of citizenship.66  Global capitalism and labour markets show no 
respect for national sovereignty or boundaries, and so-called 'economic migrants.' Aihwa 
Ong eloquently describes the existence of a kind of 'flexible citizenship' among the 
Chinese diaspora in Asia and in the West.67  Some industrialised states, or certain 
elements in their midst, initially encouraged immigration as a source of cheap labour, but 
later appear unwilling or unable to cope with the subsequent social obligations associated 
with making 'good citizens' out of masses of migrants.  Citizenship has a timeframe and 
some groups appear to be expendable or burdensome when it comes to concluding 
entitlement.   
 
Aihwa Ong sets up a welcome paradigm of the type of citizenship that transcends 
territorial boundaries, enabling the bearer multiple identities and access to different 
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societies on their own terms. This accurately applies to the Chinese diaspora, but may not 
be so readily acceptable for more exclusive nation-states such as Thailand or Malaysia.  
Ong’s account of mobility, identity, and multiple allegiances among the global Chinese 
community was enlightening evidence of the dangers associated with accepting a limited 
definition of citizenship tied within national boundaries.  Ong’s thesis shows how Asian 
societies can exist independently of the nation-state while claiming the nationality of 
whichever most suits their purpose.  In a number of cases this results in multiple 
identities across geographical boundaries. 
 
The ideology and principles of citizenship, as well as the traditions from which modern 
representative political systems are derived evolved from ancient Greek and Roman city-
states.  Athenians in the fourth century B.C. distinguished between citizens, slaves, 
metics, and travellers, to establish ranks of peoples under the sovereign.68  Ancient 
Romans were divided into “enfranchised Roman citizens” (cives Romani), 
"disenfranchised citizens” (cives sine suffragio), and individuals “too dangerous to be left 
independent, even under a treaty of alliance.”69  By the second century A.D, all free 
subjects in Rome were connected by citizenship acquired by birth, adoption, or gift of the 
magistrates.  Women and children, like slaves, were considered chattels and remained 
outside the spectrum of those persons eligible for citizenship.  Plato, of course, had much 
to say about the status of male and female citizens, particularly with regard to access to 
education, and the right to follow a range of occupations.70         
 
Universal suffrage is a relatively recent institution: women were politically enfranchised 
in Australia in 1902, in 1918 in Britain, in 1920 in the United States, and in 1944 in 
France.71  The links between gender relations and national construction are covered 
elsewhere, but control over women’s reproductive role through jus sanguinis has always 
been absolutely crucial to nationality and eligibility for citizenship.72  This explains why 
nations discriminated against the children of women marrying foreigners being eligible 
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for citizenship.  The same was not always true for men, whose children were generally 
entitled to citizenship without question.  
    
The ancient Greek city-states of Aristotle and Plato’s day, however, were structured 
around small close-knit societies united by kinship and blood relations.  Being a citizen 
depended on blood connections over at least two generations on both sides of a “citizen-
parent” and the State resembled a “family writ large.”73  Ancient Athenians excluded the 
majority of society by disenfranchising women, slaves and foreigners.  As Saul wryly 
puts it, while citizenship is a “reality inherited from Athens,” we have little choice but to 
accept it since democracy cannot function properly without it.  “But if the individual is 
not first a citizen, then the obligations and privileges that go with that status are 
effectively lost and the person ceases, to all intents and purposes, to be an individual.”74  
 
As a definition of legal status ‘nationality’ is relatively modern term.  According to 
Koessler, the ‘matrix’ of the word nationality evolved from the French nationalité.75  The 
labelling of individuals as citizens rather than subjects has its genesis in the French 
Revolution, which marked the important shift from absolutism towards republicanism.  
Prior to this, everybody was subject to the monarch or sovereign.  Afterwards, citizens 
owed allegiance to the nation, rather than obeisance as subjects of the sovereign in 
person.  Nationality introduced new methods of surveillance and allegiance to replace the 
links to a sovereign with links to the state.  There is residual confusion over the terms 
citizenship and nationality (as with ethnicity and race), which are often conflated, but are 
not interchangeable.  As demonstrated in the interviews conducted in this research, 
attitudes and awareness of citizenship rights, and what citizenship means, can vary.  
 
The difficulty in searching for a ‘universal’ definition of citizenship is also complicated 
by the fact that citizenship means very different things to different people.  This 
dichotomy is best illustrated through the dual relevance of citizenship as simultaneously a 
legal status (nationality) and a normative goal (participation as a member of society on all 
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levels; political, social, cultural and economic).  Nationality, the first step, denotes the 
status of an individual, or ‘legal person’ in relation to society; a sovereign state, or a 
political system.  It is the fundamental legal bond between an individual and a state that 
gives rise to “reciprocal rights and duties.”76  Membership, or participation, the second 
step, delivers the means to access a ‘trinity’ of political, cultural and social rights.77  It 
outlines the boundaries and rules of belonging.  Citizenship is therefore more than a legal 
claim to membership, or bundle of rights; it is a mode of incorporating society.  
 
The theoretical basis for this research is the assertion that citizenship is more than 
possession of nationality, an identification card or a passport.  Citizenship, most 
importantly, implies eligibility to access a range of economic, social and political rights.  
It provides people with the necessary credentials to participate as members of a given 
society and dictates the conditions under which that participation takes place.  Citizenship 
also offers rights to access legal and social services.  It can make it possible to send 
children to school, to move about as we wish, and participate in politics.  Citizenship is a 
multi-dimensional concept, which guarantees liberty to join in the activities of the 
society, to enjoy access to democratic processes as equal partners with a stake in the 
future of the collective.  Citizenship is therefore, theoretically, a universal right.   
 
It is widely assumed that whether one qualifies or not can be instantly and objectively 
determined by application of a simple formulaic eligibility test.  It all appears fairly 
straightforward, black or white.  In practice, however, there are hierarchies and different 
types of citizenship.  Citizens may be grouped according to membership of a limited 
national community, and as members of mythical or “imagined political communities.”78   
 
Benedict Anderson, who emphasised the importance of print media in guiding and 
forming modern nationalism, introduced another key paradox that has “perplexed and 
irritated” theorists of nationalism: "the formal universality of nationality as a socio 
cultural concept - in the modern world everyone can, should and will ‘have’ a nationality, 
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as he or she has a gender” as opposed to the “irremediable particularity of its concrete 
manifestations.”79  Nationality, according to Anderson, is therefore an ‘imagined’ 
grouping, dependent on access to language and culture, and compliance with social 
norms.  Exactly who is entitled to membership is then dependent on a range of factors.  
And to further complicate matters, all nations are pluralistic in racial, religious, and 
political composition.  Thanks to migration, too, societies are becoming more diverse.   
 
Membership - citizenship - of a national community implies acceptance of both rights and 
obligations.  To quote Coleridge (1772-1834): “there are no rights whatsoever, without 
corresponding duties.”80  Modern citizenship models attempt to balance rights and 
obligations to realise a ‘common good.’  Rights may be limited, differentiated, and 
dependent, not least upon the political will of states to provide for citizens.  The 
development of citizenship theory has inevitably hinged upon the Anglo-Saxon centric 
narratives of a gamut of predominantly British thinkers with the associated relativist 
notions of the ethical, moral, historical and theoretical tradition of the ‘collective’ good.  
The way we view citizenship is also linked to our view of human nature and individual 
rights as opposed to society’s needs.  Thailand’s model of citizenship, understanding and 
application of the principles, will be different to Germany, China, or India. 
 
The enormous economic, social, and political changes that took place through the 
colonial period, the industrial and technological revolutions, and the devastation caused 
by both the World Wars and other cataclysmic ideological battles such as the Cold War, 
sponsored a new type of citizenship.  Notions of ‘global citizenship’ are far from being 
realised, but more work on the division of ‘citizens’ along racial and territorial lines and 
the implications this holds for the nation-state is required.  Citizenship is inextricably 
linked to migration, as border and immigration controls arose as a relatively recent effort 
to restrict access to migrants for a range of reasons.  Migration is increasing for various 
reasons in spite of restrictions on the right to move between different regimes.      
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The Thai State has adopted a differentiated citizenship model, where human beings are 
ordered according to a complex hierarchical scheme of social stratification. Thailand is 
not unique in this regard; many modern states including immigrant societies like 
Australia and the United States, have also established complex social hierarchies of 
citizenship entitlements linked primarily to the period of migration and duration of 
settlement, but also to other more implausible and imperceptible criteria such as ethnicity, 
race, and notions such as claimed allegiance and perceived levels of assimilation. 
 
Thailand, which has historically employed large numbers of migrant workers and, like 
many other countries, has built a modern nation through internal and external migration, 
appears to employ a combination of jus sanguinis (right of blood) and jus soli (right of 
the soil).  Thailand has simultaneously transformed ancient methods of keeping track of 
subjects and citizen, and adopted modern legislative principles using documentary 
evidence to separate and distinguish between citizens, aliens and outsiders. In the 
process, it has created a complex hierarchy of differentiated overlapping layers of 
citizenship, best represented by a mathematical structure like a Venn diagram (see Figure 
1), where different groups emerge in and out of legal, illegal and semi-legal status.  In 
this model, there are different rules and rights for Thai citizens, aliens, migrant labourers 
and refugees.  Some groups merge in and out of others, and individuals and families may 
straddle both worlds across geographical boundaries.   
 
Citizenship status is not well defined by the Thai State, which does not officially 
recognise ‘refugees’ in the legal definition applied by the United Nations, perhaps due to 
the potential precedent this might create.  The public policy formulations developed by 
Thai decision-makers to deal with the complexity of a poly-ethnic society with 
ambiguous migrant labour practices and porous borders are mostly, therefore, reflective 
of national security challenges.   Policy has historically not followed a consistent pattern, 
but has been guided instead by elite actors and key events, historical prejudice, and the 
occasional tendency towards reactive political fixes.  Citizenship policy in Thailand is 
also influenced by bilateral relationships with other regional countries, particularly in 




Thai authorities have publicly offered Thai citizenship to individuals with special merit – 
such as the Thai Miss Universe, Vanessa Mae the violinist, and Tiger Woods.81  Thailand 
is certainly not alone in seeking to grant citizenship to sporting, musical, or social 
leaders, as it could be reasonably argued that such decisions contribute beneficially to 
enhancing the social fabric of the nation.  But concurrently there remain significant 
segments of the population who may have resided in Thailand for generations whose 
children are not citizens and are therefore not able to enrol in school, travel, visit a 
hospital, or participate in political processes.  The next chapter examines the theoretical 
importance of migration, identity documents, and surveillance to citizenship. 
 
  
                                                 
81  Tiger was granted ‘honorary’ (rather than full) citizenship due to Cabinet concerns about dual 
citizenship.  He was also reportedly reluctant to accept this honour, claiming Thailand discriminated 
against him and his family.  After his public admission regarding ex-marital affairs, however, Thai 
newspapers published headlines stating ‘Tiger Woods Really Is Thai’ (Bangkok Post, 30 January, 1997).   
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Figure 1.  The Differentiation of Thai Citizenship – Relationship Diagram 
 
This Venn diagram represents an abstract model of the relationship of key groups 
residing in Thailand and their proximity to the central goal of citizenship.  The inner 
space where the circles overlap represents those groups entitled to Thai citizenship.  
Outer circles signify groups at the extremity, who may be excluded from access to social, 
political, and economic rights by the State.  The overlap between the circles is 
intentional, as some groups do indeed overlap.  Some individuals and groups occupy 
several circles or chambers simultaneously.  A Hmong or Yao person, for example, 
working illegally in Thailand, fleeing China to have several children, might theoretically 
straddle all external circles without access to the centre. 
 
















5. The Importance of Migration: Surveillance and Identity 
 
Migration is central to citizenship, and citizenship laws in most countries have always 
been influenced by migratory practices.  But citizenship debates do not always revolve 
around matters of migration.  There are other factors and influences.  Migration is in 
itself a complex field of analysis.  Just as the idea of citizenship implies two processes; 
membership of a national community, and the corresponding existence of a set of rights 
and obligations: migration incorporates the physical act of movement, leaving one place 
in search of work or a better livelihood; and the act of settling and deciding to stay; 
becoming a citizen in the new place and not returning to one's place of origin.82   
 
It is helpful to set out some of the events and milestones in the history of migration at this 
point, as it contributes to a broader picture of Thailand’s current diverse ethnic 
composition as a factor of conquest.  This migration is in many ways a product of 
international or external events, and efforts to mitigate these through the development of 
nationality law and citizenship policy have met with limited success.  It is precisely 
because migration is a normal, and predictable, process that policy makers should seek to 
develop innovative and inclusive means of humanely incorporating outsiders and aliens. 
 
We inhabit a complex interrelated global society with a framework for the protection of 
human rights, but many international institutions are weak and ineffectual.  Border 
controls have failed to stem the increasing tide of migrants seeking economic success in 
more developed and affluent countries.  As the senior legal adviser to the UNHCR has 
stated, even if developed countries “were prepared to betray the very values on which 
their societies are based, by building new iron curtains and Berlin walls around their 
common territory, the human flood would still find its ways.”83  Similarly, many new 
migrants will seek better employment conditions in the work force in Thailand.  This 
flow of people will continue to test the processes in place to keep track of citizens and 
outsiders in Thailand, and place a considerable burden on existing social services. 
 
                                                 
82 Wang Gungwu, 1985, eloquently describes the duality of migration in the context of Malay history. 
83 UNHCR, 2000. 
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Compared to its neighbours, Thailand is an oasis of democracy and (relatively) a 
powerhouse of economic opportunity.  Indeed, in the decade from 1987 to 1997, Thailand 
was the world’s “fastest-growing economy.”84  Between 1985 and 1990 foreign 
investment increased tenfold.  Investors from Japan and other ‘Tiger’ economies moved 
to take advantage of the attractive combination of cheap labour and a competitive 
climate.  Local firms joined an orgy of investment in export-oriented manufacture.  
Demand for workers, combined with Thailand's high standard of social services and 
relatively open political system, enhanced the ‘pull factor’ for labourers from surrounding 
countries.  Development transformed Thailand from a net exporter to an importer of 
labour in a relatively short period.  Of course, migration is both an internal and external 
phenomenon.  Large numbers of people move within Thailand to take advantage of 
seasonal labour shortages.85  Large scale migration from Asia to the Middle East reached 
a peak in the 1980s.  By 1985 there were more than 3.2 million Asian workers in Gulf 
States; more than 2 million in Saudi Arabia.86  The number of Thai workers overseas 
jumped rapidly from 20,000 to 125,000 in a decade87.   
 
Thai migrant workers migrate to the Middle East, and Thai women are engaged in 
significant numbers Brunei, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan.  Taiwan is one of the 
world’s most populated countries, yet shortfalls have sponsored the large-scale 
importation of foreign labour.  In 1992 a foreign labour policy allowed greater access for 
foreign workers and about 68 per cent of foreign workers in Taiwan (around 150,000 
people) originated from Thailand.  Thai consular officials assigned to provide consular 
services to their citizens in Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore regularly recounted stories of 
abuse and exploitation.88  There are approximately 40,000 Thai workers in Japan, only 
half of which have legal status to remain in the country and the number of abandoned 
                                                 
84 Phongphaichit, 1998, p. 1. 
85 Fuller, 1990, pp. 534-562. 
86 Castles, 1998, p. 147. 
87 Castles, 1998. 
88 Conversation with Thai Official, Bangkok, December 2004. 
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children without citizenship continues to rise.89  These issues are also experienced by 
other South East Asian labour exporters, such as the Philippines and Indonesia.90   
 
Thai women are regularly trafficked to the sex trade, and many children from resulting 
liaisons end up stateless with limited access to services or identity documents.  The tragic 
case of Ms Puangthong Simaplee, a highlander from Chiang Mai, smuggled to Australia 
as a sex worker at the age of twelve, is a sad example.  Ms Simaplee died fifteen years 
later in Villawood Detention Centre “in a pool of vomit” after immigration officials 
raided a Sydney Brothel.91  She was originally smuggled into Australia using a fake 
Malaysian passport.  Thai consular officials told the researcher that arrests involving sex 
workers in Australia were often difficult to resolve as the documentation used to transport 
women to Australia was invalid, making identification and repatriation problematic.       
 
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) reports that Thai emigration is 
routinely characterised by “trafficking in women, illegal recruitment of workers, 
excessive placement fees that leave workers in virtual bondage, and other abuses.”92  The 
exodus has resulted in labour shortages and gaps in Thailand, filled by migrants from 
Myanmar and Laos.  There is a hierarchy of suffering based on comparative perceptions 
of wage and other advantages across different economies. 
 
The number of illegal migrants in Thailand is variously estimated at between 2 and 4.5 
million.93  The majority of illegal labourers in a registration drive were from Myanmar 
(81.7 per cent), with smaller numbers from Cambodia (8.7 per cent), Laos (3.7 per cent), 
and a trickle from China, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka (many of whom travel onwards to 
Malaysia and other countries).94  Some are fleeing persecution, poverty, and ethnic 
conflict.  Others are seasonal agricultural workers.  Migrant labour is encouraged in 
                                                 
89 Bangkok Post, 25 September 2001. 
90 Blackburn, 1994. 
91 Sydney Morning Herald, 13 March 2003. 
92 IOM, World Migration Report 2000. 
93 US State Department, 2012. 
94 Kwen Fee, 2002, p. 309-331. 
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certain sectors (fisheries, agriculture, and construction) for economic purposes.95  The 
circumstances and conditions of labourers on Thai fishing boats are particularly brutal: 
 
Men remained at sea for up to several years, were not paid, were forced to work 
18 to 20 hours per day for seven days a week, and were threatened and physically 
beaten. 58 per cent of migrant fishermen trafficked aboard Thai fishing boats 
reported witnessing a fellow fishermen killed by boat captains in instances when 
they were too weak or sick to work.96 
 
Migrant labourers, provided they can locate a sponsor willing to comply with legal 
registration requirements and pay required fees, are free to work and reside in Thailand 
temporarily.  Despite repeated registration efforts, large numbers of migrants remain 
beyond state control (or protection).97  328,122 migrant workers were registered in 1996, 
and about 260,000 were repatriated (mostly to Myanmar)98.  Many later returned to 
Thailand.  There are many barriers to registration, which we will explore further.   
 
Migration has always been a natural occurrence in human existence.  It must be 
understood as normal and permanent, rather than unusual and temporary.  Solutions to 
the challenges of migration must reflect this fact.  Human beings spread out and settled 
tens of thousands of years ago in response to a broad range of environmental and other 
stimuli.99  Migration has accelerated at peak times in association with certain key events.  
Forced migration due to institutional slavery, imperialism, colonisation, industrialisation, 
the decline of absolutism (Russia and China), the two ‘World’ Wars, the ‘Holocaust’ and 
its aftermath, the so-called ‘Cold’ War, the Indochina Wars, the change in Hong Kong's 
status to a Special Administrative Region, and the ‘War on Terror’ have all presented key 
landmarks in the mass movement of people.  There will no doubt be more to come. 
 
                                                 
95 US State Department, 2012, p. 338. 
96 Us State Department, 2012, p. 338. 
97 Bangkok Post, 19 July 1997. 
98 Bangkok Post, 19 July 1997. 
99 Diamond, 1997. 
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The rise of commercial slavery as an institution in the 15th century, for example, 
witnessed the forced migration of hundreds of millions of human beings across 
continents.  It permanently altered the demographics of receiving states, in many cases 
decimating, displacing, or outnumbering the original ‘native’ occupants, and source 
societies, particularly in Africa, were profoundly and irreparably damaged by the tragic 
impact of the forced removal of so many of their members.  The researcher has visited 
refugee camps in Africa as well as historical sites such as Cape Coast in Ghana, where 
the slave trade reached its peak.  European nations, notably the Netherlands, and 
England, made economic fortunes and became large powers on the trade in slaves.        
 
From a Siamese perspective, King Chulalongkorn’s landmark legislative reforms to 
abolish slavery reflected international social changes, including the abolition of slavery, 
and aligned Siam with other ‘civilised’ nations, to protect Siamese sovereignty from 
foreign colonial predatory interests.  The reforms introduced by Chulalongkorn also 
succeeded in establishing a plausible legislative framework, paving the way for the 
introduction of a constitutional monarchy in 1932.  King Chulalongkorn’s preoccupation 
with Western (British) manners and customs profoundly influenced his efforts at 
reforming Siamese institutions.  In 1871, three years after his coronation, the young king 
(at the age of 18) travelled to British colonies in Singapore and India, and the Dutch 
colony of Java.  His exploration of the outside world and the experiences her contributed 
on return permanently altered the Siamese world-view, resulting in the introduction of 
documentary evidence to keep track of citizens and outsiders.  
 
In 1971 the war leading to the establishment of Bangladesh forced 10 million people to 
flee to India, the ‘largest single displacement of refugees in the second half of the 
twentieth century.”100  Over two decades since the mid-1970s, two million Vietnamese, 
Lao and Cambodian refugees were resettled in other countries, “around 1.3 million of 
them in the United States.”101  Nine million people went on the move following the 
                                                 
100 UNHCR, 2000, p. 6-10. 
101 UNHCR, 2000, p. 7. 
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dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.102  Ethno-nationalist claims for independence in 
former empires (like Russia and Indonesia) and humanitarian emergencies in Africa and 
the Middle East have accelerated trends.  Half a billion people pass through America's 
borders each year, including at least 8 million suspected illegal immigrants.103  In 2000, 
the UNHCR estimated that 20 million 'persons of concern' were seeking asylum around 
the world.104  By 2012, this figure had jumped to nearly 30 million105.  One in every 
hundred people around the world now lives outside their country of birth.106  The 
evidence confirms that migration, particularly within Asia, is increasing at a rapid pace, 
and will continue to do so.  This movement will place increasing pressure on 
governments to introduce more inclusive citizenship policies to maintain social stability.   
 
As the scale of migration has peaked and waned at certain times, the role and practices of 
states in monitoring and controlling the means of movement has also changed.  Up until 
the twentieth century, labour was considered a scarce and sought-after commodity.  The 
need to establish a work force, maintain military capacity, and extend the state’s 
influence through population growth in outlying areas encouraged and promoted 
migration as a tool, including by coercion and force if necessary.  Large populations were 
valuable for economic purposes.  Identity was monitored by appearance and cultural 
characteristics, and outsiders labelled accordingly.  People were bought and sold. 
 
Papers were not required and migration from Europe to the ‘New World’ in North 
America and Australia was actively encouraged.  It was not until 1793 that restrictions 
were first placed on migration when England introduced an ‘Alien Bill’ to provide 
protection for local labour markets107.  America followed suit with the introduction of the 
‘Chinese Exclusion Act’ in 1882 to restrict the large influx of Chinese labourers, 
heralding the start of a more restrictive international migration regime.  The 1880s 
witnessed the advent of mass transportation and the facilitation of labour migration 
                                                 
102 UNHCR, 2000, p. 9. 
103 Corbin, 2002, p. 176. 
104 UNHCR, 2003. 
105 UNHCR, 2012. 
106 Los Angeles Times, 6 April 1998. 
107 Rystad, 1992, p. 1169. 
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through the introduction of the steamship.  The combination of a decline in the Chinese 
dynastic state and the economic opportunities available abroad witnessed the movement 
of greater numbers of Chinese labourers at the turn of the century.  States reviewed their 
policies in response to the influx of Chinese and immigration controls became the rule 
rather than the exception.108   
 
During World War I, states began to take a more active interest in the movement across 
borders of potential enemies, systematic immigration controls were introduced, and the 
passport became a necessity.  After the war, immigration controls were sustained to 
protect labour markets from unwanted foreign competition.  The same protectionist 
policies that hampered rade and contributed to global depression were effectively applied 
to limit migration.  The exodus of large numbers of refugees during and after World War 
II coincided with an increasing demand for labour in industrialised states.   
 
By the mid to late 1970s, the world witnessed the wholesale introduction of more 
stringent immigration controls.  Legal migration to industrialised countries was limited to 
family reunification and those persons seeking political asylum.  The repercussions of the 
‘Vietnam’ War witnessed the largest organised migration in history since the abolition of 
institutional slavery.  Legal labour migration to Europe declined as the demand for 
labourers decreased, and the flow of illegal migrant labourers increased.  The late 1970s 
up to the end of the 20th century witnessed the end of the Cold War, the decline of the 
Soviet empire, and the fragmentation of states in Eastern Europe.  Overpopulation, 
environmental degradation, natural disasters and resource mismanagement, (most of 
which are interlinked and related) further stimulated international migration.    
 
Migration is a constant phenomenon that has waxed and waned at different stages in 
human history.   Likewise, the scale of the challenge posed to states by migration is 
steadily increasing.  The majority of these changes have taken place over the past 50 
years, and migrants have faced varying degrees of acceptance in destination countries.  
The way outsiders and aliens are viewed by society has also changed over time.  While 
                                                 
108 Torpey, 2000, p. 96-101. 
59  
 
accepting the need for labour, particularly at the bottom end of the social scale, many 
societies and states are suspicious of migrants, and have introduced new methods of 
surveillance and restrictions on access to citizenship.  Let us now take a look at the 
history of attempts to define citizenship and the efforts of states to provide a justification 
for determining who should be accepted and excluded from a given polity.    
 
Migrant labourers are often the most vulnerable and least protected members of society.  
They are subject to abusive, exploitative and discriminatory treatment and are required to 
perform the so-called “three-Ds” (dirty, difficult and dangerous) jobs shunned by 
locals.109  Fortunately, an international framework exists which offers some protection, 
and recognises that workers and migrants have certain fundamental and inalienable 
rights, regardless of their legal status.  Unfortunately, implementation of these 
instruments is often a matter of political will, and is limited by a range of historical, 
social and economic factors.  This thesis is primarily about Thailand’s experience with 
defining citizenship, but the theoretical analysis of citizenship and migration apply 
equally to most other modern countries with a significant number of migrant labourers.     
 
Hollywood is churning out blockbusters about action heroes valiantly rescuing shipping 
container-loads of helpless immigrants, victims of rent-seeking syndicates and vicious 
people-smugglers rather than their own agency.110  Tragically, of course, these images do 
have a basis in reality.  In June 2000, 58 Chinese migrating from Fujian Province 
suffocated in a shipping container abandoned in Dover.111  In October 2001, an 
Indonesian fishing boat (now known as the SIEV X) with 397 asylum-seekers on board 
disappeared en route to Australia.112  There were only 44 survivors.  In December 2001, 
Irish Police discovered 8 Eastern Europeans, including two children and an infant, dead 
inside a furniture container shipped from Milan.113  In March 2002, the bodies of 13 
Burmese labourers, their necks broken by unscrupulous employers who refused to pay 
their salaries, were discarded in rice sacks at a rubbish tip in Bangkok, Thailand.  The 
                                                 
109 Abella, 2002, p. 1. 
110 A common theme in movies: ‘The Transporter’ (2002) is one example. 
111 The Guardian, 8 December 2002. 
112 Refugee Action Committee 2002.  The acronym ‘SIEV’ stands for Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel. 
113 New York Times, 9 December 2001. 
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month before, the mangled bodies of 17 ethnic Karen workers were found in a stream in 
Tak.114  Despite the grave risks, more and more people are making the journey.  Each 
new story appears to eclipse the horror of the previous tale.  The economic advantages 
outweigh the dangers so people are still moving to follow economic opportunities.   
 
As we enter the 21st Century, citizenship and migration rate among our most contentious 
political, economic and social issues.  Trafficking in human beings and people smuggling 
are a massive global industry115.  The United Nations estimates human trafficking 
generates around 10 billion dollars each year, second in scale only to narcotics and arms 
trafficking.116  The flow-on profits associated with this phenomenon, in sexual servitude 
and debt bondage, exceed hundreds of millions of dollars.  It is estimated that 
approximately 27 million people worldwide are subject to some form of slavery or debt 
bondage, and the majority of these are women and children.117  Displacement of human 
populations has been necessary to make way for infrastructure projects from the Great 
Wall to hydro-electric dams, or as a result of natural disasters.  Many states, particularly 
net exporters of labour like the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, are now highly 
dependent on remittances: income generated by citizens labouring abroad.  The next 
chapter examines the historical and other factors that have contributed to the present 
situation in Thailand.  What have been the primary causes of migration in Thailand?     
                                                 
114 Bangkok Post, 6 March 2002. 
115 These terms are often confused and conflated.  Facilitating illegal entry to another country (people 
smuggling) does not, in itself, constitute trafficking, although large-scale transfer of illegal migrants may 
offer evidence of human bondage.  
116 Abella, 2002. 
117 US State Department, 2012. 
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6. Slaves, Tattoos, Mandalas and Migrants   
 
 
This chapter explores the categorisation of society in pre-modern Siam.  In the space of a 
few decades around the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Siam was notionally transformed from a feudal society heavily reliant upon 
slave labour, to a modern nation-state with a dynamic economy and wage labour system.  
In the early twentieth century the Kingdom of Siam evolved into the Kingdom of 
Thailand and permanently changed the means of monitoring and keeping track of people.  
To appreciate current circumstances and the implantation of a differentiated citizenship 
model, it is important to acknowledge of historical developments.  In many respects, 
contemporary social structures and class barriers continue to be influenced by ancient 
methods of stratification. Debt bondage and other forms of slavery are still widely 
practiced, and the current differentiation of Thai citizenship on ethnicity, class, and other 
criteria are not recent phenomena. 
 
In early Siam, the populace was divided into ‘muang,’ or 'cities' of varying greatness.  
Within these disparate but interrelated polities, subjects claimed allegiance to and 
protection from a sovereign, or sovereigns.  To conceptualise the muang, the sovereign, 
the subject, and the nature of their interaction, it is useful to first focus on early Siamese 
social formations.  Tambiah’s “galactic polity” and Wolter’s “mandala” could more 
accurately depict geo-spatial realities in ancient Siam than terms like 'cities' or 'states.’118  
 
The mandala, a Sanskrit word for ‘circle,’ denotes the metaphysical representation of a 
sacred realm, the abode of a deity, or deities, in heaven.  In a Siamese political context, it 
offers a mode of human rather than geographical investigation.  According to Wolters, 
the mandala is “a vaguely definable geographical area without fixed boundaries where 
smaller centres tend to look in all directions for security.”119  It epitomises a dispersed yet 
structured model of political organization, and represents an attempt to classify and 
modulate the unique pattern of political organization and citizenship in early Siam.  The 
                                                 
118 Tambiah, 1977, p. 69-97.  Wolters, 1968, p. 166-78.  Stuart-Fox, 1996, p. 3-4. 
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introduction of geographically marked territorial boundaries by colonial powers marked 
the displacement of shifting networks of kingdoms and empires linked by blood and 
allegiance within and beyond Siam.    
      
The subjugation by the Siamese of the Khmer empire at Angkor, and the subsequent 
adoption of Khmer systems of social organization and notions of kingship, for example, 
permanently altered the relationship between sovereign and subject in Siam.  The Khmer 
Empire relied on captive labour to achieve the important infrastructure projects extending 
the ability of the monarch to support large populations.  In the fifteenth century the 
Siamese kingdom of Ayuthaya conquered the Khmer at Angkor Thom.  In addition to a 
treasure of looted silver and gold, the Siamese returned with “civil servants, philosophers, 
legal advisers and the whole system of government of that great empire.”120  The 
accomplishments made possible by systems of social organization in Khmer civilisation, 
impacted significantly on Siamese society.    
  
The gap between the monarch and subject in Ayuthaya was expamded.  Ayuthayan kings 
were deified; as incarnations of divinity they were “absolute monarchs who wielded all 
powers, executive, judicial and legislative.”121  The character of the Siamese state and the 
nature of kingship were transformed.  'Devarajas,' or God-Kings, and Chakravartins - 
“Universal Sovereigns” - exercised absolute power.122 Siamese rulers inherited a 
boundless capacity to guide and protect subjects, the legal system, and the prevailing 
social order.  The king embodied righteousness, justice, and law.  The language of a 1740 
royal decree clearly illustrates his absolute power: 
 
Only the king is the highest in the land, because he is Godlike.  He can make the 
superior person (phu yai) be the subordinate person (phu noi) and vice versa.  
When the king gives an order, it is like the axe of heaven.  If it strikes trees and 
mountains, the latter cannot withstand it, and will be destroyed.123   
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Siamese subjects were forbidden to gaze upon the face of their rulers for fear of severe 
punishment.  When the king left the palace, subjects were obliged to lower their heads 
lest an earthenware pellet be shot into their eyes by the king’s guard124.  Men, women and 
children were “chattels,” who could be bought or sold at will125.   In an account of his 
mission to Siam in 1821, the British envoy, Dr John Crawfurd, reported: 
  
Among the Siamese, the distinction of castes has no existence, and in so far as 
religion is concerned, there is no hereditary privileged order.  Except official rank, 
which is entirely personal, the only civil distinctions among them are of freemen 
and slaves.  Slavery is an established institution, and it is thought that about one-
third part of the Siamese nation is bondsmen.  These are of three descriptions, 
namely prisoners of war, parties sold for a consideration by their parents under a 
written contract, and parties who mortgage their services in liquidation of a debt.  
The second class is the only one not redeemable, and the last the most numerous.  
We are assured by the bishop of Siam, that the Siamese treat their slaves with 
kindness and humanity, exacting from them no severe labour, and treating them 
rather as domestic servants than bondsmen.”126 
 
Wars were fought for the purpose of capturing slaves to build cities.  Populations were 
captured and relocated to be put to work (as slaves, corveé or bonded labourers).  Corvée 
was a form of labour, often unpaid, imposed on people of lower social standing by the 
state or elite (noble). Corvée differs from slavery as the worker is not owned outright, but 
required to provide labour. The worker is not, or may be partially, compensated and may 
only work on a specific task.  People, not territory, were the object of battle, the building 
blocks to create a stronger state.  The purpose of warfare was not to capture territory and 
hold it, or, as it appears today - to control markets or resources and enforce a dominant 
ideology of economic and social organization – it was to capture populations to serve as 
subjects and labourers.   
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In a dissertation on the institution and abolition of Siamese systems of slavery, Chatchai 
Panananon observed: “Rarely do we see the victor control the land of the loser as a result 
of his victory; instead those captured in wars were placed into bondage.”127  Bruno 
Lasker, in a description of the character of human bondage in Southeast Asia accurately 
wrote: “Only one condition seems to be present wherever human bondage survives in any 
form.  Always there lies back of it a history of war and conquest.”128  The practice of 
conquest and slavery introduced a system of social stratification that survives today. 
 
Indigenous systems of bonded labour or slavery were not uncommon in the Philippines 
before the arrival of the Spanish colonialists, and war captives were also employed in 
public works in seventeenth century Java and Myanmar.129  During the colonial era (c. 
1840 – 1940) slavery was well established as a ‘legitimate’ global economic activity and 
a significant source of revenue.  In a complex process of ethno-spatial ordering, ‘slaves’ 
were drawn from a pool of war captives; human tribute in a civilizing mission to modify 
ethnic groups in Siam for the economic benefit of the state.  
   
While there is evidence of the use of bondage, corveé, and slave labour before the 
Ayuthaya period, the use of slaves reached its zenith during the period of reconstruction 
after the Burmese destruction of the Kingdom of Ayuthaya.  The defeated Siam was 
sparsely populated and desperately in need of workers to boost economic capacity in a 
new era of vigorous international trade.  The Siamese therefore conducted deliberate 
‘slave raids’ against the Lao and other minorities to rebuild the population.  King 
Taksin’s “search for regalia,” for example, provoked a series of bloody battles, 
culminating in the sacking of Vientiane, not once, but twice, in 1779 and 1827.130   
 
Forced migration after this “conflagration” has been estimated at between five thousand 
families (in French chronicles), one hundred thousand people, and more than three 
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hundred thousand people (according to the Chiang Mai chronicles).131  The long war and 
the “systematic displacement” of the Lao from the east bank of the Mekong provided 
Bangkok with “abundant manpower” and ethnic Lao residing in Thailand outnumber 
their cousins in Laos two to one.132  The slaves and conquered populations were brutally 
chained together and marched to Bangkok in convoy from different directions, creating 
hostilities that remain exposed and unresolved with neighboring countries to this day.  
 
The basis for social organization in the early Bangkok period (1782-1873) stemmed from 
the idea that the sovereign owned “not only all the land within the kingdom, but all the 
people who owed allegiance to him.”133  Siam’s legal system was inextricably linked to 
the system of kingship, as the purveyor of justice and holder of supreme merit (bun), and 
other moral concepts in Buddhism.  Codification and enactment of Siamese law, central 
to the monarchy’s key role as upholder of ‘sacred’ law, was the Thammasat, a complex 
legal code inspired by the Hindu dharma-sastras inherited from the Mon civilization.134  
The Thammasat, a fundamental source of legitimacy in pre-modern Siam, sets out the 
moral basis of laws and the origin of kings.  It defines the relationship between the 
individual subject and the ruler in religious terms, and proscribes the norms by which 
rulers, societies, and individuals might be morally governed in their actions.  This basis 
for law has developed significantly in modern Thailand, but existing principles and 
prejudices ensure class and ethnicity guide responses to citizenship and other legal rights.     
 
In response to dissatisfaction with the outcome of a divorce case involving allegations of 
adultery with a judge, a Royal Commission was convened to recommend and implement 
a systematic revision of Siamese law.  The result, introduced in 1805, was known as Tra 
Sam Duang or the Law of the Three Seals.  This revised legal code formed a basis for the 
introduction of modern statutes and principles, many of which are in circulation today.  
The code was divided into 39 chapters, or laksana, such as laksana rap fong (law of 
plaints), laksana phua mia (law of husband and wife), or laksana that (law on slavery).   
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Siam gradually enhanced its interaction with European powers, and slavery (that) was 
formally abolished in 1905.135  The Court established new systems of social and political 
control to increase economic activity.  The system of periphery states paying tribute 
(song suay), for example, was continued until the late nineteenth century when it was 
discontinued and replaced by an economic and social system dependent on taxes.  
Education and taxation models were introduced along with modern bureaucratic methods.  
Bureaucratic reforms placed limitations on the power of officials.  The influence of the 
Siamese State spread further to outlying regions using a modern military and weapons 
 
Chinese influence in South East Asia pre-dated European settlement, and there is solid 
evidence that Chinese merchants were active in Siamese ports since the fifteenth 
century.136  The Chinese junk trade vastly outstripped British (East India Trading 
Company) international commerce of the era and the period 1740-1840 was feted as ‘The 
Chinese Century.’137  Chinese immigration to Siam increased at an exponential rate due 
to a combination of political unrest in China and the wealth of economic opportunities 
available in Bangkok.  King Taksin (1767-1782), himself the product of a Sino-Siamese 
union, provided “extraordinary encouragement” to the voluntary immigration of hundreds 
of thousands of Chinese to fuel Siam’s recreation.138  From around 10,000 in 1660, the 
Chinese population reached 230,000 by 1825, and 300,000 by 1850.139  In 1802, three 
quarters of Bangkok’s population were of Chinese origin.140  Thailand’s modern 
prejudice and differentiated citizenship model is the product of the establishment of these 
historical patterns of influence.    
 
The influx of large numbers of people posed complex organisational challenges.  Intricate 
systems of social stratification and identification were developed out of the traditional 
framework of patronage systems.  Siamese subjects were thus cast in a hierarchy of nai 
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(masters), phrai (corvee), and that (slaves).  Men, women and children were bought and 
sold in a market.141  The system was militaristic in intent.  Nai were responsible for 
mobilising phrai under their charge for battle.  The corresponding number of phrai 
assigned to each nai, denoting their relative power and influence in society, was 
determined by the sakdina principle.  Sakdina, or ‘dignity’ marks offered a scaled method 
of determining a male human being’s worth and social rank by the amount of land 
allocated to them.142  It was one of the various systems of “honorary tokens, such as the 
great array of ranks and titles, the system of paraphernalia such as fans and betel boxes, 
and the practice of allowing a person to adopt a new name as he rose through the 
administrative hierarchy.”143 
 
The position of women was subject to their relative status.  Rabibadhana notes that 
offering a daughter to the palace was considered the “highest form of gift-giving.”144  It 
was important in “keenly competitive circles” to have a member of one’s kin “as close as 
possible to the source of the royal power.”145  Women of noble birth were afforded royal 
titles, but children of slaves were born into perpetual servitude and bondage.     
 
Tattooing or ‘marking the body’ was widely employed as a method of determining 
identity and status.  The tattoo designated a “boundary status on the skin.”146   It was a 
“marker of difference, an index of inclusion and exclusion to mark off entire civilisations 
from barbarian or ‘savage’ neighbours.”147   The only extant decree of King Taksin was 
that of 1774 requiring every phrai be tattooed with the name of their nai (master) and 
town of residency.  The regulation prescribed death for daring to use a counterfeit 
tattooing needle, or falsely tattooing phrai to claim ownership.  There is no prior 
evidence of tattooing as an identification of status in Siam.   
 
The stated reason for this practice was to ensure all subjects performed ratchakan (royal 
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service; military and corveé labour).  The tattooing of phrai was considered an extremely 
important ritual, “an affair of state.”148  The practice of tattooing was not discontinued 
until the nineteenth century. 
 
In the Ayuthaya period (1350-1767), Chinese migrants were ordered within a structured 
system of identification marks.  “Everyone fitted into the system, so that local born 
Chinese had to remain under the Chinese master of their father or seek out a Thai 
patron.”149  Thai were subject to corvée and tattooed by their masters, while Chinese, in 
lieu of corvée, were subject to a tax, which was identified by a wrist tag.  The two groups 
were easily identified by either a tattoo, cropped hair, or a wrist tag and a ponytail.  The 
Thai was required to perform corvee, and the Chinese paid the triennial tax.  “It was 
impossible to do neither or mix up the components of the alternatives.”150  The system 
employed visual (tattoos, wrist bands, ponytails, and clothing etc.), rather than 
documentary (identification cards, passports, house and migrant registrations) evidence to 
distinguish and differentiate between subjects, citizens, and outsiders in a hierarchy.   
 
After establishment of the capital in Bangkok, social controls were restructured with a 
view towards increasing economic activity on a European model.  Public education and 
taxes were introduced.  Bureaucratic reforms placed limitations on the power of officials 
and diminished the status of the nobility.  Bangkok’s influence spread through the 
provinces with the establishment of a disciplined military using Western weapons and 
standards.  Corvée was replaced by hired labour, and slavery eventually became an 
anachronism.151  The decision to abolish slavery in 1905, partly a gesture to impress upon 
Europeans the level of Siamese sophistication, was also motivated by the realisation that 
slavery could no longer serve the state’s long-term economic requirements.  The Siamese 
rulers became highly successful in emulating colonial states by constructing railroads, 
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centralising administration, and extending Bangkok’s influence to regional centres.152  
Siam became a modern nation with new methods of surveillance.   
 
The superimposition of foreign political ideas permanently changed Siam.  While 
colonialism in the nineteenth century “manifested itself in the abrogation of unequal 
treaties, seizures of territory, and the breakup of royal monopolies, the most profound 
menace (for Siam) was ideological.”153  Europeans arrived armed with “legal, 
anthropological, political, and geographical categories more challenging in the long-run, 
than gunboats and cannons.”154  Siam changed, not by the invasion of a foreign military 
power, but the introduction of Western ideas about surveillance and political structures. 
  
Siamese peoples were organized and labeled according to a pre-determined set of 
Western ethnographic criteria.  The Siamese adopted a differentiated social structure with 
Bangkok overseeing the ‘Others Within.’ The state and elites developed a system of 
tattoos and other visual evidence along ethnic and class boundaries determining the 
criteria for inclusion and exclusion.  The Siamese elite claimed a superior place, ordering 
subjects in the new “linear cosmic order called civilization.”155  Class became a factor in 
determining access to citizenship by denoting certain ethnic groups as uncivilized and 
unworthy.  The same perceptions created from this exclusionary principle have persisted 
and moderate access to Thai citizenship today by differentiating between eligible groups.   
 
Siamese relations with the French deteriorated into territorial conflict in the late 
nineteenth century as the French colonialists sought to acquire areas traditionally under 
Siamese control and influence.  In a dramatic stand-off known as the ‘Paknam Gunboat 
Diplomacy’ incident, France threatened to bombard the royal palace in Bangkok from a 
warship in 1893. The Siamese monarch was pressured (under extreme duress) into 
relinquishing all formerly sovereign territory ‘East of the Mekong.’ The Franco-Siamese 
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Treaty of 1907 awarded Siamese tributaries in Laos and Cambodia to France and 
established the modern borders of all of these countries.   
 
Another challenge emerged in the foreign, unfamiliar battleground of legal terminology 
and anthropological determination.  Under Article 4 of the 1893 Franco-Siamese treaty, 
the Siamese were ordered to “hand over all French, Annamite, and Laotian subjects of the 
left bank, as well as Cambodians detained under any pretext whatever.”156  The French 
aimed to cast the Siamese as usurpers, gain control of Lao and Cambodian subjects 
residing in Siamese territory, and claim sovereignty over the territory that these people 
might have inhabited within Siam.  The French negotiated hard for the Siamese to accept 
the status of French protégés and the Siamese rallied strongly against the proposition.   
 
The draft treaty specified that any people under French jurisdiction who wished to do so 
could register at a consulate and receive French protection.157  The language of race was 
invoked by the French colonialists to reclassify the Siamese as a “race mixed with the 
Chinese,” unworthy of the control they held over the population.158  The Thai elite 
emerged “armed with the medium of a newly infused language capable of generating the 
nationalist consciousness, rhetoric and world view that have defined the boundaries of 
modern Thai thought and identity.”159  Thailand was forced to adopt the language of 
nationality and citizenship and restructure society accordingly.   
 
The invention of the steamship and the introduction of regular passenger-steamer traffic 
to Bangkok in 1882, coupled with a demand for labourers to build roads and railways, 
and dramatic political unrest in China and Indochina (including the end of Absolutism in 
China following the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty by the nationalists in 1911), 
greatly accelerated the pace of Chinese migration to Siam160.  Siam’s treaties with Japan 
and Britain influenced its reception and treatment of Chinese migrants following the 
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prolonged Sino-Japanese territorial conflict and the Civil War in China and the founding 
of the Republic of China.   
 
The Siamese State effectively assimilated Chinese migrants by enforcing a decision in a 
“clear and conscious choice” regarding nationality.161  It was incumbent upon children 
and grandchildren of Chinese migrants to make a decision regarding Siamese nationality.  
This avoided the creation of an “intermediate Sino-Thai society separate from the 
majority Thai society.”162   So where other colonized countries in Asia, such as Indonesia 
and Malaya, created complex hierarchies where ethnic Chinese existed in a social 
position superior to native inhabitants below the colonial powers, Siam encouraged full 
assimilation of Chinese migrants to ensure cohesion.  Siam gradually inherited Chinese 
cultural and social customs and adopted business and other practices that exist today.  
 
Chinese labourers paid a moderate tax once every three years by visiting the nearest 
police station.  They received a receipt in the form of a wax seal, which they wore on 
their wrists to show the authorities, “who were extremely active for a few months" that 
the tax had been paid.163  In 1910, Chinese labourers rioted over the imposition of a new 
head tax.  The steady increase in Chinese immigrant labourers, merchants and their 
entourage encouraged debate on the introduction of a nationality law to clarify the 
“official and legal status of Chinese residing within Siam” and resolve the threat posed by 
French claims on ethnic Vietnamese, Cambodians and Lao residing on Siamese soil.164   
 
International events and alliances undoubtedly played a large part in the establishment 
and development of nationality law in Siam.  There is evidence that bureaucratic reforms 
introduced by King Chulalongkorn emulated not only the Western model, but also 
followed a strikingly similar path to the Japanese Imperialist and militaristic ideology 
introduced during the Meiji restoration in Japan 1868.  Siam’s alignment with the 
Japanese during the Second World War was historically important, but the process of 
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political alignment actually commenced many years before. Siam’s restrictions upon the 
rights of foreign nationals in the Kingdom were guided by this alliance.  
 
The following chapter outlines the development of identity documents and the legal 
processes used by Thailand to keep track of outsiders and citizens.  The establishment of 
national identity was crucial to this process and determined the criteria for inclusion 
exclusion.  The introduction of identity cards followed a long process of alternative 
methods of surveillance.  Nationality laws, as in most countries, were determined in 
response to specific historical events.  The next chapter sets out the development of 
various documentary forms of evidence that have evolved into the current system of 
keeping track of citizens and outsiders in Thailand. 
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7. Documenting Nationality and Citizenship in Thailand 
 
 
This chapter highlights the historical changes to nationality law, and other important 
events leading to the present circumstances in Thailand in determining who is entitled to 
nationality and citizenship.  The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a detailed 
analysis of all the legislation, but to emphasize the timing of key changes, how this was 
linked to various historical events, and how this impacted on the population for various 
reasons.  The objective is to place the current difficulties faced by outsiders in achieving 
basic citizenship rights within the context of the historical data on legislative changes.  
 
Siamese historical attempts to introduce nationality laws and place restrictions upon the 
immigration of aliens from abroad must be seen against the backdrop of similar activities 
abroad.  In 1882, for example, European immigration to the United States peaked as 
improvements in mass transportation led to cheaper transatlantic passage.  The United 
States adopted the Chinese Exclusion Act prohibiting the importation of Chinese contract 
labour for ten years and an Immigration Act was introduced to exclude “persons likely to 
become public charges.”165  Australia adopted the racist ‘White Australia’ Policy in 1901.  
 
At the start of the 20th century Siamese citizens were still considered ‘subjects.’  The 
word “nationality” was expressed as “under the dependence of” and, in the absence of 
any treaty provisions to the contrary, all residents were considered to be under the 
authority or “dependence” of Siamese Kings.166  Land and other possessions (including 
people) belonged to the sovereign.  Individuals had limited rights over their own destiny:    
 
Mr Masao, acting judicial adviser to His Siamese Majesty writing in 1906 to Mr 
Westengard, acting general adviser to His Siamese Majesty, said that, "we have so 
far neither a law of citizenship nor a naturalisation law."  This must be taken to 
mean that there were no express legislative enactments.  Practice had established 
the following rules:  All Asiatics residing in Siam were considered Siamese until 
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there was proof to the contrary.  All Europeans were foreigners, even those born 
and established in Siam for generations.  The word "nationality" in Siamese is 
expressed by the phrase "under the dependence of..." and all persons, from the 
Siamese point of view, were under the dependence of Siam if there was no treaty 
provision to the contrary.  The effect of marriage on nationality was not very 
clear, though as a general rule the wife followed the condition of her husband.167 
 
Mr Masao’s insightful efforts were rewarded when a naturalisation law (No. 130) was 
passed on 18 May 1911.  A nationality law followed soonafter on 10 April 1913.  In the 
original 1911 naturalisation legislation, the power to determine nationality was vested in 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs.  Thailand’s Nationality Act of 31 January 1952 passed 
this role to the Minister for the Interior, recognizing the importance of the legislation for 
social cohesion and internal security.  
 
Before 1911, no formal legal framework existed to differentiate between Siamese 
subjects and foreigners.  Europeans were considered ‘foreigners’ (regardless of whether 
they were born in Siam and had lived there all their lives or not).168  Siamese were 
peremptorily labelled ‘Siamese of Chinese origin’ or what (one scholar) confusingly 
labels ‘Nationality: Thai, Sovereignty: Chinese.”169  They were considered Siamese by 
virtue of the fact that they were, in all respects, subjects, under the authority of the king.    
 
The Naturalisation Law No. 130 of 18 May 1911 
 
The turmoil associated with changing economic conditions in Siam, contributed to the 
introduction of a Naturalisation Law (No. 130) on 18 May 1911.170  The Minister for 
Foreign Affairs was responsible for charge and control of the law and aliens could apply 
to be naturalised as a Siamese subject provided they could demonstrate that they were: 
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1. Of full age according to Siamese law and to the law of his (sic) nationality; 
2. Residing in Siam at the time of application; 
3. Residing in Siam for not less than five years; and 
4. A person of good character and in possession of sufficient means of support. 
 
Under Article 12, the wife (or wives) of a naturalised subject became “as of right” 
Siamese subjects.  Under Article 15, every Siamese subject who became the subject of a 
foreign state lost the “special rights attached to the status of a Siamese subject.” 
 
Chinese residents were previously accustomed to a moderate tax once every three years, 
when they were required to pay a visit to the nearest police station.  They received a 
receipt in the form of a wax seal, which they wore on their wrists to show the authorities, 
“who were extremely active for a few months" that the tax had been paid.  In 1910, the 
Chinese rioted over the imposition of a new capitation (head) tax.171  The steady increase 
in Chinese immigrant labourers, merchants, and their entourage encouraged debate on the 
introduction of a nationality law to clarify the “official and legal status of Chinese 
residing within Siam” and resolve the threat posed by French claims on ethnic 
Vietnamese, Cambodians and Lao residing on Siamese soil.   
 
The Nationality Law of 1913 (B.E. 2456) 
 
On 10 April 1913 Siam introduced its first ‘Nationality’ Law.  The Minister for Foreign 
Affairs retained control and eligibility for Siamese nationality was limited to: 
 
1. Persons born to a Siamese father on Siamese territory or abroad;  
2. Persons whose mother is Siamese and whose father is unknown; 
3. Persons born on Siamese territory  
4. Women of foreign nationality married to a Siamese; 
5. Aliens who have acquired Siamese nationality by naturalisation. 
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Under Article 4, a Siamese woman who married an alien lost her Siamese nationality if 
by his national law she acquired the nationality of her husband.  Under Article 5, Siamese 
subjects could not relinquish their nationality without state sanction, probably so they 
could not be arbitrarily declared French citizens.  The Act contained adequate provisions 
for acceptance of both jus sanguinis (by descent through a Siamese parent) and jus soli 
(for persons born on Siamese territory) to obtain nationality.  Notably absent from this 
particular legislation, however, was any reference to the description of ‘alien.’  Nor is 
there any guidance on who might be considered ‘Siamese.’  It is assumed that Siamese 
mothers and fathers knew who they were at the time the legislation was introduced.    
The Nationality Act of 10 April 1913 granted citizenship to persons born with a Siamese 
father. This Act was fundamentally revised in 1952, and again in 1965.  On 13 December 
1972, coup members led by Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn introduced the 
Revolutionary Act 337 revoking the citizenship of children born in Thailand to ‘alien’ 
parents. Aimed at countering the threat of communism, the Act specifically targeted 
Thai-born children of Indochinese parentage.  This highly offensive rule was only 
annulled as recently as 1992, after extensive lobbying by community groups and activists.  
Prior to the 20th century, most Siamese and immigrants used only one name.  On 1 July 
1913, King Vajiravudh introduced a requirement for all citizens to adopt surnames (nam 
sakun) in order to resolve confusion associated with population increases.  Mr Bua, the 
Ambassador’s secretary in the Thai Embassy in Germany, was credited with this 
initiative.  During his time abroad, a Mr Bua apparently recognised the need to adopt 
surnames in keeping with European tradition and selected his own surname from his 
mother’s ancestors (Bua Tong In).  Chinese residents combined 'clan' or guild names with 
Thai surnames (Sae-Ang etc), and later adopted Thai names.  Most Thai citizens now 
have a first name and a surname in the European tradition, as well as a nickname.  This 
ordering process was an important part of the steps leading towards the introduction of 
identity documents and modern surveillance, resulting in contemporary citizenship. 
 
King Vajiravudh's reign (1910 - 1925) introduced an entirely new perspective on the 
utility of Chinese immigrants.  Fear of Chinese economic and political dominance 
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encouraged a series of administrative and social reforms. Suspicion of Chinese intentions 
capitulated in 1911 following the overthrow of the Manchu Qing Dynasty and the 
proclamation of the Chinese Republic in Nanking on 1 January 1912.  Presumably there 
were concerns that Republicans amongst the Sino-Siamese might influence local views 
and the Siamese elite would meet a similar fate.  Racism reached a spectacular peak in 
1914 when King Vajiravudh published an infamous tome under a nom de plume 
(‘Asavabahu.’) denouncing the Chinese influence entitled “The Jews of The East.”   
 
As previously noted, World War I (1914–1918) brought a swift end to ‘laissez faire’ 
migration.172  Foreigners were no longer perceived as benign, and suspicion of outsiders 
mounted with the rising conflict.  Documentary evidence of nationality, such as a 
passport, was universally required.  This was a global phenomenon not unique to Siam.   
 
Chinese society in Siam, and local perceptions of the success of their assimilation, 
changed again with the arrival of larger numbers of Chinese-born females.  Before 1914, 
Chinese women were forbidden from leaving China, and Chinese male immigrants to 
Siam could apparently ill afford to bring their wives.173 Chinese males had previously 
intermarried exclusively with the local population.   
 
In 1910 a Chinese woman was a rare sight in the streets of Bangkok; twenty years 
later there were hundreds of them to be seen.  By 1937, the number of (Chinese 
Born) Chinese females was, according to the census, 189,000 as compared with 
336,000 (Chinese Born) males.174   
 
Before 1911, all children born in Siam were considered Siamese “unless registered by 
their parents with the legations of the powers with which Siam had treaty relations.”175  
This was a dilemma as China and Siam did not establish treaty relations until 1946, and 
there were no consulates where children could be registered.  Children of Chinese 
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nationals born in Siam before 1946 were considered Siamese.  By 1929 the number of 
Chinese descendants in Siam had reached around 113,050.176  
 
In the wake of World War II, Siam changed its name to Thailand (Prathet Thai) for the 
second (and, so far, final) time, reinforcing a new national consciousness.  The tide of 
millions of refugees spilling across Europe led to the establishment of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees with a correspondingly European outlook.  The 
communist rebellion in China culminating in the proclamation of the Peoples' Republic 
of China on 1 October 1949, witnessed a new wave of Chinese migrants arriving in 
Thailand without papers or proof of nationality.  
 
After initial concern over the potential anti-state - especially republican - activities, of 
Chinese nationalists, the Siamese political and security apparatus shifted focus towards 
the potential threat posed by the Chinese communists.  Revolution in China had 
effectively polarised the Sino-Siamese community, which was split into factions 
sympathetic to communists and nationalists, each with its own political ambitions.  
Political events in Thailand were undoubtedly also influenced by the dramatic 
transformation taking place in China.  Extreme nationalists like Phibun Songkhram 
managed to retain control in the face of more democratic opposition.  Fear of 
communism fuelled suspicion of outsiders and influenced the prevailing political climate.   
 
The Korean War from 1950 to 1953 turned up the heat on the Cold War.  Communism 
was banned in Thailand.  In 1951, agrarian reform in China, the San Fan (Three Anti) and 
Wu Fan (Five Anti) movements unleashed violent campaigns affecting millions of people 
in China.  The Kuomintang army, their families, and others associated with the nationalist 
movement fled in haste to Myanmar and Northern Thailand, arriving progressively in 
Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and Mae Hong Son, where many of their descendants remain 
today.  A number of interviews with their descendents were conducted for this thesis.   
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Thailand's Department of Local Administration documented the following movements: 
 
x In 1954, Thai authorities registered and issued white identity cards to 13,143 
Chinese nationalist former soldiers; 
x Between 1950 - 1961, yellow identity cards were issued to 7,814 'Jin Hor' 
migrants, claiming to be descendants of the nationalist soldiers, and; 
x Between 1962 and 1989, orange identity cards were issued to a further 16,581 'Jin 
Hor Issara' - or Free 'Hor' Chinese claiming to be descendants of the nationalist 
Chinese soldiers and the earlier 'Jin Hor' migrants.177 
 
The Nationality Act of 1952 
 
The enormous social and political changes that had taken place over thirty-nine years 
since the enactment of Thailand’s first nationality laws, not least the change of the 
country’s name from Siam to Thailand, prompted the Thai government to introduce the 
1952 Nationality Act (B.E. 2495), superceding the Naturalisation Act No. 130 of 1911 
(B.E. 2454) and the Nationality Act of 1913 (B.E.2456)178.   
 
Responsibility for application of the Nationality Act was removed from the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and provided to the Minister for the Interior (Mahathai), whose power 
was exercised through a delegated ‘competent official.’  The tone of the 1952 Nationality 
Act reflected social and political changes that had taken place in the country, and the 
need to more closely define eligibility for Thai citizenship.  There would be no further 
significant changes to the legislation for forty years until the issuance of the 1992 Act.   
 
The 1952 Nationality Act introduced the following definition outlining the difference 
between Thai citizens and aliens: 
 
'Thai' means a person who has Thai nationality; 
'Alien' means a person who has not (sic) Thai nationality. 
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This was the first time that the Act had attempted to procure a strict definition of ‘Thai-
ness,’ and the definition itself can only be described as absolutely brilliant in its 
simplicity.  The second component part of the definition, that of the ‘khon dtang dao’ or 
‘aliens,’ also makes it clear who is eligible and who is not eligible for citizenship and 
who constitutes an outsider for the purposes of the law. 
  
Under Section 7, the following persons were eligible to acquire Thai nationality: 
 
1. Persons born of Thai fathers, whether born in the Kingdom or elsewhere; 
2. Persons born of Thai mothers, whether born in the Kingdom or elsewhere, whose 
lawful fathers are not known or have no nationality; 
3. Persons born of Thai mothers in the Kingdom. 
 
Under Section 8, foreign women who marry a Thai national would acquire Thai 
nationality, but not alien men who marry Thai female citizens or their descendants. Thai 
women who married aliens would automatically relinquish Thai nationality provided that 
they were eligible to acquire their husband’s nationality.    
 
Under Section 9, aliens could apply for Thai nationality under the following conditions: 
 
1. They must have attained the age of sui generis in accordance with Thai laws (21 
years of age) and the laws of their own nationality; 
2. They must have been domiciled in the Thai Kingdom continuously for not less 
than ten years up to the day of filing the application for naturalisation; 








The Nationality Act of 1965 (B.E. 2508) 
 
The Nationality Act of 1965 was introduced during of the Cold War and the associated 
Indochina conflict, which witnessed the unprecedented migration of large numbers of 
refugees into Thailand.  There is nonetheless little substantive change between the 1952 
and 1965 Nationality Acts. The 1965 Act provides for some gender equality by 
introducing the word ‘mother’ in the first point of eligibility for nationality in Section 7, 
so “persons born of fathers and mothers who are Thai nationals, inside or outside the 
Kingdom of Thailand” are eligible for Thai nationality by descent.  The interpretation of 
this clause, however, resulted in denial of Thai nationality to many of the children of 
mixed relationships as persons born of a Thai mother were not considered eligible.   
 
The Nationality Act of 1992 (B.E. 2535) 
 
The 1992 Nationality Act sought to incorporate the many social changes that had taken 
place in Thailand since 1965.  The biggest change was not the introduction of new 
legalistic language or ritualistic rhetoric about what it means to be Thai, but the 
introduction of a single two-letter participle  – the word ‘or’ – which effectively provided 
retrospective eligibility to Thai nationality for thousands of children born to Thai 
mothers.  Thai nationality was now available for persons born of Thai fathers or mothers.     
 
The increasing number of foreign males resident in or passing through Thailand during 
the ‘Vietnam’ era and the subsequent tourism boom of the 1980s and 1990s produced a 
large number of mixed-blood children (‘luk kreung’), the offspring of a union between 
Thai mothers and foreign (mostly Caucasian) fathers.  This dilemma was (im)politely 
referred to in Thailand as the problem of the ‘kao nork na,’ or ‘rice growing outside the 
fields.’  These children were excluded from education, medical and other social services 
due to their ineligibility to apply for documentation proving their identity.  They were 
born ‘non-citizens’ and the difficulties associated with their condition only increased as 
they came of age.  The Nationality Act of 1999 introduced a significant change to allow 




Nationality is often perceived in terms of defending racial purity or sovereignty and 
security.   There is a sense of confusion expressed overtly in the Thai nationalist 
discourse, evident King Vajiravudh’s writings, to over-emphasise the need to “re-assert, 
and re-discover Thainess.”179  This same emphasis continues to be an important objective 
for the Thai State.   
 
In a scandalous display in 1996, for example, then Prime Minister, Banharn Silpa Archa, 
was ridiculed and (eventually) removed from office as a result of negative publicity about 
his Chinese ancestry, his own, and his family’s uncertain Thai citizenship status, and his 
lack of formal education.180  Prime Minister Banharn was subjected to intense scrutiny 
following opposition claims to being in possession of documents providing that 
Banharn’s father, a Chinese migrant by the name of Seng Kim, had originally migrated to 
Thailand in 1937 (instead of 1907, according to the Prime Minister).  The issue centred 
on the question of whether Prime Minister Banharn was born in China in 1932, and was 
therefore excluded from holding political office, or was born in Thailand of Chinese 
parentage.  The government produced photocopies of alien registration documents 
allegedly proving the Prime Minister’s citizenship status by demonstrating that his father 
had migrated to Thailand in 1907, but these were considered by the opposition parties to 
be of doubtful authenticity.181  The original documents were never tabled.  Prime 
Minister Banharn resigned in September 1996 in the face of opposition to his economic 
management credentials, questionable citizenship status, and lack of educational 
qualifications.   
 
Identification cards and house registrations 
 
In 1963 (B.E.2506), in response to the perceived Chinese threat, the Interior Ministry 
(Mahathai) introduced a national identification card system, documenting and identifying 
those with a legal right to reside within Thailand.182  The identification card system is 
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180 Bangkok Post, 21 September 1996. 
181 Bangkok Post, 1996. 
182 Sor Playnoy, 2002, p. 52.         
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linked to a nationwide system of household registrations (tabian baan), which uniquely 
identify all occupants of a certain address.  To obtain an identification card, a person 
must first present a copy of their household registration documents.  This presents a 
number of problems, particularly where people cannot demonstrate their right to land, or 
where they are homeless or stateless.  In 1995, the Thai government introduced a national 
computer-based registration system in an attempt to eradicate identification card fraud.   
 
Identification cards in Thailand are the most important signifier of status, and the key to 
understanding the differentiation of citizenship into categories.  Without an identification 
card, it is legally impossible to travel, engage in employment, attend school, seek medical 
treatment, or participate in political activity.  Of course, many people manage to perform 
many of these activities and operate on the fringe of society as ‘stateless’ individuals.  
They are subject to arbitrary arrest and detention, exploitation, and abuse by authorities 
and employers alike due to their illegal status.  Registration provides for a series of 
temporary documents for migrant workers, which are similar to identification cards.  The 
process for gaining access to these documents is difficult and can be subject to corruption 
or discrimination, depending on the circumstances.  In the past it was possible to obtain 
false documents, but this has become more difficult with technological advancements. 
 
Identification cards are uniquely numbered, and all Thai authorities know the meaning of 
the numbering system that classifies migrants and citizens into the differentiated 
hierarchy.  It is possible to determine, simply by examining the registration number on a 
person’s identification card how they obtained citizenship, if their parents are Thai, when 
they obtained the card, and therefore their place in the social strata of Thailand.  The 
numbering system on the cards is the key to understanding the differentiation of Thai 
citizens and migrants.   
 
Each identification card has a series of unique numbers, each of which has a meaning 
known to the officials who examine them183.  The numbers identify the category of the 
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person and their status in Thailand.  A person can change their name if they wish, but the 
number on the identification card can never be changed.  Identification cards are used as 
a means to access all social services, including bank accounts, schools, hospitals, and for 
identification in case of police checks and so on.  The identification cards include a 13 
digit sequence of numbers that clearly identify the category of person. 
 
The chart at Appendix 3 lists the various categories of identification cards, denoted by the 
first digit in the sequence (and easily recognizable to any person with knowledge of the 
categorisation process).  Identification cards are mandatory in performing day to day 
transactions, and are often required to enter restaurants, hotels, or other establishments. 
On 8 December 2001, then Interior Minister Purachai Piusombun announced that 
obtaining Thai citizenship would be more difficult in the future as the government sets 
“stricter criteria for naturalization.” The government will be "tougher and more careful" 
in bestowing Thai citizenship, as it provides eligibility for public benefits, including 
hospital care and village-fund loans.184   Restrictions on citizenship increase along with 
the demand for access to social services and governments seek to protect sovereignty. 
In March 2002, Purachai announced a bold initiative to introduce a new "era of e-
citizenship" where "all-purpose identification cards will carry essential information about 
Thai citizens, including digital codes of fingerprints and DNA185."  The new cards, which 
will remain valid throughout a person's lifetime, will replace identification cards, 
household registrations, tax ID cards, social-security cards and driving licences.  In 
Bangkok plastic identification cards are now issued with magnetic strips, like a visa or 
MasterCard, but in the provinces the older cardboard laminated cards are still in 
circulation.  This system has placed a new social stratification template over urban and 
rural dwellers.  The Labour Ministry is encouraging migrants from rural areas to register 
in Bangkok so they can participate more fully as citizens in the community.  
Unfortunately, many people will never be able to take advantage of the new 
opportunities, or comply with the demands for documentation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
184 The Nation, 8 December 2001. 




Citizens and outsiders are therefore labelled according to a unique documentary system 
denoting ethnic exclusion and the fortune (or otherwise) of having been born and 
registered in a particular place in a particular time.  Children whose parent or parents 
might not meet the full criteria may be falsely registered by other relatives to attempt to 
circumvent the system and ensure they have access to social services.  The next chapter 
examines the circumstances of different ethnic groups in Thailand in order to highlight 
the diversity of approaches towards classification and codification of citizenship in line 





8. Ethnicity and Citizenship in Thai Geo-Politics 
 
 This chapter will briefly describe the circumstances facing some groups of migrants in 
Thailand.  It is not intended to provide a detailed comprehensive historical survey of the 
circumstances of each ethnic group in Thailand.  The objective is to offer a summary of 
key developments and add context to the case studies and interviews on Shan experiences 
to illustrate the different ways individual cases have been managed by the Thai State.  
There are also significant groups not included in this chapter (such as the Mon, for 
example).  A detailed treatment of each group has been the subject of independent 
research in other studies, but little has been done to place all these issues in context from 
the perspective of access to social services and citizenship. 
 
Since the 'Indochina' wars officially ended in 1975, several million people from Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia fleeing conflict in their homelands have sought asylum in 
Thailand.186  Some 370,000 Indochinese refugees were repatriated from Thailand within 
a year following the Paris Peace Agreement.187  In addition, the Thai Government is also 
cooperating with the UNHCR to process over 110,000 refugees in 11 camps along the 
Thai-Myanmar border.188  While it offers sanctuary before resettlement in third countries, 
Thailand is not a signatory to international refugee conventions and tries not to accept 
refugees as permanent settlers.189  Outsiders are therefore classified as 'migrants,' 'illegal 
workers,' or 'registered aliens.190 While a number of refugees inevitably end up in 
factories or building sites in Bangkok and the provinces as illegal labourers, they cannot 
legally look for work and are subject to detention, or residing in legal limbo awaiting 
resettlement in third countries like Australia, Canada, France or the United States. 
 
At various stages, for strategic reasons, Bangkok has been comfortable with the 
ambiguity surrounding the status of migrants and minority groups.  As relations have 
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190 Department of Local Administration, 1999, (in Thai). 
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improved, and 'battlefields' have transformed into 'marketplaces' there are signs that this 
policy is gradually being dismantled.   
 
In a revealing admission in 2002, for example, then Prime Minister Thaksin declared an 
end to the ‘buffer state’ policy, where military support was clandestinely provided to 
rebel groups in border regions.191  Thaksin subsequently rescinded his remarks, claiming 
he was misquoted by a media keen to 'sensationalise.'  Defence Minister, General 
Chavalit, attempted to come to the Prime Minister's aid with an explanation that the 
buffer-state policy, which he had himself exploited in the 1980s, was “old, outdated and 
long discarded.”  Former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai weighed in with criticism of 
Thaksin's statement, but agreed the buffer policy was ancient history, which had been 
abolished when Gen Prem Tinsulanonda was Prime Minister in the 1980s.  Chuan added 
that “Thailand helps refugees for humanitarian purposes, but does not favour rebel forces 
over neighbouring governments.”192  The changing political circumstances resulted in 
less sympathy for the remaining refugees, who had become a burden to Thailand’s new 
regional relationships and economic ambitions.    
 
Political expediency contributed unwittingly to refugee policy and Thailand’s approach to 
migration and citizenship was formed through its objectives in regional conflict and 
related security issues.  These events have resulted in a complex series of migratory 
patterns and residual problems with long term refugees.  The following sections focusing 
on different groups identify some of the complex circumstances and key events that 
identify the need for a broader and more inclusive citizenship policy in Thailand.   
Myanmar 
 
Thailand’s stormy relationship with, and the political and economic situation inside, 
Myanmar, has contributed to mass migration and difficult circumstances for a number of 
significant ethnic groups now residing inside Thailand, including Mon, Karen, Shan, and 
others.  The history of violent border conflict between Myanmar and Thailand (similarly 
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with Cambodia and Laos) has resulted in a complex web of citizenship and migration 
issues, which will be examined briefly in the following pages.  Thailand has benefited 
economically with a flourishing border trade at the border towns of Mae Sai and Mae Sot 
providing a wealth of consumer goods to Myanmar.   
 
Thailand’s relationship and strategic interests in Myanmar have changed from historical 
enmity towards promoting peace and prosperity.  The researcher watched at Thailand’s 
strategic boder with Myanmar at Mae Sot as long convoys of trucks passed through with 
emergency assistance during cyclone Nargis in 2008.  Thailand officially despatched 
US$100,000 in food and other supplies, thirty tonnes of medical supplies and twelve 
tonnes of food supplies from the Red Cross. On behalf of the Thai Government, Health 
Minister, Chaiya Sasomsap, sent medical supplies valued more than one billion baht 
($31.3 million) to Myanmar and dispatched twenty medical teams and disease supression 
units193.  These were the first medical and food supplies to reach Myanmar after the 
cyclone and contributed to emergency response after the disaster.  The relationship 
between Myanmar and Thailand, however, has not always been amiable.   
 
Myanmar’s history and struggle for independence, and the relationships between various 
ethnic groups within and beyond its borders, have created significant conflict, particularly 
along Thailand’s Western border regions, where there has consistently been a level of 
ambiguity regarding nationality and citizenship.  Groups like the Mon, Shan, and Karen, 
reside in significant communities across both countries with cultural links transcending 
geographical borders.  The longstanding brutality of the regime in Myanmar in 
attempting to resolve issues surrounding ethnic identity and insurgency through forced 
labour, forced relocation, rape, and murder, is well documented194.  This has contributed 
to the problems faced by Thailand in keeping track of outsiders and providing citizenship 
rights and basic services to the population.    
 
                                                 
193 Thai Rath, 5/7/2008. 
194 See, for example, Thornton, 2006. 
89  
 
A fundamental principle of the current global economic system is that capital almost 
always moves towards the location where there is the cheapest production (other factors 
being equal).  Unfortunately this can mean that those jobs will also disappear the moment 
a better alternative is located, or the status quo becomes uneconomical or unviable.  
Thailand’s borders with Myanmar have become increasingly saturated with factories 
taking advantage of the availability of a seemingly unlimited supply of cheap unregulated 
labour.  Enterprises can employ many thousands of workers in a variety of trades. 
Workers from Myanmar are permitted entry to Thailand under a registration scheme, 
involving payment of a bond, but many simply cross the border without documentation 
and many employers do not bother to go through the registration process195.   
 
Since the economic crisis in 1997, workers from Myanmar have been made scapegoats 
for conditions in Thailand, accused of “stealing jobs,” and presenting a threat to national 
security.”196  They are labeled “thieves, murderers, rapists, drug traffickers, prostitutes, 
and blamed for spreading infectious diseases.”197  Employers rarely comply with 
registration requirements, placing workers in a precarious position with regard to 
documentation and access to basic services, such as medical treatment.  Under the 
guidelines issued by the Local Administration Department, hospitals are unable to issue 
birth certificates for children born in Thailand to foreign workers.198  The inability to 
obtain identity documentation exacerbates and perpetuates injustice and discrimination 
against millions of people residing permanently in Thailand.  According to Professor 
Vitit Muntabhorn of the Law Faculty, Chulabhorn University, the Interior Minstry’s 
policy to deny documentation to children violates international human rights treaties and 
their rights by “denying access to education, health care and other basic services, which 
makes them vulnerable to exploitation.”199 
 
                                                 
195 Phil Thornton, 2006, provides an excellent analysis of the situation facing refugees and migrant workers 
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196 Koetsawang, 2001, p. 22. 
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Over a period of several years, the researcher regularly visited the Mae Tao Clinic 
established by Dr Cynthia Maung to provide assistance to migrants and refugees on 
Thailand’s border with Myanmar in Mae Sot.  The clinic was recently successful in 
organizing 20,000 birth certificates for children born to Burmese parents “to inform the 
relevant Thai and Burma authorities, lawyers, to ensure these children are eligible for 
Burmese citizenship at some point in the future.”200  All children born at the Mae Tao 
Clinic were entitled to receive birth certificates.  The birth certificates enabled the 
children to study in schools in the Mae Sot area.   Such triumphs are few. 
 
Thailand’s hospitals are regularly overwhelmed, not only due to chronic insufficient 
funding resulting from populist health schemes, but with the influx of aliens needing 
emergency medical treatment.  As these clients do not have identification cards, they are 
not eligible for subsidized treatment or health care, and many simply do not have the 
money to pay for treatment.  Hospital workers and administrators complain repeatedly 
that many of their worst cases involve communicable diseases that had previously been 
eradicated through treatment or vaccination programs, but are now resurfacing due to 
poverty and overcrowding.  Similarly, social workers are working hard to raise additional 
funds to manage the costs of complications associated with large sectors of the 
population requiring medical treatment.  Hospital budgets are allocated depending on the 
number of registered voters in the district.  In one case a Burmese migrant woman 
suffered complications during pregnancy and the hospital provided emergency treatment.  
The accounts increased to several million baht, and this money was found through the 
social security network, placing additional strain on existing social services.  
 
Generations of workers with limited rights and access to social services or safety 
networks are employed on tenuous labour contracts.  In the best cases, workers are 
adequately registered by their employers, with documented status and access to social 
security services and health insurance.  In the most extreme examples, however, workers 
are trafficked debt bondage ‘slaves,’ who have little or no say about the type of work they 
                                                 




will be doing or the industry they enter.  They have no identity documents, limited 
bargaining power, and there are literally millions of others waiting to take their place if 
they do not accept the restrictive and exploitative working conditions on offer.  This 
applies to many other categories of migrants listed below (but most notably Shan, Karen, 
Khmer, and Lao).  Thailand emerged from an investment boom in the late 1980s and 
several debilitating economic crises in the late 1990s as an enormous factory economy 
producing low cost goods in competition with China by exploiting migrant labourers. 
 
This situation has been encouraged one way or another for decades by the Thai State (and 
tolerated by Myanmar for the sake of remittances) in an effort to boost export-led 
economic recovery following the financial crisis in 1997, but also by those with a direct 
interest in enriching themselves from the sweat and tears of unregulated and 
undocumented workers.  There have been multiple well-documented cases where migrant 
workers have been arrested and deported, or simply killed and their bodies dumped 
unceremoniously, to avoid payment or scrutiny.  The following examples of incidents and 
events demonstrate the extent of animosity and difficulties associated with granting 
limited residency rights or full citizenship to migrants from Myanmar.   
 
The fishing industry in Thailand, both at sea and on land in the gigantic canneries and 
processing plants along the Isthmus adjacent to the Gulf of Siam, also rely almost 
exclusively on (Burmese) migrant labour.  So if the system were to change tomorrow, all 
of these activities would be out of business.  This is unlikely to happen in the medium 
term.  The long term social costs, however, of millions of new migrants without adequate 
provision for their welfare or citizenship rights, have not been added to the equation.  
Crime, poverty, drug and people trafficking, smuggling, insurgency, prostitution, slavery, 
gun running, disease, and the tragedy of several long running complex and violent ethno-
nationalistic conflicts along the border are testimony to the scale of the problem. 
 
In 1998, 5,736 displaced Burmese nationals of Thai origin were granted citizenship as 
part of a bid to reintegrate ethnic Thais living inside Myanmar’s territorial boundary.   
The ethnic Thais were “lost to Burma along with pockets of land as a result of an unfair 
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Anglo-Thai treaty in 1868.”201  Descendants of Thais taken to Burma as slaves following 
Thai-Burmese wars more than two centuries ago were considered eligible for citizenship.  
“This is part of Thailand's policy of assimilation. We are getting our people back and 
they do not threaten our national security,” said a Thai official202.  Applicants were 
required to “provide evidence of Thai origin, and have been resident in Thailand for 20 
years, look Thai, speak and understand the Thai language, revere the monarchy, and 
observe Thai customs.”203  The people involved were required to provide evidence of 
their status to receive the citizenship, which would no doubt be problematic for many.  
The lack of documentation results in desparate efforts to cross borders and exploitation, 
often resulting in grave consequences.  
 
The Embassy of Myanmar on Sathorn Road in Bangkok was taken over by armed 
activists in October 1999.  Several tourists and passers by were held hostage by a group 
known as the ‘Vigorous Student Warriors.’ A drawn-out confrontation was eventually 
resolved by then Deputy Foreign Minister, Sukhumphand Paribatr (now Governor of 
Bangkok), who selflessly offered himself in place of the hostages and accompanied the 
terrorists in a helicopter to the border where they escaped.  The mood following this 
incident was critical of the military’s perceived lack of action in responding forcefully to 
violent incidents, and this precipitated the heavy handed response in Ratchaburi Hospital.   
 
In January 2000, patients and staff at Ratchaburi Hospital were taken hostage by a 
heavily armed group of ten Karen rebels.  The crisis was resolved following a raid, when 
the rebels were executed by Thai commandos, allegedly in an extra-judicial execution to 
serve as an example to other would-be hijackers.  Some of those killed had their hands 
tied behind their backs and their heads covered with sacks.  This was widely 
acknowledged in the local media as an extrajudicial execution, but there was little 
sympathy at the time for those involved as it followed several other incidents that had 
increased the level of distrust.  Police involved told the researcher that the rebels had 
originally entered the hospital to seek medical assistance for an injured colleague in 
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Myanmar, but the doctors had refused to go with them to provide help.  They had then 
threatened to kidnap the doctor and force them to provide assistance, and this resulted in 
the difficult stand-off that ended in tragedy with the execution of people originally 
seeking medical assistance.  
 
In November 2000, Thai commandos killed eight Burmese jail escapees holding three 
hostages in Kanchanaburi.  The Foreign Ministry blamed the presence of illegal migrants 
on Thai soil as the "root cause" and called on Yangon to cooperate in tackling the 
problem of illegal migrants.204  Three teenagers died and more than a dozen were 
wounded when masked gunmen sprayed a school bus with bullets in Ratchaburi in June 
2002.  Thai authorities claimed the shooting was carried out by a 'third party.'  The Karen 
National Union quickly denied involvement.  Jobi, a Karen suspect arrested for the crime, 
later denied guilt claiming he was forced to confess.205  These few incidents illustrate the 
tension along the border and the reasons for some of the ambiguity surrounding ethnicity, 
citizenship, and the motivations for migration. 
 
In March 2002, the bodies of 13 Burmese labourers, their necks broken by unscrupulous 
employers who had refused to pay their salaries, were found discarded in rice sacks at a 
rubbish tip in Bangkok, Thailand.  The previous month, the bodies of 17 Karen workers 
were dumped in a stream in Tak.  Migration from Myanmar, which is by far Thailand's 
largest source of aliens, refugees and illegal migrant workers, is complicated by ongoing 
political unrest in Rangoon, conflict in border regions, the violent intentions and actions 
of certain groups, and deep-seated historical prejudice in Thailand which tends to unfairly 
lump ethnic groups together as 'Burmese conquerors.'  Ambiguities associated with ethnic 
diversity in Myanmar, the highly profitable cross-border activities of drug barons and 
enforcement agencies, and attempts to enforce geographical boundaries have contributed 
to a climate of conflict, confusion and surveillance.  Some communities like the Mon, 
Karen and Shan, for example, which have straddled the territorial and cultural space 
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between these two nations for centuries, exist in a perilous state.  There are several 
hundred thousand refugees in camps along the Thai border with Myanmar. 
 
There have been numerous cases of protest after Thai authorities removed citizenship by 
deleting names from house registration books following allegations of corruption.  In the 
most serious examples, in Mae Ai District in Chiang Mai, and in Suan Peung District in 
Rayong, several thousand Mon, Karen, and other groups had their citizenship and identity 
documents taken away with a stroke of a pen.206  Many of the people in these cases were 
born in Thailand, and some had received tertiary education on scholarships provided by 
Thailand’s royal family.  Thai authorities requested those affected reapply for citizenship 
with full documentation, not travel, maintain a low profile, and in some cases the 
applicants were required to submit DNA evidence of family connections.207 
 
These few examples demonstrate how Thailand’s relationship with Myanmar has 
contributed to confusion and discrimination on eligibility for citizenship and access to 
rights.  Migrant workers contribute positively to the economy in Thailand in many 
sectors, and many people have resided in Thailand for several generations without access 
to citizenship.  Thailand differentiates access to citizenship rights based on historical 
prejudice and security grounds, and needs to take a more progressive approach.  
Demands for documentation do not always produce results where people are unable to 
register births or locate evidence of citizenship.  More flexible processes are needed to 
register and protect the rights of the millions of workers inside Thailand from Myanmar.   
Shan (Tai Yai) 
 
An important group in Northern Thailand, another category of ‘the others within,’ is the 
Shan, who are often described as the Tai Yai or ‘Big Thai’ (ไทยใหญ่).    The Shan are 
considered Burmese for immigration purposes, as they nominally reside or originate from 
the Shan States inside Myanmar’s Northern border with Thailand.  Significant numbers 
of Shan have migrated to Chiang Mai Province in Thailand, but not all of them migrated 
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permanently and many regularly travel to and from Myanmar.  This thesis includes a 
number of interviews with Shan who have lived in Thailand for many years to explore 
contemporary attitudes to citizenship and barriers to achieving basic citizenship rights.208 
 
Shan State is situated in Myanmar, with borders on Northern Thailand.  It occupies a 
territory of 62,500 square miles, with a population of between six and ten million 
people.209  The name Shan is considered a corruption of the word Siam, and the Shan 
people are ethnically closer to the Thai and Lao than to their Burmese hosts.210  The Shan 
are ethnically and linguistically related to Tai Lue, Dai, and other groups stretching 
through modern Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and China.  The Shan State was 
ruled by a line of princes or ‘Saobhas,’ and was a nominally independent kingdom in the 
mandala of South East Asian city-states, under the protection of Ava (Burma), and was 
closely affiliated with the Lan Na Kingdom, until it was subsumed as part of the British  
colonial empire until after World War II.   
 
On 12 February 1947, the Shan State unified with Burma and gained independence 
through the ‘Panglong’ Agreement.  Shan rulers insisted on a clause allowing Shan State 
independence after ten years, but the agreement was not honoured, and the clause omitted 
from the final treaty.211  The capital city of Shan State is Taunggyi, a small city of some 
150,000.  Other important cities in Shan State include Thibaw, Lashio, Kentgung, and 
Tachilek, across the border from the busy checkpoint at Mae Sai in Thailand. 
 
In the 1950s, the Saobhas were a product of British colonial rule, having grown up in 
English boarding schools in Taunggyi, with imported headmasters.212  They were 
gentlemen who “combined the best of Eastern and Western manners,” and for several 
decades, the Shan States “seemed to enjoy an almost idyllic peace and prosperity.”213  
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After the Burmese Army took over in 1962, however, all the Shan chiefs were 
imprisoned, and many of them were never seen again.214 
 
The history of the Shan State’s struggle for independence is intertwined with the 
experience of the Kuomintang (KMT) Army, which also settled in the area following the 
triumph of communism in China after 1949.  The KMT operated with Thai and 
Taiwanese support, as it was thought at the time that a Shan insurgency would create a 
“legitimate façade,” as well as a buffer against Thailand’s traditional enemy, the 
Burmese215.     
 
The links between these groups and the Thai military resulted in a lengthy period of 
involvement in the global drug trade, producing opium and heroin for trafficking216.  
Drug barons have dominated the politics of Thailand’s border regions for decades, and 
conflict is continuing with the new drugs, Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (ATS).  Born 
in 1934, of a Shan mother and Chinese father in Shan State, the legendary ‘Khun Sa’ or 
‘Chang Shi Fu,’ ruled the global heroin trade from the 1960s through to the 1990s.217   
 
He emerged in 1984 as the leader of the Muang-Tai Army (MTA), and his influence grew 
until 1994, when Myanmar’s SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) cracked 
down to reduce his influence.218  Khun Sa cultivated close relationships with the military 
and politicians in Thailand and Myanmar, and in 1996, facing arrest for involvement in 
drug trafficking, eventually surrendered, laundered himself, and retired ‘honorably’ to 
run ‘legitimate’ hotel and other businesses in Yangon.219       
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The various Shan armies united in 1996 to form the Shan United Revolutionary Army 
under the leadership of (then) Major Jao Yord Seuk.  SLORC responded by forcibly 
relocating 22,000 households from 605 villages at gunpoint over 5,000 square kilometers.  
People were forced to abandon their belongings and houses, crops, animals, and move to 
the dry barren location offered by the government.  Their stated intention was to “wipe 
out the rebel group, their unstated intention was ethnic cleansing of the Shan people” 
claimed Kham Harn Fa, of the Shan Human Rights Foundation.220  Hundreds of 
thousands of Shan fled to Thailand to escape persecution.  More have followed.          
 
In 2001, Thailand’s National Security Council refused to offer protection to 300,000 
Shan refugees fleeing conflict in Myanmar.  Shan leaders called on the government to 
grant them refugee status and build a holding camp.221  National Security Council Chief, 
Kachadpai Buruspat, declared this request “unacceptable” as the group “came to look for 
jobs and avoid hardships at home.”222  So yet another group that was formerly of 
assistance to the Thai military, like the Hmong, became expendable ‘economic’ migrants.    
 
This is only one example of several incursions by large numbers of Shan seeking refuge 
in Thailand from conflict in Myanmar.  Thailand has been unsympathetic, and official 
acknowledgement of the humanitarian condition of the people concerned, has been 
negligent.  Thailand apparently views humanitarian concerns and obligations through the 
prism of national security, resulting in further social problems where migrants are 
undocumented and have limited or no access to social services.  Thailand has not lived up 
to its commitments to the Shan as neighbours, as siblings, and as former instruments in 
Thailand’s strategic efforts to resist communism and engage in conflict with Myanmar.    
 
Between 2005 and 2008, the researcher visited Wiang Hang District in Chiang Mai 
Province several times.  It is an isolated valley through a steep mountain pass near the 
Burmese border in Chiang Mai province.  The last fifty kilometers of the journey takes 
over one hour by road in good weather because the highway curls and winds its way up 
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and down steep hills at an elevation over one thousand metres above sea level.  The road 
travels through ethnic highland villages marked by animistic totems.  These are designed 
of sticks and string in bright colours, intended to ward off evil spirits.  The villagers line 
the route with baskets selling fruit, sweet potatoes, and other agricultural produce.  The 
area is populated by many ethnic groups including; Lisu, Muser, Akha, Karen, and Shan.   
 
In a clumsy attempt at ethnic classification, both presumably to exercise pretensions of 
cultural superiority, but also to group outsiders in a single category for ease of 
administration, all of these groups are designated by Thailand, along with various others, 
as Chao Khao, ‘Hilltribes’ or 'upland minorities'.  Some are Thai citizens with normal 
identification cards, able to participate in society more or less to the same extent as other 
citizens, while others live beyond the law in statelessness and poverty.  Fortunately, local 
officials insisted upon universal access to education for the children.223  Otherwise, "they 
don't understand Thailand," and can't work or participate in society.224  Some Shan 
obtained Thai identification cards, allowing them access to Chiang Mai, and even 
Bangkok.  There is little method to issuing identification, as some people are unable to 
prove either the fact of their birth, or their residency in Thailand, and there is much 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that documentation can be obtained for a bribe.225 
 
There is a sense of isolation and fragmentation in this area, which is not altogether 
uncommon in other parts of Thailand, and for the most part people just get down to 
business, farming, trading, labouring, as they have always done.  The main problem is the 
geographic demarcation of the borders.  The control of villagers with identity 
documentation is another cause for exploitation, as it limits their ability to travel and 
access services.  The researcher assisted in one case where a foreign man died of illness 
after being moved to hospital in Chiang Mai, and his (Shan) wife was unable to attend to 
his remains in the traditional manner as she was not entitled to travel out of her 
immediate area in Wiang Hang.  She did not have identity documents in Thailand.  She 
                                                 
223 Researcher’s interview, 2005. 
224 Researcher’s interview, 2005. 
225 Bangkok Post, 30 September 2011, Stricter ID Process for Migrants.  The article quotes Somphong 
Sakaeo, Manager of the Labour Rights Promotion Network.  Somphong claims police “demanded money 
from” and “pressed false charges” against alien workers in order to extract significant bribes. 
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was concerned that she might be arrested by the police for travelling to her husband’s 
funeral in Chiang Mai, and did not attend.   
 
Police in Chiang Mai informed the researcher that robberies and motorcycle gangs 
comprised of Shan bandits are endemic.  While they make some arrests, the culprits have 
little documentation, so even if they are caught they often flee across the border to safety, 
or reside in the border regions to avoid detection.226  The prisons in Chiang Mai and 
Chiang Rai are full of Shan and other ethnic groups from Myanmar.227  The restriction on 
movement even with limited documentation, and the potential risks involved, including 
arrest, was a consistent theme in interviews conducted by the researcher.  Participants 
expressed concern about the lack of identity documents held by migrants and the 
corresponding difficulties faced by police if they needed to apprehend criminals. 
 
Up till about 10 years ago, Wiang Haeng was considered very unsafe for travel, as 
bandits and insurgents moved effortlessly in the space across national boundaries.  Before 
asphalt roads and modern communications reduced the isolation and distance from 
regional centres and large towns, it was not safe to travel after dark on these roads.  Much 
travel was undertaken by helicopter, four-wheel-drive and on foot.  Now the roads are all 
sealed and the major barrier is the time it takes to drive across the mountain ranges.  
Military checkpoints with armed soldiers and jeeps, looking like a relic from previous 
wars, with 50 calibre machine guns, sandbags, barbed wire, and other accoutrements of 
conflict are placed at key intersections.  Soldiers look sleepy in the heat, but keep a watch 
on suspicious vehicles.  While border security is a problem, the soldiers are interested in 
bandits and drug traffickers.  At one stage this was a key opium growing area and various 
powerful and influential figures were in direct competition for control of the region.228  
Agriculturalists introduced substitute crops with the support of the administration and 
                                                 
226 Private discussion with police, Chiang Mai, 2008.  Shan women and girls are also frequently exploited 
through the commercial sex industry and trafficked as debt slaves. 
227 Researcher’s interview with prisoners, Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai Prison, 2004. 
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100  
 
Thailand’s royal family.229  Coffee, oranges, chillies, and other crops well-suited to the 
altitude replaced more lucrative illegal narcotics. 
 
The researcher visited this area several times, staying in the local agricultural research 
facility, a government guesthouse and an orange farm.  The isolation was welcome, as 
was the rural atmosphere, and the friendliness of all the people.  The local officials, 
including the district chief and the head of the agricultural facility related many stories.  
The district head was well versed in the history and politics of this part of Thailand even 
though he had migrated there himself decades ago from another province in the North of 
Thailand.  He was a useful informant on the human rights and citizenship issues faced by 
the Shan.  His wooden house was aesthetic in the traditional Thai sense, with outdoor 
living areas sporting fantastic views.  The collection of memorabilia inside the house, in a 
small but practical bedroom, showed his former status.  The gardens around the house 
were beautiful and various water features were built around places to sit and enjoy the 
view.  A training centre, with a blackboard and a number of seats for local meetings, 
agricultural education events, and project management with detailed maps of the vicinity, 
was perched a little higher up commanding a strategic view of the valley below.  The 
valley is situated in a remote mountainous area adjacent to the border with Myanmar.   
 
Just next door, a little higher up the incline, in a small bamboo hut, lived a retired Shan 
soldier and his wife, assigned to provide security to the district head.  Not living up to his 
'Big Thai' classification, this diminutive man and his cheerful spouse, bustled about 
preparing lunch.  They killed a black chicken and turned it into soup and various other 
dishes with mushrooms and herbs, boasting of the medicinal qualities.  The soldiers were 
provided as ‘guards’ to the District Head by General Jao Yord Seuk.   
 
The District Head explained that trade moves freely through the border towns, and people 
travel across to work in local farms or to seek their livelihood further afield.  The District 
Head said that Shan and Burmese would just walk through the temple and could attend 
festivals and other important events on either side of the border.  He explained that the 
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district officials were obliged to reason with the Burmese, in particular regarding the 
passage of goods and people across the border.  As soon as some kind of agreement had 
been reached and a truce brokered concerning the interests of the villagers on either side 
of the border, the officials on both sides changed frequently, and much of the good work 
was undone.  The situation was always in a state of flux depending on the mood of the 
officials on either side, but trade was brisk. 
 
Officials provided various accounts regarding the leader of the Shan State Army (SSA), 
General Jao Yord Seuk.  He holds legendary status as a fierce fighting man, with over 
20,000 troops under his command.  He travels freely and maintains houses in Bangkok, 
Chiang Mai, and Wiang Hang, in addition to his ancestral territory inside Myanmar in the 
Shan State.  Fighting commences every cold season, and the intricacies of allegiances 
between the different government agencies, ethnic groups, and outside influences are 
complex.  Thailand maintains a close watch and actively steers events in the national 
interest.  The SSA has been fighting the Wa for many years inside Myanmar.  The 
conflict is fuelled by proceeds from narcotics and funds from abroad.  Thailand 
historically supported a proxy conflict to extend its influence and create a buffer zone.230   
 
Artillery attacks were not uncommon in the area, both sides lobbing shells into villages 
indiscriminately.  The conflict has forced hundreds of thousands of ethnic Shan into 
Northern Thailand, where many have resettled permanently.  The cultural and linguistic 
similarities of the group, as well as the historical ties and strategic priorities have 
facilitated a natural alliance between the SSA and the Thai military, and resulted in some 
acceptance in Thailand of Shan as quasi-Thai with limited citizenship rights.  Jao Yord 
Seuk is widely considered to be ‘cautious,’ and was described as “generous and 
warm.”231 He is well respected and retains a position of status in Bangkok and Yangon. 
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Chiang Mai is home to millions of Shan migrant workers232  Some are now second and 
third generation with children and grandchildren born and raised in Thailand.233  Some of 
the members of the next generations have access to citizenship or identity documents, but 
many of their elders do not.  As the younger generation grew up in Thailand they have 
more or less become Thai, adopted Thai customs and modern practices, and many 
identify themselves exclusively as Thai.234   
 
The researcher interviewed a number of Shan to seek a cross section of the community’s 
views and attitudes on identity and citizenship, particularly with respect to access to 
social services.  These interviews, explored in the following chapter of this thesis (and 
presented in full in Appendix 2), provide solid evidence of the hardship faced by one 
significant ethnic group, prevalent in Thai society and fundamental to the economy of 
Northern Thailand, resulting from the differentiated citizenship model.   
 
It was beyond the scope of this project to interview all of the ethnic groups disadvantaged 
by Thailand’s current citizenship model.  This would, however, be a very worthwhile and 
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Chinese Migration and The Kuomintang (KMT) 
 
The majority of Chinese settlers migrated to Thailand from Southeastern coastal areas of 
China by sea in the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the twentieth 
century as traders or labourers.  Significant groups included Teochiu, Hokkien, Hakka, 
and Hainanese.235  The descendants of these groups have experienced some success in 
assimilating and integrating into Thai society and have delivered a strong economic and 
social contribution to the country.  This group is most often referred to as ‘Sino-Thai.’  
The integration of Chinese migrants has not been without turmoil, however, as political 
affiliations and the divisions between pro-Nationalist and pro-Communist groups resulted 
in friction within and beyond Thailand’s borders.   
   
The influx of Chinese as merchants, administrators, labourers and their entourage in the 
nineteenth century prompted King Chulalongkorn to herald the need for an official 
nationality law providing an official and legal status for Chinese persons residing within 
Siam.236  Large scale Chinese migration to Siam in the modern era commenced in 
between 1865-1910 when large numbers of Chinese merchants moved to Thailand as a 
result of wholesale political unrest in China and what was then referred to as 
Indochina.237  Migration was facilitated by unfettered access to Bangkok by boat from 
Swatow via Singapore and Penang.  The reason Siam accepted large numbers of Chinese 
migrants at that time was the pressing need for additional construction labourers to build 
roads and railways to fuel development in the kingdom as it began to emulate the 
Western path to development and modernisation.  By 1802, some three quarters of 
Bangkok’s population were of Chinese origin.238  This enormous migration and the 
corresponding social changes guided the ethnic and social differentiation of Thailand.   
 
The Siamese state had planned that the financial benefits of the migrant labourers would 
remain as much as possible within Siam.  Chinese labourers were required to pay hefty 
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taxes.  In a pattern that has been repeated consistently into modern times, early Chinese 
migrants met at a central location where they were assisted to find work by a Tao Gae (or 
Agent).  It was generally accepted that the new aspirant “coolies” would be indebted to 
the agent for the work assignments they had been given and would pay back a large debt 
before they could earn any money of their own.  The Chinese trade and labour networks, 
clan systems, and agents of this era continue to exercise considerable political and 
economic influence in modern Thailand today.  This system of indentured labour is 
common today in modern Thailand for Burmese, Lao and other foreign labourers, and the 
new network of agents are not always Chinese, but Thai, Lao, Burmese, and Cambodian.   
   
Chinese migrants were not regulated as much as the Siamese, who were forbidden to 
smoke opium or engage in other nefarious social practices (opium smoking was illegal 
for Siamese, but not for Chinese residents).  As a result, many Siamese males apparently 
took to shaving their heads, adopting the pigtail hairstyles worn by the Chinese coolies, 
so that they, too, could behave in a relatively unrestricted manner.239  The Siamese 
maintained a monopoly on prostitution, gambling and the opium trade, the majority of 
which was managed (by Chinese middlemen) as a superbly profitable business venture 
for the state and a few individuals (largely at the expense of the new Chinese migrants). 
 
The historical movement of the Chinese Nationalist Army or Kuomintang (KMT) in 
Thailand highlights a number of issues relating to citizenship.  Special provision has been 
made for access to citizenship, albeit on a limited basis, by the members of the forces 
who fought against the Chinese communists.  Unfortunately, however, the administrative 
process for documenting citizenship has resulted in ambiguity and suffering for many 
families.  The KMT remnants, created their own folklore, fighting energetically against 
the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), and took control over opium production and 
trafficking in Northern Thailand.  They maintained connections, but declined to 
accompany their political counterparts in Taipei, preferring to remain close to Yunnanese 
origins with the advantages of proximity.  The KMT intermarried with local highland 
women, and continued to fight against communists in China (with the encouragement of 
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many other countries, including Thailand) for many years.  Despite several efforts to 
repatriate the demobilized soldiers to Taiwan, many of them remained in Thailand as 
settlers and their offspring have had some limited success in obtaining access to Thai 
citizenship.  The various militia groups at various stages comprised over 16,000 soldiers, 
who retain close links to Northern Thailand and reside in the border regions.240    
 
The researcher visited the ‘Martyrs Museum’ on Doi Mae Salong in Northern Thailand in 
2009 and several other KMT villages near Mae Hong Son in 2012 to conduct research on 
citizenship.  Sixty years after the events that resulted in their establishment, the KMT 
villages retain limited autonomy.  Elders promote Chinese culture and language, 
particularly elements of ancestor worship and other familiar customs, and administration 
is conducted both through the Chinese villagers themselves in cooperation with Thai 
authorities, as it would be in remote Thai villages of similar size.  Depending on the size 
and (often remote) location of the village, a number of ethnic minorities may reside 
together, and intermarriage has blurred some of the ethnic boundaries, encouraging a new 
integration and acceptance towards Thai customs, language, and administration.  
 
During one visit, the researcher interviewed the female curator of the Martyrs Museum 
about citizenship.  While she was born in Thailand to Chinese KMT parents, she 
explained that she had been arrested and placed in prison for six months after travelling 
to Chiang Rai to go to hospital.  As she could not present identification documents she 
was unable to convince authorities of her status.  She later struggled to obtain 
identification documents following repeated requests to local officials.  So while the 
earlier generations were permitted to reside in Thailand for reasons of political 
convenience and strategic purposes, the generations that follow still struggle to obtain 
citizenship rights and access basic services. 
 
Her case was similar to the experience of many descendants of the KMT army who 
migrated to Northern Thailand, many of whom still reside in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai.  
Many of the younger generation, however, have now moved into Thai cities seeking 
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employment and better circumstances.  They identify themselves as ‘Sino-Thai’ 
descendants of earlier Chinese migrants and try not to reveal their KMT or Yunnanese 
origins due to negative perceptions in Thailand about the historical involvement of these 
groups in illegal activities such as drug trafficking and armed conflict241.  The experience 
of the Yunnanese KMT is linked to the complex history of ethnic conflict in Myanmar 
and at various stages has become intertwined with the fate of other ethnic minorities 
residing in Thailand and fleeing persecution, or simply seeking better economic 
conditions.  While there has been some effort by the Thai State to recognize the 
contribution made by these groups and integrate them into broader society, there is 
continuing evidence of discrimination.  The documentation provided to confirm 
citizenship is insufficient or loaded with struggle.  Efforts to obtain Thai citizenship have 
been successful for previous generations due to their contribution to national security, but 




In November 2001, the researcher attended to a sumptuous wedding in Nong Khai 
Province between two wealthy and Vietnamese influential families.  The provincial 
governor was in attendance, as were leading members of the local business community.  
The Thai Ambassador to Laos drove over the friendship bridge from Vientiane in his 
Mercedes Benz.  The guests were resplendently outfitted in Vietnamese traditional 
costumes and were treated to a night of Vietnamese cuisine and musical entertainment in 
an open field in the center of town.  The street was crowded with passers-by enjoying the 
immensely colorful spectacle.  It was significant that an enclave of Vietnamese culture 
was conspicuously on display in a small Thai town on the Lao border.  There is evidence 
that Vietnames have crossed in and out of Thailand for centuries, and many have 
established permanent settlements in the border towns of Nong Khai, Nakhon Pathom, 
and Sakhon Nakhorn.  Udorn Thani also has a significant ethnic Vietnamese population.     
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The researcher interviewed the groom’s older sister, who owns a successful Vietnamese 
restaurant in Nong Khai.  She confirmed that Ethnic Vietnamese own ninety per cent of 
the businesses in (the Thai town) Nong Khai.  This concentration is particularly evident 
in the Tha Sadet border market along the river.  This initially seemed surprising, but 
several other provinces (Mukdahan and Sakhon Nakhorn, for example) boast a similar 
ethnic composition.  Her father, who worked as a clerk for the French regime in 
Vientiane, made a decision to move to Thailand for economic reasons when the French 
regime in Indochina began teetering on the brink of collapse.  
 
Her brother, the groom, said he identified with other Vietnamese in Nong Khai, but had 
only been to Vietnam once, where his relatives were apparently annoyed at his inability 
to communicate properly in Vietnamese.  He said he had no intention of returning to live 
in Vietnam, other than for business reasons to purchase stock.  He thought of himself first 
and foremost as a Thai citizen, while Vietnamese ethnicity provided a cultural context to 
his life in access to religious and social activities within the broader ethnic Vietnamese 
community in Thailand.  As a second generation Vietnamese migrant born in Thailand, 
he had managed to obtain Thai citizenship. 
 
The groom explained the differences between his generation, who were born in Thailand, 
and older generations of ethnic Vietnamese in Thailand, some of which had only recently 
migrated.  He indicated that he believed his generation was ‘100 per cent’ Thai.  He 
explained that in the past it had been very difficult as the identification card distributed to 
Vietnamese had the words ‘Vietnamese refugee’ in bold type on the front and this 
brought with it certain social and travel restrictions.  Things had improved since new 
identification cards were issued which do not identify the holder as a Vietnamese 
migrant.  But in a case of very subtle social surveillance, the alpha-numerical prefix on 
the cards clearly identifies the holder as Vietnamese, is common knowledge to 
immigration officials and police, and this apparently results in ongoing discrimination.   
 
While there have clearly been genuine efforts by Thai authorities to provide permanent 
sanctuary and grant citizenship to descendants of long-term Vietnamese migrants in 
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Thailand, the stigma associated with being labelled as a ‘refugee’ continues, even for 
those who may have migrated decades and generations ago.  It is also clear that 
Vietnamese migration has enriched Northeast Thailand economically and culturally.  The 
ability of ethnic Vietnamese in Thailand to interact as full members of society, indeed as 
Thai citizens, has not yet reached the stage for many people where they can comfortably 
participate in politics or fully access social services, but the degree of acceptance by the 
authorities and the broader community is improving.  The following example also 
highlights the bureaucratic barriers experienced by many ethnic Vietnamese in their 
efforts for recognition as Thai citizens. 
       
In May 2004, a gifted teenager, Yuttana Farmwan, (more affectionately known by his 
nickname ‘Nong Kung’) from Sakhon Nakhorn was awarded, on the basis of academic 
merit, a scholarship to study medicine at the prestigious Chulalongkorn University in 
Bangkok242.  Nong Kung and his parents were born in Thailand with Vietnamese heritage 
and his family had resided in Sakhon Nakhorn for generations.  He was initially 
prevented from accepting the scholarship due to his uncertain citizenship status, and the 
corresponding restrictions on his right to travel outside a certain radius – including 
Bangkok where he would need to attend university.  Citizenship was also an important 
factor in this case because medical scholarships in Thailand are only available to Thai 
citizen.  A loan must eventually be repaid by ‘return of service’ – by serving the 
community.  His case was elevated by the media and, after the benevolent intervention of 
the Thai Prime Minister, Nong Kung was granted Thai citizenship and permitted to 
accept the scholarship in Bangkok.   This case, which was no doubt cause for jubilation 
for the family and the Vietnamese community in Sakhon Nakhorn, provided an excellent 
illustration of the difficulties experienced by ethnic Vietnamese in Thailand.  It 
highlighted the uncertain circumstances of people whose grandparents may have been 
born in Thailand, but who are unable to access services others take for granted.   
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The Prime Minister’s comments were indicative of the historical and institutional 
prejudice associated with Vietnamese in Thailand and the whimsical inconsistencies in 
the nationality law.  In a meeting with ministers to request more details he said:  
 
The mother and father lived in Thailand for decades and were born here, and a 
child of this quality we should keep – I mean, we allow people who sneak into 
Thailand illegally and beggars to stay here – we should investigate the legal 
possibilities, but even then if we need to change the rules in this case that would 
not be a problem because we can do this by making this a special case.  Because 
this child has been offered a medical scholarship then it would be better if we can 
include him in the Thai population.  Let’s not be too straight on this – our weak 
point in the bureaucracy is following the rules too strictly.243 
 
The experience of Vietnamese immigrants in Thailand, and their treatment by the Thai 
authorities, has been strongly influenced by historical prejudice associated with conflict.  
There appears to be a widespread perception that most Vietnamese migrants in Thailand 
appeared in the wave of turmoil after America’s war in Vietnam, probably because this 
era is still in the relatively recent memories of many people, and because much literature 
on this subject addresses the refugee phenomenon.244   
 
Peter Poole divides the Vietnamese minority in Thailand into three major groups, which 
are useful to enhance our understanding of eligibility for Thai citizenship.  The first 
group, “old Vietnamese,” include seventh generation descendants of those Vietnamese 
who arrived in Thailand to escape the wars of the eighteenth century or the organised 
anti-Catholic persecution of the nineteenth century.245  Most of this group has been 
accepted as Thai citizens.  The second group include “first-generation refugees”: those 
who sought refuge in Thailand from their domicile in Cambodia or Laos during the 
various conflicts that have taken place after World War II, particularly between the 
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French and the Vietnamese nationalists, but also later after Poole’s book was published, 
when Laos and Cambodia were liberated by the Khmer Rouge and the Pathet Lao.   
 
Most of this group, which Poole estimated at around 15-25,000 people at that time, was 
given sanctuary by the Thai Government but was initially not considered eligible for Thai 
citizenship.  The third group is the Thai-born children of the postwar refugees, many of 
whom - like Nong Kung - are now eligible for Thai citizenship.  These categories have 
now become less relevant as new waves of ‘economic migrants’ and other family 
members have swelled the ranks of the Vietnamese community in Thailand, but they are 
illustrative for the Thai Government’s purposes in determining citizenship eligibility 
     
There is evidence to support the view that while many families actively worked towards, 
and others fled, the collapse of the French administration in search of economic 
opportunities, and others were ‘displaced’ in the massive unrest following the collapse of 
the Saigon regime, Vietnamese migration and permanent settlement in Thailand predates 
both Indochina wars.  It is clear that early nineteenth century Siam was “highly 
cosmopolitan” - Mon settlements lined the Chaopraya River close to the capital and 
Vietnamese, Malay, Lao and Khmer war captives and immigrants settled in “an arc” 
stretching along the northern and eastern fringes of the delta.246  Goscha cites reports 
from French missionaries in Ayuthaya in 1662 who noted the presence of around 100 
Cochin-Chinese families.  So there have been several stages of Vietnamese migration, 
and corresponding delineated patterns of assimilation and acceptance in Thailand.      
 
Vietnamese migrants originally arrived in Siam at the end of the eighteenth century 
following the period of political unrest associated with the Tay Son rebellion (1771-1802) 
when Prince Nguyen Phuc Anh, who subsequently ruled Vietnam as Emperor Gia Long, 
arrived in Bangkok with an army to seek French military assistance and attempt to recoup 
military strength and alliances.247  Nguyen Anh presented his sister to the Siamese King 
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Rama I (r. 1782-1809) as a bride in order to cement relations between the two states.248  
When Anh returned to Vietnam in 1787, the majority of his troops stayed behind in Siam.  
King Rama allowed Prince Anh and his men to reside around Samsen and Bangpho, now 
part of the greater Bangkok metropolis, and areas where the Vietnamese demographic 
remains significant.249   
 
Nguyen Huynh Duc led a further contingent of 5,000 troops through Laos to rejoin Prince 
Anh.  When he discovered that Anh had already returned home, Duc petitioned the 
Siamese for assistance so he and his soldiers could follow him.  Transport was provided 
on the condition that those soldiers who wished to stay with the Siamese armed forces 
could do so.  Approximately two-thirds opted to stay behind in Bangkok.  In 1802, with 
the assistance of troops and materiel provided by the Siamese monarch and Chinese, 
English, French and Portuguese merchants, Nguyen Anh crushed the Tay Son rebellion, 
ending the civil war and reuniting Vietnam.250  He proclaimed himself Emperor Gia Long 
(r.1802-1820).  Many of the troops he left behind in Siam joined the Siamese army, while 
others worked as traders, police, doctors, lawyers and officials and over time through 
intermarriage, many were assimilated into broader Siamese society.  Unlike later groups, 
which were comprised of complete families, these first migrants were all men.   They 
married Thai or Chinese women, and few of their descendants speak Vietnamese.   
   
A further group of Vietnamese émigrés arrived in Thailand in the mid-nineteenth century 
as the Siamese and Vietnamese courts wrestled over Cambodian sovereignty.  The new 
arrivals included thousands of prisoners of war captured by Siamese armies in Cambodia 
and southern Vietnam.  As half of these migrants were Christians they established a 
church, Saint Xavier, which still stands rebuilt on the original site in a residential area 
known as ‘Vietnamese village’ or ‘Ban Yuan’ in Bangkok.  A French census in 1887 
indicated that there were as many as 5,000 Vietnamese in Bangkok.251 
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Other Vietnamese émigrés, predominantly seafarers and traders, also took the coastal 
route to Siam to escape social and political dislocation in Vietnam252.   
Two Vietnamese officers, Thong Dung Gian and Ho Duong Dac, were appointed 'head of 
the Vietnamese military community' and established the first Vietnamese pagoda in 
Thailand; Wat Anamnikayaram.  The number of Vietnamese Catholics in Siam grew 
considerably in the early eighteenth century, when they were employed by French 
missionaries to rebuild their mission following the expulsion of the French when the 
Siamese king was dethroned in 1688253.  In 1765, however, the Burmese invasion put an 
end to the mission.  During the Vietnamese Emperor Minh Maung’s reign (1820-1841) 
and before the French conquest of Tonkin in 1884, Catholics were singled out for rough 
treatment in Vietnam, and as a result many fled to relative safety in Siam at a time where 
freedom of religion was broadly tolerated254.  A French Diplomat (Garreu) based in 
Nakhon Phanom noted both the diversity and spread of Vietnamese settlements in 
Northeastern Thailand fostered by overland migration:    
 
Near Roi Et, the Vietnamese allegedly dominated the local markets.  As in 
southeastern Siam, mixed with the traders and the jobless were numerous 
Catholic exiles, who had crossed the Annamese chain to escape persecution in the 
19th century.  As of 1916, a small Catholic Vietnamese community lived in Tha 
Hae, a village located near the Mekong River.  Thabo, another small village 
across from Vientiane, was home to around 2,000 (Vietnamese) Christians.  
Opposite Thakhek, in Nong Saen, around 100 Vietnamese Catholic families 
prospered.  Even the Governor of Nong Khai, Phra Borihan, surprised Garreu 
with his mastery of the Vietnamese language.255       
 
The next wave of Vietnamese immigration from the late nineteenth to early twentieth 
century followed a pattern of resistance to French rule in Indochina.  Vietnamese 
nationalists, with encouragement from a Siamese government wary of French territorial 
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intentions, regarded Thailand as a place where they could be comparatively “safe from 
French police.”256  Thai resistance against French rule in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia 
was coordinated through émigré communities operating out of the region that is now 
Northeast Thailand.  The remnants of these later formed the basis for the first 
independent governments in Vietnam and Laos. In 1929, Ho Chi Minh, operating from 
Siam, established the Annamite Fraternity of Siam (Hoi Than Ai Nguoi Annam O an 
Xiem) to organise armed resistance against French rule in Indochina.257 
 
The Vietnamese independence leader Ho Chi Minh was accepted by Thailand as a 
collaborator during Vietnam’s war of independence against French colonialism.  
Thailand supported Vietnamese nationalists against the French with the intention of 
regaining territory ceded by force in Laos and Cambodia.  Ho Chi Minh established a 
resistance base at Sakhon Nakhon to fight the French and was aided by Thailand in his 
efforts to seek independence and banish the French.  At that stage of history, the mutual 
interests and links between the Vietnamese nationalists and the Thai State coincided and 
Vietnamese incursion was tolerated and encouraged.  A significant number of 
Vietnamese migrated to Laos and North East Thailand in the period following WWII and 
the decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu that routed the French forces in Indochina.  Many of 
the Vietnamese who migrated to Thailand in this period stayed and did not return.258   
 
A group of 46,700 Vietnamese refugees fled into Thailand when the French reoccupied 
Indochina in 1945-46.259   The Thai Government provided refuge and allowed them to 
settle.  Subsequently, the Thai Government became concerned about the “subversive 
potential” of the refugees and began to try to repatriate them.260  40,000 were sent to 
North Vietnam from betweem 1960 and 1964.  Many of the returnees were born in 
Thailand and had never seen Vietnam.  In Nakhon Phanom, which has the largest 
concentration of Vietnamese in Thailand, about 600 refugees married Thai citizens and 
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resettled.  Many of the estimated 30-50,000 children born to Vietnamese parents in 
Thailand since 1946 were able to obtain citizenship as they had one Thai parent.    
  
With the collapse of the Saigon regime in 1975 hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese 
transited Thailand, most of them were en route to semi-permanent resettlement in 
Western countries like Australia, Canada, France and the United States.  The politics of 
Thailand’s reception, resettlement and repatriation of Vietnamese refugees are worthy of 
several volumes of historical analysis.  The Thai Government’s key objective was to 
provide assistance to the United Nations to assist with the short-term humanitarian needs 
of the refugees, and facilitate their resettlement abroad in third countries such as 
Australia, Canada and the US.  There was little done to encourage settlement of these 
communities in Thailand, quite the contrary.  Despite the active discouragement of 
Vietnamese settlement through forced resettlement and other questionable practices, a 
significant numbers of Vietnamese again decided to stay in Thailand.   
     
First generation Vietnamese, the most recent migrants who moved to Thailand after 
cessation of hostilities in 1975, are still treated with suspicion and are not eligible to 
apply for Thai citizenship, but second and third generations, which have adopted Thai 
language, customs, culture and beliefs, have been eligible for Thai citizenship since 
1996261.  Thai law regards Vietnamese as ‘refugees fleeing the Indochina conflict with 
France.’  Restrictions were placed on the movement of Vietnamese in Thailand, generally 
limited to a 50-100 kilometer radius from their place of registration.  I heard anecdotes 
about efforts to thwart this level of control and supervision by young Vietnamese wishing 
to experience the sights and smells of Bangkok.  They claimed to have avoided detection 
during the 600 km journey to Bangkok by keeping a very low profile, and speaking 
perfect Thai to police when questioned along the way.262 
 
Citizenship rights, however, were not won without struggle.  In 1954, a rumour that 
police planned to forcibly relocate the refugees to another part of Thailand resulted in a 
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large demonstration where hundreds of women squatted, wailing, in front of the 
provincial offices; some cut their hair in protest and lay in the street blocking traffic.  
After a series of further protests, which capitulated in a spectacular demonstration against 
forced repatriation where thousands of Vietnamese residents of Nong Khai lay down on 
roads and train tracks en masse in 1989, then Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, finally 
agreed in 1992 to grant citizenship to the grandchildren of those Vietnamese who 
migrated after 1945.263  The Vietnamese in Thailand were granted white identification 
cards with blue boundaries in 1996.  These cards originally had the words 'Vietnamese 
Refugee' stamped in bold type across the photograph on the front.   
 
All first generation ‘Dien Bien Phu’ migrants were granted residency status in 1996, 
allowing them to return to Vietnam and travel freely throughout Thailand.  In 1997 the 
Interior Ministry threatened to deport the children of Vietnamese refugees living in 
several provinces (Nong Bua Lamphu, Amnat Charoen, and Yasothon) if they did not 
apply for naturalisation under a Cabinet Resolution and Ministry Regulation dated 11 
September 1993.264 
   
In 1996, in response to complaints about the slow process of applications and demands 
for kickbacks by officials, the National Security Council, the Interior Ministry and the 
Internal Security Operations Command announced that Vietnamese refugees eligible to 
apply for Thai nationality would be allowed to resubmit applications to governors of 
provinces in which their domiciles are registered.265  The Interior Ministry later 
announced that children of Vietnamese refugees would be granted an extension until 30 
April 1997 to apply for citizenship.  This decree applied strictly to those Vietnamese born 
in Thailand and living in Nong Bua Lamphu, Amnat Charoen and Yasothon in the 
Northeast; Prachin Buri and Sa Kaew in the East; and Surat Thani and Phatthalung in the 
South.  Those in Nong Khai, Udon Thani, Sakon Nakhon, Nakhon Phanom, Mukdahan 
and Ubon Ratchathani, which have a larger number of Vietnamese refugees, could also 
apply for citizenship but were not subject to any deadline.   
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In 1996, 9,100 children of Vietnamese refugees were granted citizenship and 
Approximately 17,000 did not apply and about 8,000 of the original refugees are 
ineligible because they were not born in Thailand.  The Internal Security Operations 
Command considered issuing them residence permits or alien certificates.266  In 1999, 
following the closure of Sikhiu camp in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan of 
Action designed to eliminate the residual refugee burden the last of the Vietnamese 
‘refugees’ remaining in camps were repatriated to Vietnam. 
   
While Laos is a popular destination for seasonal Vietnamese labourers, and porous 
borders easily allow access, as well as established Vietnamese communities, there is 
limited evidence of Vietnamese labour migration to Thailand.  The inability or apparent 
unwillingness of Vietnamese labourers to take up economic opportunities in Thailand is a 
product of historical enmity and linguistic and cultural disparities.  These same factors, 
however, have not prevented millions of migrant workers from Myanmar, perhaps due to 
geographical proximity and the lack of economic opportunity in that country, particularly 
in border regions.  The low number of Vietnamese as opposed to Burmese migrant 
labourers in Thailand is possibly also related to the ongoing conflict in the border regions 
in Myanmar.  So while Lao (and Khmer) migrant workers share language and culture and 
can ‘blend in’ to society to a limited extent, Vietnamese workers face a number of 
cultural barriers.  In October 2012, the violent murder of his Thai employer by a 
Vietnamese worker in Thailand over entitlements highlighted public perceptions and 
prejudice regarding Vietnamese in Thailand.    
According to a Thai police official the Thai Government had previously treated the 
Vietnamese migrants with suspicion (and many harbour this view), fearing they might 
use their links with the Vietnamese state to undermine Thai security.267  Other grounds 
for prejudice were mostly economic, based on perceptions regarding Vietnamese 
ingenuity, capacity for hard work, and business acumen.  First generation Vietnamese, 
the most recent migrants, are still treated with suspicion are not eligible for citizenship, 
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but second and third generations, which have adopted Thai language, customs, culture 
and beliefs, have been eligible for Thai citizenship since 1996.   
Thailand considers Vietnamese migrants as refugees fleeing the Indochina conflict with 
France.  These are divided into three groups: 
 
x The mothers and fathers; meaning those Vietnamese who originally migrated to 
Thailand in 1945-1946; 
x The children; meaning the descendants of the mothers and fathers who migrated 
to Thailand, and who were born in Thailand after 1945, and; 
x The grandchildren; meaning those children whose mothers and fathers were born 
in the Kingdom of Thailand and were the children of those mothers and fathers 
that migrated from Vietnam. 
The responsibility for registering these groups was placed in the hands of provincial 
officials (office no. 114) until 1989, when this was transferred to the 'Committee for the 
Registration of Vietnamese Migrants.'  Restrictions were placed on movement, which 
was limited to a radius within around 50-100 kilometres.  After a series of protests, 
including one incident in the where the residents of Nong Khai lay down on the roads and 
the train tracks to protest against forced repatriation, they were granted white 
identification cards with blue boundaries in 1996.  These cards originally had the words 
'Vietnamese Migrant' stamped across the photograph.  A group of Vietnamese refugees 
were repatriated as recently as 1999 following the closure of Sikhiu camp.   
Identification cards no longer identify the holder as a Vietnamese migrant, but in a case 
of very subtle control, the prefix on the cards is common knowledge to immigration 
officials and police, apparently resulting in discrimination on a continuing basis.  Today, 
most of the earlier Vietnamese migrants and refugees living on Thai soil and their 
descendants have been granted Thai citizenship268.  All of the first generation has been 
granted residency status, allowing them to return to visit their homeland.  Vietnamese 
migrants now play an important part in the economic and social fabric of Thai society, 
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particularly in a number of North Eastern provinces where they are more prolific and 
have assimilated to a greater extent.  It is important to acknowledge the historical events 
that resulted in diversity and promote acceptance of difference to enable social harmony. 
Laos and Cambodia 
 
Lao villagers regularly travel to Thailand in search of paid employment.  There are 
approximately 90,000 Lao migrant workers in Thailand.269  Sometimes these workers 
return home periodically, particularly those who are engaged in the agricultural sector in 
surrounding provinces, while others apparently depart with little intention of returning to 
Laos.  Border controls between the two countries are not strictly enforced and avenues 
for sneaking across otherwise porous borders by boat, or on foot in the dry season, are 
plentiful.  Some of these sojourners are seeking a decent wage in Thailand through their 
own agency; others are subject to a form of debt bondage when a sum of money is paid to 
their parents.  The Lao newspapers referred to this practice as ‘slave labour’ in reporting 
the return to Laos of 20 young women discovered working illegally in Thailand.270  This 
was the fifth group of Lao workers repatriated by the Thai labour ministry under a United 
Nations project addressing Trafficking in Women and Children in the Mekong sub-
region.  On 16 October 2002, Thailand and Laos signed their first agreement on border 
security, providing for cooperation in joint operations against illegal migration, narcotics 
trafficking, terrorism and the activities of anti-Vientiane resistance groups. 
 
In 1992, Ban Vinai refugee camp, the largest in South East Asia at the time, was closed 
by the UNHCR (17 December 1992).  About 55,000 refugees (mostly Hmong) passed 
through Ban Vinai at some stage, and only a fraction of these people were repatriated to 
Laos.  In 1993, 15,000 Hmong refugees sought refuge at a temple known as Wat Tham 
Krabork in Saraburi rather than face repatriation.  Their fate continues to present a 
pressing political issue for the Thai and Lao governments.   
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Lao workers in Thailand are consistently subject to cruel and inhumane treatment and 
abuse.  Many arrive as debt bondage workers (a sum of money is normally paid through a 
broker to their parents), are smuggled or trafficked. Several cases of abuse were 
documented and published by the Foundation for Child Development:271 
 
Mee, 15, from Laos worked for the owner of an Isan food restaurant.  She 
worked from 4am to 1am the next day, every day, without a day off.  She 
never got paid in over two years.  She was hit with a stick on her face, 
shoulder, and body.  She was detained and threatened so she could not 
run away.  The employer was charged with physical assault, and required 
to provide compensation. 
 
Ton, 14, was abducted by a human trafficking racket and sold to an 
employer in Nakhon Pathom.  He ran away after being beaten up.  He did 
not know the employers address or name.  He only remembered the 
employer had a big house surrounded by high fences. 
 
Tam, 13, worked as a child servant.  Her eyes were swollen from beatings.  
Her body was pierced by sharp objects.  She was constantly scolded and 
traumatised from being unable to keep the house and 30 dogs clean as 
required by her employer.  
 
Wan, 22, began working as a child servant at the age of 15.  She said she 
never got paid.  Punishments included beatings with long sticks, squeezing 
Wan’s tongue with a pair of tweezers and pouring hot water on her body.  
She ran away and later rescued two friends from the house.  They have 
scars from having a hot iron placed on their skin.   They said they only 
received one meal per day, and worked from 6am to midnight.  There were 
three houses and six cars in the compound.  
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On 30 September 2002, 621 Cambodian illegal migrants, apparently beggars, were 
rounded up from the streets of Bangkok, fingerprinted and photographed, given a bottle 
of water, some medicine, and a vomit bag, and flown to Phnom Penh aboard three 
military transport planes.  This was not the first time foreign mendicants in Bangkok had 
been rounded up and repatriated by the authorities, but it was the first time aircraft have 
been used.  Cambodian gangs often recruit beggars and kidnap children to travel to 
Thailand, where they seek alms on the street.  The Thai police round them up periodically 
and repatriate them at the border, but like many of the migratory stories, many of the 
gangs bring the people back to Thailand again.  It is a vicious cycle of abuse.  
 
The horrific history of Cambodia’s recent conflict resulted in millions of people seeking 
refuge in Thailand. From the 1970s to the 1980s a massive relief effort took place to 
support unprecedented migration and large refugee camps along the border regions.  
Many of these people later returned to Cambodia, or were resettled abroad, but a number 
took advantage of the ambiguity to blend in to Thai society and take advantage of cultural 
similarities in the border regions.  The experience of Cambodian refugees has in Thailand 
been well documented.272  Many Cambodians settle in the border provinces and work 
illegally in Thailand as agricultural labourers.    
 
Thailand’s borders with Laos and Cambodia, in particular, are easily navigated, and 
migration has been a constant factor throughout their combined history.  Cambodians and 
Lao are culturally and linguistically closer to Thais – ‘the others within’ – and for that 
reason are more readily assimilated and included in Thai society (especially in rural 
areas) than other minorities.  Many Lao now study legitimately in Thai schools and the 
exchanges between these countries, including the links between governments and 
institutional ties, are going some way to improving access to support services and 
cooperation on people trafficking networks.  The borders are still poorly managed, 
however, and there is little scrutiny of many migrants.  Lao visitors to Thailand only need 
a border pass (not a passport) to cross borders, and can travel as far as Udorn Thani (but 
no further).  There is now visa free entry across ASEAN borders, but the process of 
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obtaining travel documents and permission to travel still prevents many people from 
using legitimate means to travel for work purposes.          
Highlanders 
 
In 2002, a disabled Thai athlete known as ‘Nat’ was unable to participate in the FESPIC 
games in South Korea because he could not produce documentary evidence of his 
citizenship.273  The nineteen year old weightlifter, crippled by polio, had no evidence of 
his parentage or where he was born, so was classified by an orphanage as a “hilltribe” 
member due to his appearance only.  He was therefore not able to gain sufficient 
documentary evidence to prove his Thai citizenship and was denied an education and the 
chance to compete internationally for Thailand.  He won a bronze medal at the National 
Games for the Disabled in Bangkok.  The Sports Authority of Thailand requires all 
competitors representing the country to hold Thai citizenship, so Nat was also excluded 
from competing in the Inthanon Games in Chiang Mai and was not permitted to travel.  
His case is similar to the experience of many people born in Thailand without access to 
citizenship or identity documents, who can not travel or access citizenship rights.     
 
The history of struggle between highlanders and the Thai authorities, where there has 
been sufficient power available to advocate on their behalf, has become violent.  In May 
1999, the Thai Government was accused of applying “double standards” when Thai 
Police violently dispersed 3,000 “hill-tribe people” protesting in Chiang Mai to demand 
equal citizenship entitlements.274  1,600 police dispersed 3,000 protesters in front of the 
provincial hall.  Their protest was organised to pressure the government to “speed up 
issuing citizenship cards” and “resolve conflict over natural resource management.”  So 
people demanding their rights in accessing documentation are routinely subject to arrest 
and violence from the authorities.  Bribery and corruption are barriers in obtaining 
citizenship documents, and complaints about rent-seeking officials are common.   
 
Ms Meeju, an Akha leader reported: "All we ask is equal rights with Thai citizens. We 
have long suffered discrimination because we lack citizenship."  She claimed officials 
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extorted money by accusing hill-tribe people of immigration or narcotics violations.  “It 
is estimated that 40-60% of 834,000 hill-tribe people lack citizenship cards.”275   
 
Meeju alleged officials also exploited people by taking their money: “If there is 100 baht, 
they take it.  If there is 1,000 baht, they take it.”276  If there is more, that person is likely 
to be branded a drug pusher and put into jail.”  The identity cards issued by the 
government restricted people to residing within their villages - a practice she described as 
“no different from keeping animals in zoo cages.” 
 
The often-used ethnic descriptor ‘hill-tribes’ or ‘highlanders’ is problematic, covers a 
broad spectrum, and is also potentially discriminatory.  Many people classified as 
‘highlanders’ can also be identified in other ethnic categories as ‘Shan, Karen, Hmong, 
Lisu,’ etc.  One Shan respondent interviewed by the researcher accurately identified the 
complexity and confusion created by using topographical markers of identity. 
 
At the time my status was complicated as I had two different identification cards.  
I first registered as a ‘highlander.’  I was also registered as a migrant labourer, 
so I had two concurrent identity documents.  One was as a ‘highlander’ or 
foreigner. The other was as a registered foreign labourer.  The two were not 
consistent or linked. 
 
However, Thailand is not the only country to designate ethnicity by altitude or 
topography.  Vietnamese often refer to ‘montagnards,’ and the Lao PDR officially 
classifies ethnicity according to three notional altitudinal categories of Lao Loum (or 
lowlanders), Lao Theung (or uplanders) and Lao Soung (or ‘highlanders’).  The intention 
is not always derogatory, and the definitions are by no means exclusive (ie there are 
ethnic groups classified as highlanders who live in cities and vice versa).  The term ‘hill-
tribes’ is still frequently used to describe a range of people living at altitude in Thailand.  
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Thailand’s Nationality Act of 1913, which confirmed receipt of citizenship from a Thai 
father reflects the nationalistic intent that rights would be conferred and inherited from 
Thai parents.  This effectively alienated and changed attitudes towards Karen, Hmong, 
Yao, Shan, and other groups277.  While Karen and others were subject to draft, tax and 
other obligations of citizenship, this changed following efforts to draft a group of Hmong 
and Yao in 1921.  A Thai official recommended chasing them out of the country by 
“burning their villages” because “they were not Thai.”278  Fortunately other authorities 
intervened, suggesting it would be more appropriate to leave them alone, and those 
groups that were not already enrolled as citizens were completely ignored.     
 
Around 1.2 million people from various upland minorities reside in Thailand279.  
According to the University of Chiang Mai, only 150,000, or around twelve per cent of 
these ‘highlanders’ have Thai citizenship.  About 650,000 reside in Thailand temporarily 
with ‘blue’ identification cards, which restrict travel beyond a certain radius.  Another 
400,000 have no legal status whatsoever.  Chutima Morlaeku, a leading member of the 
Thai Assembly of Indigenous Tribes, highlights a survey result indicating ‘citizenship’ as 
the foremost priority for highlanders, without which they would be “deprived of their 
right to education, employment and travel, in short to live free and fair on Thai soil.”280 
 
The devil is in the detail of the definition.  'Full citizenship' can be granted to aliens 
provided they meet certain requirements, but the category of their citizenship entitles 
them to a certain type of document/s (ID cards - bat prachachon and house registrations - 
tabian baan), which uniquely identifies them as belonging to a certain group and places 
some (legal some social) restrictions on their actual participation as full members of the 
community.  So while the part of their house registration that says 'citizenship' (sunchat) 
says 'Thai' - the next field on the form is 'race or ethnicity' (cheuachat) and identifies 
them as Chinese, highlanders, Vietnamese, or whatever.  So while they have been granted 
Thai nationality in a legal sense, they are not fully Thai citizens in a social sense. 
                                                 
277 Turton, 2000, p. 79. 
278 Turton, 2000, p. 79. 
279 Chiang Mai University, March 2003. 




According to a collection of legislation collated by the Department of Local 
Administration there are two references for highlander - one for 'pookhon bon peun ti 
soong (or 'highlanders') and chum chon bon peun ti soong  ('highland communities').  The 
first group pookhon bon peun ti soong (or 'upland dwellers') is divided into two 
categories:  chao kao dang derm (originals) and chao kao nork (outsiders). 
 
1.  The ‘chao kao dung derm,’ or 'original highlanders' comprise Thai people 
(researcher's emphasis) who possess no official evidence of registration documents.  This 
was either because they were excluded from census data or resided in isolated or remote 
areas where government officials could not make contact.  Upon consideration, a decision 
was therefore made to grant citizenship to this group in the 'tabian baan chao Thai 
pookao' highland dweller house registrations enacted under the provisions of the Royal 
Decree (Nationality Act) of 2535 (1992) amended and revised in 2539 (1996). 
 
2.  The ‘chao kao nork,’ or 'outside highlanders,' meaning those highlanders who had 
migrated from outside the country from Myanmar, Lao(s), or China.  This group was not 
born in Thailand, but after migrating to reside in Thailand produced descendants, who 
were not eligible for Thai citizenship according to the provisions of the Royal Decree 
(Nationality Act) of 2535 (1992).   In accordance with a Ministerial regulation issued in 
2538 (1995) on the 'status of highlanders who had migrated to Thailand' in 20 provinces, 
these groups were issued with blue identification cards with limited access to services. 
 
The NESDB (National Social and Economic Development Board) requested an accurate 
survey of highland communities, which was completed in twenty provinces in the same 
way as the highland dwellers.281  The survey was limited as only statistics were provided 
and no historical data of highland communities was gathered.   Therefore, the responsible 
committee produced historical data for 1,975 families, 7,303 people in 2542 (1999) in the 
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twenty provinces, and agreed that the persons in the directory of highland communities 
would receive green cards with red borders. 
 
The purpose of providing the above statistics is to illustrate the complex task of 
registering and keeping track of minorities within Thailand.  The process is 
discriminatory and unclear.  Participants are subject to restrictions on movement, 
harassment, detention, discrimination, and are required to pay bribes to obtain 
documents.  The highlanders continue to struggle with bureaucracy and discrimination in 
seeking to assert citizenship rights.  They continue to be associated with security issues 
such as insurgency and drug trafficking.  The organisation of support groups, with 
funding and monitoring from the international community, to seek greater government 
support for citizenship rights, and protection from corrupt or inept officials, has improved 
the situation.  Large numbers of people continue to live beyond the legal boundaries of 
the Thai State, without access to education, medical treatment, and protection of 
employment rights.  Highlanders stand accused of destroying the environment through 
swidden farm practices, and the solutions to the citizenship and empowerment struggles 
they face are linked to forest management and land use planning.282   
 
Malaysia and Southern Thailand 
 
Thailand’s three southern provinces (Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat), and four districts in 
Songhkla Province, are predominantly Malay-Muslim.  Historically these areas were 
notionally independent Malay Sultantates.   The known history of the region extends back 
to the kingdom of Langkasuka, around the first century AD. Three southern provinces – 
Patani, Yala and Narathiwat – and four districts in Songhkla, became known as Patani or 
Patani Raya (Greater Patani) from around the fifteenth century. Patani was a regional 
trading power, one of the leading centres of Islam in Southeast Asia, and an important 
component in the politics of the Malayan peninsula.  The factors and events leading to the 
violent insurgency in this region are complex and have contributed to a vigorous debate 
on citizenship issues and identity.  
                                                 




The southern regions also maintained a significant relationship with the powerful 
Siamese kingdoms of Ayuthaya and, from the late eighteenth century, Bangkok. For 
much of the time Patani enjoyed a degree of independence under what was often a loose 
tributary arrangement. However, after the founding of Bangkok, Siamese forces crushed 
Patani in 1786 and took control.   There were several rebellions in subsequent years, but 
Siam still managed to assert strong influence over local affairs. In the late nineteenth 
century King Chulalongkorn introduced a policy of centralization, and in 1902 the area 
was annexed under Siamese sovereignty, confirmed by the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 
1909 when Thailand ceded Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu to British Malaya. 
 
In 2001, the researcher visited the palace that once belonged to the Sultan of Patani and 
met his grandson, who still retains a measure of symbolic hereditary authority.  The 
palace was run down and sheep roamed freely in the grounds.  The ground was sandy and 
the gardens sparse and well kept.  The researcher was escorted by a local historian, a 
former insurgent, who had returned to the city from the mountains and exchanged his gun 
for a pen to write the history of Patani.283   
 
We visited Muslim cemeteries and ancient mosques.  The historian pointed out facts of 
interest and explaining the history as we went.  We paid our respects at important grave 
sites, and spent a day talking to the imam at the Krue Se Mosque.  On 28 April 2004, this 
site was desecrated in fighting after militants attacked several police stations.  The 
military stormed the mosque and killed all of the militants.  The mosque suffered 
considerable damage from grenades and machine-gun fire.  Acknowledging the 
significance of the site, the government later spent millions attempting to restore it to its 
former glory.  The Imam at Krue Se mosque painted a vivid picture of the original 
conquest in the area between Siam and Malay Sultans.  He described scenes of elephants 
crushing people with their feet, and lines of slaves chained together, with the chains 
pierced through their Achilles tendons marching to the capital.  The symbolic 
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significance of the Krue Se massacre has had grave consequences for stability and 
citizenship in southern Thailand.   
 
The southern insurgency is a sad legacy of historical enmity, party, and personality 
politics staged like a deadly chess game.  It suffers from decades of neglect and ignorance 
from inept officials sent to what they perceived was a miserable backwater, determined to 
make the most of the situation by abusing their authority.  International actors and 
insurgents from other countries have exacerbated the problem as part of the broader 
international ‘War on Terror.’  The insurgents are demanding an independent state.   
 
The potential political solution could perhaps include a mixture of limited autonomy, 
economic development, and intelligence.  Thousands of people have been killed in the 
violence, which sharply escalated in 2004.  Excesses by a government and military 
attempting to show a strong hand, have worsened the situation.  On 25 October 2004, at 
least eighty five youths were brutally murdered by Thai soldiers, stacked on top of each 
other, hands tied behind their backs, into military trucks after a riot was forcibly put 
down by the authorities in a place called Tak Bai.  The evidence of the incident is 
shameful and horrific.  Most of the victims died of suffocation, but any others were 
beaten to death, and a number were shot in the head.  Anybody looking for the source of 
anger and frustration and the roots of violence perpetuating the insurgency need search 
no further than these events. 
 
 Around 70% of Satun is also Malay, but the province was previously linked to Kedah 
not Patani, and its more integrated, Thai-speaking population has never been the centre of 
violent resistance to Bangkok.  According to the 2000 census Narathiwat has around 
546,450 Muslims (82% of the population), Patani 482,760 (81%), Yala 286,005 (69%) 
and Satun 168,640 (68%); Songkhla also has 291,392 Muslims, and although this is less 
than 25% of the provincial population four Malay majority districts adjacent to Malaysia 
have also been caught up in the recent conflict. In total Malay-Muslims in the five 
southern provinces number around 1,775,247, and 2,345,800 for the 14 southern 




Malays in Southern Thailand and Malaysia maintain close ties despite political divisions. 
Families cross the border to visit extended links on either side.  The language in Southern 
Thailand is identical to the dialect in Kelantan and Terengganu States – though many 
Thais describe it as ‘Jawi,’ which correctly refers to the written Arabic-based script. Most 
Southerners are poly or bilingual, and Malay is widely spoken in the three southernmost 
provinces.  Many Southerners identify themselves as ethnically Malay with Thai 
citizenship.  The conflict has persisted for centuries. 
 
The researcher interviewed a senior Thai Police General responsible for security in the 
southern provinces.  At first he presented a military perspective; “the area had a violent 
history for many decades.”  He acknowledged military excesses and administrative and 
bureaucratic errors. The perceptions created by politicians keen to present an image of 
control did not help to improve the situation.  He did not advocate violence, but 
emphasised the need for understanding and a measured approach taking into account the 
diversity and needs of local people.   
 
The police had difficulty with ‘hot pursuit’ of terrorists and bandits, particularly in 
relation to cooperation with Kelantan State across the border in Malaysia.  The leaders of 
the former sultanate were opposed to the current government in Kuala Lumpur and either 
actively or tacitly supported the insurgents.  This was creating problems for law 
enforcement, and little could be done until the local political situation in Malaysia 
evolved.  Security operatives could not perform their duties overtly in Kelantan as they 
were in danger of being discovered and killed.  It is likely that more radical Islamic 
elements in Kelantan had some sympathy for the separatists seeking to return the three 
southern provinces to Malay States.   
 
Thais regularly cross the border for trade purposes and for education in Malaysia, while 
some Malaysians study at renowned Islamic schools (Pondok) in Thailand.  Islamic 
teachers and Imams cross the border as the exchange in language and religious teaching 
in the area is close.  Large numbers of Thai Muslims have also sought employment in 
Malaysia.  The border between the two countries has never been a barrier to movement. 
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A large number of people on both sides of the border have dual nationality.  In theory 
Malaysia does not allow dual citizenship, but in practice this is not an obstacle.  Dual 
nationals may be counted in the tens or hundreds of thousands.  In practice, it is not 
always people with dual citizenship that are imvolved in the insurgency and removing 
citizenship is not likely to resolve the security issues in Southern Thailand284.    
 
Border residents without dual citizenship are able to cross over with a border pass valid 
for six months rather than using a passport. But many do not even bother with this. 
According to a recent report in 2006 1,468 crossed the west side of the border legally to 
obtain employment, while at least 50,000 crossed illegally.  Another report on the east 
side of the border notes that despite a legal crossing at Sungai Kolok, many commuters 
prefer to cross illegally, and authorities do nothing to stop them.  In August 2004, the two 
countries agreed to replace the border pass with new ‘smart cards’ being  introduced in 
each country, but the date for commencing this scheme has yet to be announced. 
 
The violent insurgency is continuing to destroy lives in Southern Thailand.  It is clear that 
one of the many reasons for this is the exclusionary politics and limited citizenship 
resources applied on a differential basis to the people in the provinces of Yala, Patani, 
and Narathiwat.  Reconciliation will require a combination of diplomacy, intelligence, 
resources, and the recognition of citizenship rights in an autonomous region of Thailand.  
                                                 
284 Bangkok Post, 17 and 28 July 2002, Violence in the South, and Best of Both Worlds. 
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9. Interviews and Case Studies – Shan in Northern Thailand 
 
The researcher conducted an informal sample series of twelve interviews with Shan who 
had recently migrated to Thailand and their descendents to explore contemporary 
attitudes to citizenship and access to social services.  The interviews were conducted in 
2011 and 2012 with the informed written consent of participants, who were provided with 
details of research objectives in the Thai language.  Most participants were labourers or 
students contacted through university students and other contacts in Chiang Mai.  A range 
of age groups was sought to provide a sample cross section of attitudes.  Interviews were 
conducted in the Thai language, and translated into English by the researcher.  Some Thai 
citizens were also interviewed to provide a contrasting view, to highlight stereotypes and 
explore broader awareness on citizenship and the experience of migrants in Thailand.   
 
The researcher acknowledges  limitations associated with a small sample group.  The 
primary objective of the case studies and interviews, however, was not to offer detailed 
empirical data or analysis of the combined circumstances of Shan migrants, but to 
introduce common themes regarding attitudes to citizenship, discrimination, and confirm 
restrictions in access to social services.  These same interviews could perhaps be 
conducted with other groups in Thailand with very similar, if not identical, results.  The 
interviews were successful in confirming the existence of confusion and prejudice in Thai 
society regarding citizenship, both within the target sample, and among Thai people more 
generally.  The results from interviews clearly confirmed the core proposition of this 
thesis that Thailand has implemented a differentiated citizenship model to keep track of 
citizens and outsiders using identity documentation.   
 
The view of citizenship corresponding with ethnicity was demonstrated clearly through 
one respondent, who had lived and worked in Thailand for 23 years, by his statement: 
 
I don’t feel that I am Thai at all because it is not easy to become Thai.  I just need 
documentary evidence to prove that I am able to reside in Thailand and that 
would be enough. I would like to obtain Thai citizenship so that I don’t feel that I 
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am disadvantaged, and so other people don’t look down on me, and so it is easier 
and more convenient to find work. 
 
This statement shows outsiders don’t automatically consider themselves eligible for 
citizenship, regardless of length of stay.  They expect to be excluded on racial grounds 
regardless of their contribution to society or other factors.  Documentary evidence is 
required for a utilitarian purpose, to make it ‘easier and more convenient to find work’ or 
‘so other people don’t look down on me’ rather than to become a full member of society.  
Migrant groups often do not feel they are eligible for citizenship, or any right to access 
social services such as medical facilities or education.  This attitude, which appears 
prevalent among migrant labourers from Myanmar, including the Shan, demonstrates that 
Thailand has a long way to go in ensuring a cohesive social framework with generations 
of migrants seeking access to citizenship.  The creation of large numbers of ‘outsiders’ 
within Thailand, who have no expectation or hope of achieving a degree of citizenship, is 
a serious social problem, particularly over time for future generations.  
  
There was, perhaps surprisingly, evidence of some understanding on the issues limiting 
access to citizenship, but also wide expectations that citizenship should be forthcoming 
where children are born in Thailand.  Several respondents, for example, acknowledged 
the questionable perception that foreigners are responsible for crime, and will not face 
justice, because they don’t have identity documents.  This is a common perception, but 
there appears little evidence one way or another to support the proposition that foreigners 
in Thailand are responsible for more crime than Thai citizens285. 
  
It is a problem for Thailand because of all the foreigners.  It is impossible to 
register them all and find their whereabouts, so when they commit crimes it is not 
possible to make them accountable.  The government should investigate everyone 
who does not have citizenship and register them to protect society.  
 
                                                 
285 The researcher discussed the availability of crime statistics, particularly for violent crimes, with the 
assistant to the Commissioner of the Royal Thai Police in 2007.  He confessed that the Thai police do not 
keep accurate statistics, but this information might be available through journalists or other sources.  He 
suggested that the best place to hide from police was in Bangkok, where it was relatively easy to become 
anonymous due to the large transitory population.  Many murders and other crimes were never resolved.  
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It is an important problem for Thailand because if people don’t have citizenship 
and commit crimes it is difficult to bring them to justice.  There is no evidence to 
show where the person comes from or who they are.  The way to resolve this is for 
the government to investigate people in each area and provide registrations for 
foreigners. 
 
There appeared to be broad, almost unanimous, agreement among respondents that 
citizenship should permit access to social services such as education and health care.  
This was clearly an issue for most of the respondents, who identified that they had 
experienced discrimination.  One participant suggested that children of migrants had a 
greater degree of eligibility. 
 
People should have the same rights, as people without citizenship also need 
access to medical services.  Diseases don’t differentiate between people of 
different citizenship or background and affect all of us.  Therefore people without 
citizenship need to pay extra to access medical services.  This is not equitable. 
 
Maybe they should have the same access in some circumstances.  Especially 
children born in Thailand from outsiders who have been here a long time should 
have the same access to education and medical facilities.  This would be a good 
outcome for their children. 
 
People should have the same access to services as we all live in the same society.  
It doesn’t matter where people come from, or if they don’t have citizenship, 
everyone should have the same access to social services as this makes society run 
effectively.  These services should be provided efficiently by the authorities. 
 
Some respondents, however, generously suggested migrants should be made to pay a 
‘higher price’ for access to education, medical, or other social services. 
 
I think there should be some access to social services, such as medical treatment, 




It is not possible to make it equal, because the system does not allow people to be 
treated equally.  It might be possible to enable access for highlanders, but they 
need to pay a higher price to access social services. 
 
Respondents echoed popular perceptions about foreign workers taking jobs from Thai 
citizens.  In reality, the researcher would argue that the dangerous, dirty, and difficult 
jobs taken by migrants have increased the size of the Thai economy and the labour force, 
and Thai workers would not take up these positions if all the migrants suddenly departed 
tomorrow.  As outlined in previous chapters, many of the migrant workers are also 
fleeing persecution in other countries, and would have difficulty returning.  So a job in 
Thailand with poor conditions and limited access to citizenship and social services is 
better than no economic opportunities in a conflict situation where it is possible to be  
 
Illegal migrants are coming to Thailand in larger numbers and trying to find 
work.  This is taking work from Thai citizens.  When there is bad news about 
migrants and people without citizenship this is a problem because we don’t know 
who is good and who isn’t and it encourages people to think of migrants in a bad 
way.  We should solve this problem by limiting the number of outsiders or 
migrants in Thailand.  People without citizenship or outsiders, or illegal 
migrants, should all be made to live together so they can be monitored. 
 
Simple responses provided evidence of an educated and balanced view of citizenship as 
defined in the introduction to this thesis, as a right of access to social and other services. 
 
Citizenship is useful because you can use this for different things such as to study, 
to attend the hospital for medical treatment, and for democratic participation. 
 
The interviews were not intended to be representative of accurate views on citizenship or 
policy.  In fact, the confusion represented in the responses regarding citizenship reflects 
different cultural attitudes about citizenship and access to rights, as well as broader 
community attitudes and confusion regarding complex legal and political concepts.  That 
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people might not always know their rights or obligations as citizens, and how to access 
the system, is illustrative of a lack of availability of basic information on registration and 
citizenship rights for migrants.  That is the most revealing conclusion to be drawn from 
these interviews, and the basis for further action in raising awareness to improve access. 
  
Some respondents nonetheless demonstrated a reasonably good grasp of how to access 
rights, the obstacles to gaining access to services, and how to address them.  It is also 
possible that in some cases participants may have been (too) polite in their responses and 
not comfortable enough to go directly to the point about access to social services or 
citizenship.  Responses also need to be viewed in a cultural context, where participants 
might answer in a certain manner to avoid controversy or creating offence, in weighing 
up the value of a positive response.  One respondent adopted a rather cryptic, suggestive, 
approach, hinting at the expectation that Thailand become more flexible and generous in 
its approach to migration and equity. 
 
Thai citizenship is a good citizenship.  Thai people are sometimes kind and 
helpful to others from other citizenships.  This is evidenced by the assistance of 
some kind people who help others who need medical assistance; even if they came 
from another country they would receive the same access to medical services.  
Thai people should also provide the same wages to people from other countries 
for the work they perform. 
 
While there are some positive developments, particularly with access to education for 
descendants of migrant workers through issuing birth certificates and identification cards, 
the interviews identify key trends in confirming a lack of access to health and other social 
services.  Migrants are limited in where and when they are able to travel, and face 
arbitrary arrest and extortion, or ‘rent-seeking behavior from police selectively enforcing 
regulations.  As one person pointed out, ‘disease does not differentiate’ and it is in the 
interest of society to ensure better access to medical services for migrants.  There was 
evidence of what could be described as ‘normal’ confusion about the different between 
citizenship, ethnicity, and nationality.  One response linked citizenship to religion, 
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indicating that self-identification and identity is a critical component of determining 
citizenship.   
 
Responses from children of migrant parents demonstrated various levels of confusion and 
understanding regarding access to citizenship and social services.  Some responses were 
sophisticated, highlighting that there is some community awareness of citizenship issues, 
and the means to acquire full citizenship. 
 
Citizenship decides the nationality of a person.  Nationality can sometimes show 
the roots of citizenship, which might come from different reasons, like people who 
were not born in Thailand but lived there for a long time so are able to acquire 
citizenship.  
 
I think I am a Thai person with citizenship because I was born in Thailand, and I 
have Thai blood.  I think Thai citizenship is an excellent thing, and I am proud to 
be Thai even though my mother was not Thai. 
 
I have Thai citizenship, but if I didn’t I would need to get it because it is not 
possible to safely live your life in Thailand without Thai citizenship.  It has a 
benefit for your safety, various rights and needs in society that Thai citizens can 
get.  People living in Thailand therefore need to obtain Thai citizenship. 
 
The final chapter draws together conclusions based on the data and interviews in this 
research project, and offers some recommendations for further research. It also offers 
some normative recommendations on possible improvements to citizenship policy in 




10. Conclusion - Differentiated Citizenship: Blood Sweat and Tears 
 
In conclusion, the above evidence confirms that Thailand has adopted a differentiated 
citizenship model to keep track of citizens and outsiders.  This model discriminates 
between various groups and individuals residing in Thailand on the basis of security, 
historical and racial prejudice, class and ethnicity.  Millions of people living in Thailand, 
including many who were born there and have lived there for generations, speak Thai, 
and contribute meaningfully to society, have limited or no access to medical services or 
education, are subject to arrest and violence, and can not travel freely in the country.  The 
procedures surrounding access to identity documentation are archaic and inconsistent, 
and nationality law is applied inconsistently  by different departments and officials in 
different places, depending on the situation. 
 
In some respects, perhaps, a differentiated approach may appear to make logical sense, 
given the varied experience of groups living near Thailand’s borders with Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos (and the Vietnamese and Chinese migrants).  Each group 
brings a different set of humanitarian and security circumstances and associated 
challenges for the Thai Government.  Thailand’s Southern provinces (Yala, Pattani, 
Narathiwat), for example, are engaged in a violent secessionist insurgency where the 
politics of culture, language, and ethnic nationalism are critical weapons used by both 
sides.  Perhaps a more inclusive approach to citizenship could be the key to resolving this 
conflict and others.  But the introduction of a structured system of documentary evidence 
to classify human beings in a hierarchy of access to social services reeks of inequality.      
 
Differentiation of citizenship, like discrimination based on rural origins explored more 
deeply in the first chapter, is also a geographical phenomenon.  In Bangkok, economic 
opportunities are seized by Chinese and Indian traders and merchants.  Labourers in 
Southern Thailand, from Samut Prakarn to the Malay border, particularly in fisheries, are 
overwhelmingly from Myanmar, with an estimated 2.5 to 4 million people in this 
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category, many of them working illegally.286 In Northern Thailand, the Shan (Tai Yai) 
dominate the migrant labour and unskilled workforce, making up the large number of 
labourers in garment and other large factories situated along the border.  And, in the arid 
North East, Vietnamese migrant and settlers gravitate to trading and market economies, 
while Khmer, Lao, and other minorities compliment the agricultural labour force.       
 
Furthermore, there is a lack of awareness about access to citizenship.  Migrants are not 
encouraged to participate in politics, and any protest can result in violence or legal action.  
Migrant labourers are particularly vulnerable, and subject to exploitation and debt 
bondage by agents and employers.  This is particularly acute where women and children 
are trafficked in the sex industry from neighbouring countries.  The ambiguity present in 
the system encourages ‘rent seeking’ by officials, and ensures that a significant number 
of migrant workers in Thailand exist in an unsafe space beyond legal or other protection.  
The officials assigned with protection of migrants are in the best position to exploit them. 
 
A (formerly) well respected senior doctor at the Police General Hospital, for example, 
was recently arrested for murdering a Thai couple and “at least four of his Myanmar 
workers.”287  The doctor kept a large armoury of guns and was accused of torturing and 
tormenting his workers.  The terrifying and chilling reality about the case is not only that 
this criminal behavior could take place over a period of many years without detection, but 
that the perpetrator was a senior public official who managed to maintain a level of 
impunity without being called to account for his actions.  In fact, it was only when 
several ‘Thai’ victims later went missing, that he was eventually brought to justice.        
 
In seeking to explain how Thailand determines who is entitled to citizenship we need to 
continue to assess the historical methods employed by Siamese sovereigns to keep track 
of subjects; and the impact of foreign ideas such as the superimposition of the territorial 
                                                 
286 Thailand Rescues Trafficked Burmese Fishermen, 25 March 2013, The Irrawaddy, viewed 10 April 
2013 http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/30462 
287 Bangkok Post, 23 September 2012, Police Seize Doctor. 
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nation-state over the Siamese geo-body.288  The interplay between these events, native 
reactions to this process, and the aftermath of social changes associated with these 
phenomena have established the boundaries of modern Thai citizenship.  The imposition 
of documentary controls, such as identification cards and registration certificates, have 
further complicated the process of determining entitlement to citizenship.   
 
Historical events, conflict, and powerful economic and social forces have shaped the 
development of Thai citizenship and set the parameters for inclusion and exclusion.  The 
future will be determined by the ‘nam jai’ or ‘generosity’ of leaders and the general 
population.  Thailand needs to redefine citizenship, so that ‘the outsiders’ inside Thailand 
are included on equal terms rather than exploited as expendable labour.  This is a serious 
human rights problem, as evidenced by the record of abuse and deaths of migrant 
workers.  The fishing industry alone would benefit from a detailed study.  Other 
industries and groups have specific issues that may require more detailed analysis. 
 
The differentiation of citizenship is enforced through the system of documentary evidence 
used to categorise people in a complex hierarchical system of social stratification.  
Identification cards adopt a discriminatory numbering and colour system to classify 
ethnic origins, limiting movement and access to social services.289  The identification 
cards are linked to a system of household registration forming documentary evidence of 
origins and family ties.  These documents replaced tattoos and wristbands in identifying 
social categories in a new complex differentiated hierarchy of citizenship. 
  
The impact of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 was manifested in increased internal 
migration. About 180,000 people left urban centers for rural areas.290  In 1998 the Thai 
government set a target for the repatriation of 300,000 illegal foreign workers.  298,480 
migrants were rounded up and deported and many found their way back again illegally.  
Complaints from employers deprived of a workforce brought a reversal of the policy for 
                                                 
288Thai legal historiography divides the development of a legal system into two distinct phases: the ‘pre-
modern’ and ‘modern,’ roughly coinciding with the introduction of Western influence and the decline of 
absolutism, A Legal History of Thailand, 2000, p. 43. 
289 The categories of the identification cards are described in Appendix 3. 
290 IOM, World Migration Report 2000, p. 92. 
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certain industries.  95,000 Burmese, Lao and Cambodian migrants were permitted 
employment in rice mills, cane and rubber plantations, pig farms and fishing vessels.291    
 
The introduction of higher minimum wages by populist regimes increases the pressure on 
migrants by pushing undocumented workers further underground.  Rather than promoting 
responsible labour practices, this may result in increasing exploitation.  There is 
widespread evidence of exploitation by employers, recruitment agents, and the 
authorities.292  Migrant workers work in difficult and dangerous conditions, are often not 
paid, are subject to arrest, detention, deportation, and have been killed in transit or by 
their employers.  They are not entitled to join unions and have limited access to courts.  
While specific international instruments protect the rights of both migrant and illegal 
workers in principle, this is entirely dependent upon local circumstances. 
 
Labour migration in Thailand continues to be spurred by conflict and poverty in 
neighboring Myanmar.  Citizenship policy is based on the erroneous expectation that 
workers might simply return home once the work is complete.  In 1996 the Thai 
government initiated a registration program allowing employers to register migrants.  The 
majority (over 70 per cent) did not participate either due to ineligibility or because 
employers were “unwilling to shoulder the government-imposed registration fee (US$40) 
and bond (US$200).”293  It is not yet clear how democratic and economic reform in 
Myanmar will improve the situation.  One Shan worker in Chiang Rai reported to the 
researcher in 2012 that she returned to Myanmar following positive news reporting 
regarding democratic and economic changes.  She discovered ongoing violent conflict in 
border areas and quickly returned to Thailand. 
 
Interviews conducted in connection with this research project demonstrated how small 
alterations to current policy can potentially have a great positive or negative impact.  For 
example, participants noted the ability to obtain a driving license had improved 
                                                 
291 IOM, World Migration Report 2000, p. 92. 
292 See Koetsawang, Pim, In Search of Sunlight, Burmese Migrant Workers in Thailand, and Lang, Hazel, 
Fear and Sanctuary, Burmese Refugees in Thailand, for well-documented examples. 
293 IOM, World Migration Report 2000, p. 91. 
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confidence through the capacity to move around and seek employment without fear of 
arbitrary arrest.  The ability of the government to provide registration services, however, 
is limited by a combination of factors including inadequate or inefficient bureaucracy, 
existing prejudice, unscrupulous employers, and a lack of knowledge or education.  
Corruption ensures that it is possible to ‘buy’ identification and citizenship documents. 
Many migrants interviewed were not aware of the process for obtaining identification 
documents.  Lack of information and access to clear instructions about rights and 
obligations for migrants is a problem that could be rectified with modest resources. 
 
The Thai government has determined that everyone in Thailand requires some form of 
identity document.  The identification card has become an important measure of access to 
society.  It is essential to take this document everywhere and present it to obtain access to 
social services.  Even if you change your name and identity, the numbering system on the 
identity cards still identifies the ethnic origins of the bearer.  The numbers in 
identification cards denote the level of access available to people living in Thailand to 
travel, go see a doctor, attend school or university, gain employment in certain sectors of 
the economy and so on.  This numerically differentiated system of citizenship is the 
method adopted by Thailand for keeping track of citizens and outsiders.  It has evolved 
from ancient methods of keeping track of subjects.  The system is now sophisticated and 
involves electronic recording of data and biometrics (such as fingerprints).   
 
There is still a measure of exclusion and discrimination in the hierarchical citizenship 
model adopted by Thailand that places some groups at the bottom of a very tall pyramid.  
There are complex historical reasons for many of these determinations, some of which 
are based on prejudice and lingering attitudes about ancient conflict that are largely 
irrelevant today.  Thailand would benefit from a more inclusive approach.  Criteria for 
allowing access to citizenship for children born in Thailand to foreign parents could be 
relaxed, for example.  This will, in time, create a more inclusive society.    
 
Thailand will be an attractive destination for migrants for as long as poverty, persecution, 
and political instability remain a fact of life in neighboring countries.  It is therefore 
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critical for Thailand and the international community to continue to contribute 
meaningfully to the development and stability of the region.  Migration has always been a 
constant factor in economic development, and it is important to demonstrate leniency and 
tolerance to include those persons fleeing conflict who have spent generations living in 
Thailand, including the Shan, Karen, Hmong, Lao, and Khmer migrants, among others.   
 
Instead of perceiving entitlement as a national security issue, Thai authorities are 
encouraged to consider citizenship in a much broader context, to acknowledge the 
contribution of migrants, and develop more equitable methods to ensure access to social 
services.  Citizenship should be offered not only to the children born of mixed marriages 
with Thai citizens and outsiders, but also to persons who have resided on Thai soil for all 
or most of their lives who can demonstrate allegiance and a connection to the country.  
Further research and consideration of the means to modify the complex differentiated 
model of citizenship adopted by Thailand should also be encouraged to seek more 
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Appendix 1: English Translations of Interviews 
 




I moved to Thailand in the year (BE) 2531 (1988) as a contract labourer for 37 baht 
(about $1.30) per day.  This was insufficient wage for my needs so I moved into the city 
(Chiang Mai). I can’t remember what day it was, about ten years ago.  I recall it was the 
day the registry changed their procedures, and I was unable to obtain registration 
documents or legalise my status.  I therefore worked without any documents as an 
undocumented illegal labourer.   
 
I later moved to Bangkok for about a year to work.  I faced problems there as I did not 
have proper documents and during crackdowns on illegal labour, I decided to move back 
to Chiang Mai to avoid detection.  One day my sister in Wiang Haeng (on the Burmese 
border), advised me that Thai authorities were registering the occupants of houses.  As 
my sister had obtained an identity card as a ‘highlander,’ and I had no legal status or 
documents, I decided to go there (in the hope of getting a registration).  At that time it 
became possible for me to attempt to legalise my status.  My child (daughter) purchased 
some land with a loan from the bank, and I was required to travel there to finalise the 
matter and regulate my legal status. 
 
Answers to Questions 
 
Are you a Thai citizen?  If not, would you like to get Thai citizenship? 
 
I don’t feel that I am Thai at all because it is not easy to become Thai.  I just need 
documentary evidence to prove that I am able to reside in Thailand and that would be 
enough. I would like to obtain Thai citizenship so that I don’t feel that I am 
disadvantaged, and so other people don’t look down on me, and so it is easier and more 
convenient to find work. 
 
Why do people need citizenship?  Why is it useful? 
 
Because citizenship for each person tells your true roots.  Citizenship is a thing that tells 
where each person comes from. 
 
Do you think Thai citizens should have equal access to education, health and other 
services?  Should these services also be available to non-citizens or residents? 
 
People should have the same rights, as people without citizenship also need access to 
medical services.  Diseases don’t differentiate between people of different citizenship or 
background and affect all of us.  Therefore people without citizenship need to pay extra 




Who do you think should be eligible for Thai citizenship (born in Thailand, long-
term residency, born to Thai parents, willing to pledge oath of allegiance etc)? 
 
People who have lived in Thailand for a long time or those whose parents are Thai, as 
both of these should be able to provide evidence of their citizenship. 
 
Do you think the issue of people without Thai citizenship is a problem for Thailand?  
How do you think the government should address this problem? 
 
I think that this is a problem in some places as we can’t always perceive people without 
Thai citizenship as ‘bad’ people all the time.  Thailand should be governed in a way that 
Thai people don’t always act in a selfish manner and take advantage of everyone else.  
Thai people sometimes take advantage of people who come to Thailand.  Agents who 
find work for people without citizenship create problems as they take advantage of 
migrants.  Selfish people use migrants and take advantages of them as they entered 
illegally.  If Thai people were less selfish then the country’s development would improve. 
  
How do you feel when people talk about people without citizenship in different 
ways, expressing views negatively? 
 
If people speak of me in a positive way, then I am pleased.  If people speak of me in a 
negative way, then I am discouraged as I have worked hard and contributed my fair 
share.  If people speak badly of me, I find this discriminatory and unfair. 
 
In your view, what is Thai citizenship? 
 
Thai citizenship is a good citizenship.  But Thai people are sometimes kind and helpful to 
others from other citizenships.  This is evidenced by the assistance of some kind people 
who help others who need medical assistance; even if they came from another country 
they would receive the same access to medical services.  Thai people should also provide 








I was born in Mae Hong Son Province.  My mother is Thai, but my father was Tai Yai 
(Shan) and does not have Thai citizenship.  My mother registered my birth normally with 
the Thai authorities, but I didn’t receive Thai citizenship until I was three years old.  My 
father passed away before he could obtain Thai citizenship.  My mother took me to 
Chiang Mai after my father’s death, so could I finish High School. 
 
At present I am still studying.  I feel that part of my body is Shan and part of me is Thai, 




Why do people need citizenship?  Why is it useful? 
 
Citizenship makes other people know which country we are part of, and what religion we 
adhere to.  Everybody needs citizenship as this says who we are.     
 
How does nationality (racial or ethnic origin) affect citizenship? 
 
Citizenship is the letter of the law about where people are born.  Some people may be 
born outside their country of nationality.  Nationality is something that people have since 
they were born, from their ancestors.  It is not something that can be changed.     
 
Do you think Thai citizens should have equal access to education, health and other 
services?  Should these services also be available to non-citizens or residents? 
 
Maybe they should have the same access in some circumstances.  Especially children 
born in Thailand from outsiders who have been here a long time should have the same 
access to education and medical facilities.  This would be a good outcome for their 
children. 
 
Who do you think should be eligible for Thai citizenship (eg. born in Thailand, long-
term residency, born to Thai parents, willing to pledge oath of allegiance etc)? 
 
People born in Thailand should have Thai citizenship.  People who were not born in 
Thailand should be able to apply for citizenship from the authorities. 
 
Why do people need citizenship?  Why is it useful? 
 
Citizenship is useful because you can use this for different things such as to study, to 





If someone talked about the citizenship of you father, how do you feel? 
 
If people speak of my father in a good way, that is OK, but if they speak badly, that’s too 
bad because I never thought my father’s origin or citizenship was a bad thing for me. 
 
How would you feel if you didn’t get citizenship from your mother? 
 
I would feel very bad.  If I had to go to school and feel that I was strange because I didn’t 
have Thai citizenship I would be ashamed. 
 
Do you think the issue of people without Thai citizenship is a problem for Thailand?  
How do you think the government should address this problem? 
 
It is a big problem because illegal migrants are coming to Thailand in larger numbers and 
trying to find work.  This is taking work from Thai citizens.  When there is bad news 
about migrants and people without citizenship this is a problem because we don’t know 
who is good and who isn’t and it encourages people to think of migrants in a bad way.   
 
We should solve this problem by limiting the number of outsiders or migrants in 
Thailand.  People without citizenship or outsiders, or illegal migrants, should all be made 
to live together so they can be monitored and they can help each other. 
 
If people without citizenship, migrant workers, or outsiders marry Thai people, the 
number of children should be limited to two in the family.  If they have many children 





Category – Mother is Tai Yai (Shan) and child (interviewee) has a Thai identity 




My mother fled as a refugee and came into Mae Hong Son from Shan State (Myanmar) 
many years ago.  She fell in love with my father.  Their life was very difficult so my 
father left for another woman and I was left alone with my mother.    
 
My mother took me to Chiang Mai to find work, but did not have any other identification 
for me, other than an identity card as a ‘highlander’ as my father did not originally 
register my birth or take any responsibility.  My mother had identification as a 
‘highlander.’   
 
One day, I reached the age to attend school, but did not have any identification.  In the 
end my father was Thai, and we were able to register my citizenship.  Fortunately another 
relative assisted us to find other Thai citizens in the village and make a statement that I 
could be included in the registration of the village.  Therefore I was able to obtain Thai 
citizenship because of the assistance of this person, who we considered a close family 
member.  I was very lucky and grateful to be able to do this so owe a large debt of 




Are you a Thai citizen?  If not, would you like to get Thai citizenship? 
 
I think I am a Thai person with citizenship because I was born in Thailand, and I have 
Thai blood.  I think Thai citizenship is an excellent thing, and I am proud to be Thai even 
though my mother was not Thai. 
 
I have Thai citizenship, but if I didn’t I would need to get it because it is not possible to 
safely live your life in Thailand without Thai citizenship.  It has a benefit for your safety, 
various rights and needs in society that Thai citizens can get.  People living in Thailand 
therefore need to obtain Thai citizenship. 
 
Why do people need citizenship?  Why is it useful? 
 
Because having citizenship as a member of the population identifies who you are, where 
you come from, and what access you have to political participation and social services.  
 
What access to services does citizenship provide?  What do you get from Thai 
citizenship? 
 
The first thing I get from Thai citizenship is I have a Thai identity card.  It gives me the 




I feel proud of the good things that other Thai people built, because I am a Thai person 
too and wish to contribute to this as well. 
 
Do you think Thai citizens should have equal access to education, health and other 
services?  Should these services also be available to non-citizens or residents? 
 
I think there should be some access to social services, such as medical treatment, by 
outsiders, but perhaps they should pay a higher price to access these services. 
 
Having obtained citizenship, how is this different from not having citizenship? 
 
I feel that I am Thai in my heart and soul.  It makes me more confident that I have 
citizenship. 
 
How does nationality (racial or ethnic origin) affect citizenship? 
 
I feel that citizenship decides the nationality of a person.  Nationality can sometimes 
show the roots of citizenship, which might come from different reasons, like people who 
were not born in Thailand but lived there for a long time, so be able to then obtain 
citizenship.  Citizenship and nationality determine the customs and culture of people.  
 
Who do you think should be eligible for Thai citizenship (eg. born in Thailand, long-
term residency, born to Thai parents, willing to pledge oath of allegiance)? 
 
I think this is not a simple issue.  Citizenship should be given to people who deserve it.  
Those who have been in Thailand for a long time, those who were born in Thailand, or 










I moved to Thailand in BE 2547 (2004).  I moved to Chiang Mai with my older sister.  I 
worked as a domestic maid in a house, but the wage was very low, and the employer had 
a difficult routine so I resigned.  One day someone suggested I seek proper registration so 
that I could work more freely, so I did.  At the time I only had a foreign identification 
card that showed that I was a migrant worker.  I met a Thai man during my studies at the 
Wat Pa Phao temple school in Chiang Mai.  I was learning Thai language.  I studied for 
two years so I could read and write and fell pregnant to my Thai husband.   
 
At the time my status was complicated as I had two different identification cards.  I first 
registered as a ‘highlander.’  I was also registered as a migrant labourer, so I had two 
concurrent identity documents.  One was as a ‘highlander’ or foreigner. The other was as 
a registered foreign labourer.  The two were not consistent or linked. 
 
So when my child was born, I went to register the birth at the district office.  I was 
advised my identity as ‘highlander’ was not valid as it had expired, and I was told to 
quickly update it.  So in the registration of my child’s birth, I wrote that his father is a 
Thai citizen, and mother Shan.  I was proud that my child was able to be a Thai citizen as 
my husband was a Thai citizen.  I did not extend my migrant labour certificate any more 
as I have a new identity card that says ‘no status in registration’ (or ‘stateless person’). 
 
Discussion with the participant showed that she initially experienced great difficulty 
obtaining Thai citizenship registration for her child, even though the birth was properly 
registered and the father was Thai.  She explained that the Thai authorities originally 
denied the application and refused to issue the documents on the basis that she might 
have been lying about the father’s citizenship.  She remained at the registry office in the 
district all day, cried, and protested until the certificate was duly issued.     
 
Questions        
 
Are you a Thai citizen?  If not, would you like to get Thai citizenship? 
 
I feel that I am a Thai person, because I have lived in Thailand long enough, and spent 
my time as a Thai person, but in reality I am not a Thai (citizen).   
 
Why do people need citizenship?  Why is it useful? 
 







What access to services does citizenship provide?  What do you get from Thai 
citizenship? 
 
Yes I need Thai citizenship because it would allow me access to social services.  It would 
allow me to travel freely.  It would allow me to access loans, and other services that Thai 
people take for granted.  It would enable me to obtain a driving license.  I am often 
arrested by police and need to pay bribes and fines to ensure my release as I do not have a 
Thai driving license, and I am not eligible to obtain one. 
 
Do you think Thai citizens should have equal access to education, health and other 
services?  Should these services be available to non-citizens or residents? 
 
It is not possible to make it equal, because the system does not allow people to be treated 
equally.  It might be possible to enable access for highlanders, but they need to pay a 
higher price to access social services. 
 
Who do you think should be eligible for Thai citizenship (born in Thailand, long-
term residency, born to Thai parents, willing to pledge oath of allegiance)? 
 
I think people who are born in Thailand should be able to get Thai citizenship.  They 
might not have both parents as Thai citizens, but they should be able to present 
documents to enable them to get Thai citizenship.  Being born in Thailand with one or 
other parents as Thai citizens should allow the children to be Thai citizens. 
 
I am confident that my child would get citizenship because my husband is Thai. 
 
Do you think the issue of people without Thai citizenship is a problem for Thailand?  
How do you think the government should address this problem? 
 
It is a problem for Thailand because of all the foreigners.  It is impossible to register them 
all and find their whereabouts, so when they commit crimes it is not possible to find them 
and make them accountable.  The government should investigate everyone who does not 
have citizenship and register them to protect society.  There should be emphasis on 
truthful answers, as this would protect people who come into Thailand. 
 
How do you feel when people talk about people without citizenship in different 
ways, expressing views negatively? 
 
I feel sad if I hear that, because I want to be Thai so nobody can look down on me.  But I 








I was born in Chiang Dao District in Chiang Mai Province.  My mother and father had 
‘highlander’ (Tai Yai, Shan) registration.  When I was born my mother and father did not 
register my birth as they did not think it was necessary. 
 
After that I learned in a school near my house until I completed primary school but was 
not able to study further due to family problems.  Therefore I could not study and 
traveled to Chiang Mai.  A friend invited me to work in Mae Hia, so I met my husband 
and lived with him as husband and wife. 
 
I had an identity card beginning with the number ‘6’ so I was not sure if I could get Thai 
citizenship.  My husband said it did not matter and we could be happy whatever the case.  
My child was born and was able to get Thai citizenship because his father was Thai.  I 




Are you a Thai citizen?  If not, would you like to get Thai citizenship? 
 
In my heart I feel that I am Thai, but I know that in reality I am not. 
 
I need Thai citizenship for convenience, so that I can travel wherever I want, find work, 
and will not have people take advantage of me. 
 
Why do people need citizenship?  Why is it useful? What access to services does 
citizenship provide?  What do you get from Thai citizenship? 
 
Citizenship enables people to do business, buy a car and house, and travel freely. 
 
Do you think Thai citizens should have equal access to education, health and other 
services?  Should these services be available to non-citizens or residents? 
 
People should have the same access to services as we all live in the same society.  It 
doesn’t matter where people come from, or if they don’t have citizenship, everyone 
should have the same access to social services as this makes society run effectively.  
These services should be provided efficiently by the authorities. 
 
Who do you think should be eligible for Thai citizenship (eg born in Thailand, long-
term residency, born to Thai parents, willing to pledge oath of allegiance)? 
 
All three: people should be able to get Thai citizenship.  It depends on each case.  There 
should be consideration of each case on its merits as to whether the person deserves to get 
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citizenship.   Children born in Thailand, like my child, should get citizenship because the 
father is Thai, and they are eligible for citizenship. 
 
Do you think the issue of people without Thai citizenship is a problem for Thailand?  
How do you think the government should address this problem? 
 
It is not a very big problem, if people came into Thailand legally, do the right thing, and 
are good members of the population then there should not be any problems. 
 
How do you feel when people talk about people without citizenship in different 
ways, expressing views negatively? 
 
I feel very sorry as what is the difference between people who don’t have Thai 
citizenship?  They are people too!  We should help each other and not discriminate as we 






Category – Person who was initiated as a monk and studied in Thailand but does 




I came to Thailand 18 years ago with my parents to Mae Hong Son.  I later moved to 
Chiang Mai.  When I was 12, I was ordained as a novice and lived in a temple.  I don’t 
have any identity documents whatsoever to prove who I am.  But I have a paper that 
shows that I stay at the temple.  Now I am a monk and study in a religious university.  
‘Another part of me, I am a normal person (sic),’ who is included in the house 




Are you a Thai citizen?  If not, would you like to get Thai citizenship? 
 
I don’t think I am a Thai person at all, but I have good intentions for Thai society, 
religion, and the monarchy.  I think all of us are the same, and the only difference is the 
citizenship category we are placed in.   
 
I don’t think I am Thai. I need to get Thai citizenship so I can gain a higher education, 
find employment, and seek access to medical services.  It is needed for all of that. 
 
Why do people need citizenship?  Why is it useful? 
 
People need citizenship because it is a symbol of the person’s place in society to establish 
unity.  It is the law of each country that governments require.  The people in each country 
need to provide evidence they belong to that country. 
 
If one day you get Thai citizenship, how will it feel different? 
 
I will be glad if I get Thai citizenship.  At least, I will be one person in Thailand with a 
proper legal status.  I hope the Thai government will have the humanity to give me 
citizenship to recognize my contribution to Thailand. 
 
Do you think Thai citizens should have equal access to education, health and other 
services?  Should these services also be available to non-citizens or residents? 
 
Everybody should have the same access to social services, as everybody who lives in 







How does nationality (racial or ethnic origin) affect citizenship? 
 
It is related and important.  I am Shan.  They are related as citizenship is more than a 
piece of paper and should ultimately reflect reality.  
 
Who do you think should be eligible for Thai citizenship (eg. born in Thailand, long-
term residency, born to Thai parents, willing to pledge oath of allegiance)? 
 
All three apply.  People born in Thailand should get citizenship.  People who have lived 
in Thailand should also get citizenship as they understand society.  People born in 
Thailand should citizenship.   
 
Do you think the issue of people without Thai citizenship is a problem for Thailand?  
How do you think the government should address this problem? 
 
It is a problem because people don’t have any education and create social problems for 
Thailand.  The government should help the population in a measured way to improve 
awareness and allow people to live their lives.  If people live in society without 
citizenship this will be a problem.  We should encourage them to study about Thailand 
once a week.  The government should consider giving rights to these people. 
 
How do you feel when people talk about people without citizenship in different 
ways, expressing views negatively? 
 
In my opinion, people shouldn’t say things like that.  There is separation in Thai society.  
People without citizenship are discriminated against and perceived in a negative way.  









I came to live in Thailand (from Shan State in Myanmar) eight years ago.  When I arrived 
in Mae Hong Son I was scared to go anywhere in case the police arrest me.  After that I 
came to live in Chiang Mai when brokers took me to find work there.   I worked at a 
restaurant, but was forced to resign as I could not understand Thai and had to work too 
hard.  After that I found work in Lampang.  At the time I was an undocumented worker.  
I faced the same problems in Lampang, as I had no documents.   
 
So I returned to Chiang Mai again to work in a factory.  I had no identity documents and 
requested help from my employer.  My employer responded that it was not necessary to 
have documents.  I resigned from that job and found another broker who offered to help 
me register as a foreign worker.  By that time my understanding of Thai had improved 
and I obtained registration as a foreign worker.  I worked as a housemaid in a hotel, 
where I met a man and fell in love.  The man took pity on me and took me to work with 




Are you a Thai citizen?  If not, would you like to get Thai citizenship? 
 
I don’t have Thai citizenship, but if I had the chance I would get it. 
 
Why do people need citizenship?  Why is it useful? 
 
People need citizenship to know what citizenship they are. 
 
What access to services does citizenship provide?  What do you get from Thai 
Citizenship? 
 
Citizenship is good so you can travel freely wherever you want.  You can live in 
Thailand, and have better employment prospects.  You can marry a Thai person, and can 
conduct business in your own name, instead of in the name of other people. 
 
Do you think Thai citizens should have equal access to education, health and other 
services?  Should services also be available to non-citizens or residents? 
 
People don’t have the same opportunities because citizenship is important in giving 
access to rights.  If people don’t have Thai citizenship they don’t have the same access to 
rights as those who do.     
 
Having obtained citizenship, how is this different from not having citizenship? 
 




Who do you think should be eligible for Thai citizenship (eg. born in Thailand, long-
term residency, born to Thai parents, willing to pledge oath of allegiance)? 
 
Children born of Thai mothers or fathers should get citizenship as this is their right. 
 
Do you think the issue of people without Thai citizenship is a problem for Thailand?  
How do you think the government should address this problem? 
 
I think this is a problem for the country.  It will follow people because they don’t have 
any evidence of where they came from.  It has an impact on people who didn’t do 
anything wrong, and because of this it makes Thai people view foreigners in a negative 
way from the very beginning.  It creates mistrust. 
 
The way to solve this is for the Thai government to register people who enter Thailand 
without identity documents.  The people without documents and the brokers should be 
registered to make it easier.  This would assist in resolving many of the problems faced 











I came to Thailand in 2538 (1995).  I came through Mae Hong Son Province and started 
work as a construction labourer in the refugee camp.  At that time I had no identification 
documents whatsoever.  In one year, my employer was able to register me as a foreign 
worker.   At that time the Mae Taeng District gave the opportunity for ‘highlanders’ to 
normalize registration.  I therefore registered my entire family, with brothers and sisters. 
   
My relatives and I combined our resources to purchase land as evidence of a place of 
abode.  I then obtained a ‘highlander’ registration document as evidence of my identity.  
After that I worked as a gardener, but the pay was very low.  I was always a hired 
labourer.  My employer was kind, however, and allowed me to take up additional jobs 
after hours.  My life improved through hard work.  Later I was able to get a driving 
license and access to the hospital.  This was a good thing for me, and I was able to 




Are you a Thai citizen?  If not, would you like to get Thai citizenship? 
 
I don’t think I am Thai.  I know my ancestors were not Thai and I was born outside 
Thailand.   
 
Why do people need citizenship?  Why is it useful? 
 
Everybody needs citizenship to prove who they are. 
 
What access to services does citizenship provide?  What do you get from Thai 
citizenship? 
 
I would like to have Thai citizenship so I do not face discrimination and I can buy a 
house in my own name. 
 
Do you think Thai citizens should have equal access to education, health and other 
services?  Should services also be available to non-citizens or residents? 
 
I don’t think people should receive the same access as foreigners should not be able to 








Who do you think should be eligible for Thai citizenship (eg. born in Thailand, long-
term residency, born to Thai parents, willing to pledge oath of allegiance)? 
 
People who live in Thailand for a long time should be eligible, but this must be in 
accordance with the government’s rules from time to time, and there should be 
consideration of each case to decide whether the person is eligible for citizenship or not.  
A person whose father or mother is Thai should also be able to have Thai citizenship.  
 
Do you think the issue of people without Thai citizenship is a problem for Thailand?  
How do you think the government should address this problem? 
 
It is a problem for Thai society, especially for people without any documentation, 
because if they commit crimes it has an impact on society.  But people who behave in a 
good way don’t present problems.  There should be a consistent registration system for 
foreign workers across Thailand so resolve this problem.  
 
There should be an official whose responsibility it is to provide advice about making a 
foreign registration certificate, working in Thailand, living in Thai society. 
 
How do you feel when people talk about people without citizenship in different 
ways, expressing views negatively? 
 
If people don’t have citizenship do bad things then they deserve to be spoken of in a 
negative way.  But if people without citizenship didn’t do anything wrong or receive 
discrimination, then we shouldn’t pay any attention because they didn’t do anything 
wrong.  If people who don’t have citizenship do the wrong thing then this behavior also 
has an impact on other people without proper documents living in Thailand. 
 
How do you feel about highlanders being allowed access to driving licenses? 
 
I feel good about this, as I was able to sit the driving license test and pass, which had a 
positive impact for me in being able to travel and move about more conveniently.  I have 
documents that enable me to travel and drive in the same way a Thai person does, even 





Category – Thai citizen by birth (1) 
 




Do you think people who come to Thailand should be able to apply for Thai 
citizenship or not (and why not)? 
 
Yes, because Thailand is a country that people want to live in.  Thai people are friendly 
and it is easier to live in Thailand without fear of persecution. 
 
You can keep the money you receive from your efforts to improve your quality of life. 
 
Why do people need citizenship?  Why is it useful? 
 
It helps us know where people come from, and which country they came from.  This 
makes it easier to distinguish, both for the population and the government. 
 
If people have identity documents then we can tell which country they come from.  If 
they don’t have any identity documents then we should imprison them, as they may have 
entered Thailand illegally.  Identity cards are important and everybody should have one. 
 
Do you think Thai citizens should have equal access to education, health and other 
services?  Should these services also be available to non-citizens or residents? 
 
People should have the same rights as we are all humans.  Even if we have different 
citizenships, people should have equal rights, because access to social services and 
political participation are important to continue to improve society and quality of life. 
 
If someone gets Thai citizenship, what do they receive for it? 
 
I feel proud if they get citizenship.  I feel that they have received the acceptance of 
society.  I feel that they would then be free to travel as they wish. 
 
How does nationality (racial, or ethnic origin) affect citizenship? 
 
I think that ethnicity has an impact on citizenship, because citizenship can tell what 
ethnicity the person is from.  The most important thing is that a person can change their 
citizenship if they wish, but they can not change their ethnicity because it is something 








Who do you think should be eligible for Thai citizenship (eg. born in Thailand, long-
term residency, born to Thai parents, willing to pledge oath of allegiance)? 
 
People who have a Thai mother or father should receive Thai citizenship as it can be 
proven that they have a right to citizenship.   
 
Do you think the issue of people without Thai citizenship is a problem for Thailand?  
How do you think the government should address this problem? 
 
It is an important problem for Thailand because if people don’t have citizenship and 
commit crimes it is difficult to bring them to justice.  There is no evidence to show where 
the person comes from or who they are.  The way to resolve this is for the government to 
investigate people in each area and provide registrations for foreigners. 
 
In conducting these registrations the government should collect detailed data from 
people.  This should provide evidence about where they come from and how to contact 






Category – Thai citizen by birth (2) 
 




Do you think people who come to Thailand should be able to apply for Thai 
citizenship or not (and why not)? 
 
I think people who don’t have citizenship are the same.  The only difference is their 
citizenship.  People without Thai citizenship who enter Thailand often come to work and 
have good intentions without wanting to conduct any illegal acts in Thailand.   
 
Why do people need citizenship?  Why is it useful? 
 
People need to receive the same benefits, just like Thai people, including a better quality 
of life.   
 
Do you think Thai citizens should have equal access to education, health and other 
services?  Should these services also be available to non-citizens or residents? 
 
People should receive the same access, if they behave well.  If they do wrong, then they 
should not receive the access.  There should be some consideration of this. 
 
There should be some analysis of the people to avoid problems later.  Therefore if 
Thailand does this people will know the value of Thai citizenship, otherwise there will be 
too many people coming in to Thailand to take advantage of us. 
 
If someone gets Thai citizenship, what do they receive for it? 
 
They receive the same rights as Thai citizens.  They get an identity card. 
 
How does nationality (racial or ethnic origin) affect citizenship? 
 
There is an impact directly from the birth of the person.  The persons roots are 
established during their birth and this can tell their identity.  For example, to work for the 
government it takes time to get the right qualifications.  People who were not born in 
Thailand don’t have access to these positions, and I think that is OK.  Some positions are 
reserved for people who were born in Thailand and are ethnically Thai. 
 
Who do you think should be eligible for Thai citizenship (eg. born in Thailand, long-
term residency, born to Thai parents, willing to pledge oath of allegiance)? 
 




Do you think the issue of people without Thai citizenship is a problem for Thailand?  
How do you think the government should address this problem? 
 
This is a serious problem for the country because we don’t know if the people are coming 
in are good or bad people.   
 
There should be a background check on the people coming in to Thailand so they have a 
registration system.  If the people don’t have good character then they should be returned 
to their country of origin.  In each occupation group they should be made to work in a 
certain area by quota (so as not to take too many positions).  Otherwise there will only be 
people without citizenship coming in to Thailand to take jobs and this will be a difficult 





Appendix 2: Categorisation of Identification Cards 
 
The differentiation of citizenship is enforced through the system of documentary 
evidence used to categorise people in a hierarchical system of social stratification.  The 
identification cards in Thailand use identifiable digits to classify ethnic origins, limiting 





เลขประจาํตวัประชาชนไทย  - แสดงตวัเลขหลกัทีÉ 1  หมายถึงประเภทบุคคล ซึÉ งมีอยู ่ 8 ประเภท ไดแ้ก่ 294 
 
The first number on an identity card signifies the category.  There are 8 categories as 
follows: 
 
ประเภททีÉ 1 - คือคนทีÉเกิดและมีสญัชาติไทยและไดแ้จง้เกิดภายในกาํหนดเวลา หมายความว่า เด็กคนใดก็ตามทีÉเกิดตัÊงแต่วนัทีÉ 1 
มกราคม พ.ศ .2527 เป็นตน้ไป อนัเป็นวนัเริÉมแรกทีÉเขาประกาศให้ประชาชนทุกคนตอ้งมีเลขประจาํตวั 13 หลกั  เมืÉอพอ่แม่ผูป้กครอง
ไปแจง้เกิดทีÉอาํเภอหรือสาํนกัทะเบียนในเขตทีÉอยูภ่ายใน 15 วนั นบัแต่เกิดมาตามทีÉกฎหมายกาํหนด เด็กคนนัÊนก็ถือเป็นบุคคลประเภท 1 
และจะมีเลขประจาํตวัขึÊนดว้ยเลข 1 3 1006 01263 52 2  
 
Category 1 - Includes people born in Thailand with Thai citizenship, whose birth was 
registered within the required period, meaning any child born since 1 January 1984, 
which was the first day of the announcement allowing all people to have the 13 digit 
identification card.  When the father or mother or legal guardian register the birth at the 
district or registration office of residency within 15 days of the birth, as the law requires, 
that child will be considered a category 1 person and have an identification card 
beginning with the sequence 1 3 1006 01263 52 2. 
   
                                                 
294 http://th.wikipedia.org/wiki/ (English translation by researcher). 
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ประเภททีÉ 2 - คือคนทีÉเกิดและมีสญัชาติไทยไดแ้จง้เกิดเกินกาํหนดเวลา หมายความว่า เด็กคนใดก็ตามทีÉเกิดตัÊงแต่วนัทีÉ 1 มกราคม พ.ศ .
2527 เป็นตน้ไป แลว้ผูป้กครองลืมหรือติดธุระไม่สามารถไปแจง้เกิดทีÉอาํเภอหรือเขตภายใน 15 วนัตามกาํหนด เมืÉอไปแจง้ภายห ลงั
เด็กคนนัÊนก็จะกลายเป็นบุคคลประเภท 2 มีตวัเลขตวัแรกในทะเบียนบา้นขึÊนดว้ยเลข 2  
 
Category 2 includes people who were born in Thailand with Thai citizenship, whose birth 
was registered after the required period.  Meaning any children born after 1 January 1984 
whose guardians forgot to register the birth within the required 15 days.  Once they are 
registered, these people will be listed as category 2 on the house registration and their 
identification documents will commence with the number 2. 
 
ประเภททีÉ 3 - คือคนไทยและคนต่างดา้วทีÉมีใบสาํคญัประจาํตวัคนต่างดา้วและมีชืÉออยูใ่นทะเบียนบา้นในสมยัเริÉมแรก )คือตัÊงแต่ก่อน
วนัทีÉ 31 พฤษภาคม พ.ศ .2527 (หมายความวา่ บุคคลใดก็ตามไม่วา่จะเป็นคนไทยหรือคนต่างดา้วทีÉไม่มีใบสาํคญัประจาํตวัคนต่างดา้ว 
และมีชืÉออยูใ่นทะเบียนบา้น ณ ที◌่ใดทีÉหนึÉ งในประเทศไทยมาตัÊงแต่ก่อนวนัทีÉ 31 พฤษภาคม พ.ศ .2527 คนนัÊนถือวา่เป็นบุคคล
ประเภท 3 และก็จะมีเลขประจาํตวัขึÊนตน้ดว้ยเลข 3  
 
Category 3 includes Thai people and foreigners that have important identity documents 
and have been registered in a house registration since the beginning of the registration 
process (that is since before 31 May 1984).  Meaning that whoever was registered in the 
house registration, whether Thai or foreigners without identity documents, before 31 May 
1984, that person will be a category 3 person and their identity documents shall 
commence with a number 3.    
 
ประเภททีÉ 4 - คือคนไทยและคนต่างดา้วทีÉมีใบสาํคญัคนต่างดา้ว แต่แจง้ยา้ยเขา้โดยยงัไม่มีเลขประจาํตวัประชาชนในสมยัเริÉมแรก 
หมายความวา่ คนไทยหรือคนต่างดา้วทีÉมีใบสาํคญัคนต่างดา้ว ทีÉอาจจะเป็นบุคคลประเภท 3 คือมีชืÉออยูใ่นทะเบียนบา้นเดิมอยูแ่ลว้ แต่ยงั
ไม่ทนัไดเ้ลขประจาํตวัก็ขอยา้ยบา้นไปเขตหรืออาํเภออืÉนก่อนช่วง 31 พฤษภาคม พ.ศ .2527 ก็จะเป็นบุคคลประเภท 4 ทนัที  
 
Category 4 - This category includes Thai people and foreigners that have important 
foreign identity documents, but don’t have an identity number and didn’t register their 
presence after the initial period.  Thai people or foreigners that possess foreign 
identification cards who might belong in category 3, because they are listed in the house 
registration but don’t yet have a personal identity number or moved before 31 April 1984, 
will be considered in category 4.    
  
ประเภททีÉ 5 - คือคนไทยทีÉไดรั้บอนุมติัให้เพิÉมชืÉอเขา้ไปในทะเบียนบา้นในกรณีตกสาํรวจหรือกรณีอืÉนๆ เช่น คนทีÉถือ 2สญัชาติ  
 
Category 5  - includes Thai people who have been granted permission to be added to the 
house registration certificate because they were initially excluded or for other reasons, 
such as people with dual citizenship. 
 
ประเภททีÉ 6 - คือผูที้Éเขา้เมืองโดยไม่ชอบดว้ยกฎหมาย และผูที้Éเขา้เมืองโดยชอบดว้ยกฎหมายแต่อยูใ่นลกัษณะชัÉวคราว กล่าวคือ คนทีÉมา
อาศยัอยูใ่นประเทศไทยแต่ยงัไม่ไดส้ัญชาติไทยเพราะทางการยงัไม่รับรองทางกฎหมาย เช่น ชนกลุ่มนอ้ยตามชายแดนหรือชาวเขา กลุ่มนีÊ
ถือวา่เป็นผูเ้ขา้เมืองโดยไม่ชอบดว้ยกฎหมาย ส่วนบุคคลทีÉเขา้เมืองโดยชอบดว้ยกฎหมายแต่อยูช่ัÉวคราว เช่น นกัท่องเทีÉยวหรือชาวต่างชาติ
ทีÉเดินทางเขา้ประเทศไทย แมบ้างคนจะถือพาสปอร์ตประเทศของตน แต่อาจจะมีสามีหรือภรรยาคนไทยจึงไปขอทาํทะเบียนประวติั




Category 6  - This group includes people who entered Thailand illegally or people who 
entered legally but are only residing in Thailand temporarily.   For example, people who 
are living in Thailand but don’t yet have Thai citizenship because they have not yet 
received official recognition.  This includes ethnic groups situated on borders and upland 
minorities.  These groups are considered to have entered illegally.  In the case of people 
who entered legally, but are residing temporarily, such as tourists or foreigners who 
travel to Thailand, even if they have a foreign passport but may be married to a Thai 
person, they may be entitled to register their history and be included in the house 
registration as a husband or wife.  These people comprise category 6.  
 
ประเภททีÉ 7  - คือบุตรของบุคคลประเภททีÉ 6 ซึÉ งเกิดในประเทศไทย คนกลุ่มนีÊ ในทะเบียนประวติัจะมีเลขประจาํตวัขึÊนตน้ดว้ยเลข 7  
 
Category 7 includes those people in category 6 who were born in Thailand, who will be 
entitled be registered in their identification card as category 7. 
  
ประเภททีÉ 8  คือคนต่างดา้วทีÉเขา้เมืองโดยถูกตอ้งตามกฎหมาย คือผูที้Éไดรั้บใบสาํคญัประจาํตวัคนต่างดา้วหรือคนทีÉไดรั้บการแปลง
สญัชาติเป็นสญัชาติไทย และคนทีÉไดรั้บการให้สญัชาติไทยตัÊงแต่หลงัวนัทีÉ 31 พฤษภาคม พ.ศ .2527 เป็นตน้ไปจนปัจจุบนั 
คนทัÊงแปดประเภทนีÊจะมีเพียงประเภททีÉ 3 ,4 และ 5 เท่านัÊนทีÉจะมีบตัรประจาํตวัประชาชนไดเ้ลย ส่วนประเภททีÉ 1 และ 2 จะมีบตัร
ประจาํตวัประชาชนไดก้็ต่อเมืÉอมีอายถึุงเกณฑท์าํบตัรประจาํตวัประชาชน คืออาย ุ 15 ปี แต่สาํหรับบุคคลประเภททีÉ 6 ,7 และ 8 จะมี
เพียงทะเบียนประวติัเล่มสีเหลืองเท่านัÊน จะไม่มีการออกบตัรประจาํตวัประชาชนให้  
 
Category 8 - includes foreigners who entered legally.  That is, people with valid foreign 
identity documents, or those who have been granted Thai citizenship, and those who have 
been granted citizenship after 31 April 1984.  Of these eight categories, only categories 3, 
4, and 5 will be entitled to an identification card.  As for categories 1 and 2, they will 
only be entitled to receive an identification card once they have reached mature age (15 
years_.  As for those people in categories 6, 7, and 8, they will only be entitled to a 







Appendix 3: Chronology of Historical Events 
  
 
1259 – 1317 Reign of King Mengrai in Lan Na; Kingdoms of Sukhotai, 
Lampang and Phayao founded by his cousins. 
1351   Founding of Kingdom of Ayuthaya 
1462 King Tilok of Lannathai (Chiang Mai) conquers 11 Shan 
municipalities and relocates 12,328 people. 
1638 – 1695 Apogee of Lao Kingdom; Lane Xang Era;  First evidence of 
European influence in Laos;  Siamese expedition to capture rebel 
town of Khorat (1691). 
1733 Chinese uprising against palace in Ayuthaya; 40 ringleaders (out of 
300 rebels) captured and executed.   
1767  
  
Sacking of Ayuthaya in Siam by Burmese forces.  Burmese troops 
destroy the city and take thousands of captives.  Migration of 
Siamese to Bangkok; Start of King Taksin's reign and Siamese 
campaign to conquer Cambodia and Laos and capture slaves. 
1767 - 1771 Sino-Burmese War. 
1771 Founding of Siamese capital at Thonburi following conquer of 
Ayuthaya. 
1778 - 1779 Siamese invasion of Vientiane; Deportation and mass migration of 
Lao; Capture of Lao ‘Prince’ Somdet Phrachao Anouvong (Chao 
Anou) by Siamese; Vientiane declared a vassal state of Siam;   
1781 Over 10,000 Chinese colonists slaughtered by Vietnamese. 
1785 Vietnamese Prince Nguyen Anh (subsequently Gia Long) arrives in 
Bangkok with the remnants of army defeated by Tay Son rebels.  In 
an effort to cement Vietnamese-Siamese relations, Prince Anh 
offers his sister in marriage to King Rama I. 
1782 Siamese capital moved from Thonburi to Bangkok; Bangkok Era.  
King Yotfa appoints Bunnag as Kalahom (Minister for Defence); 
The term ‘subject’ ceases to be synonymous with the term ‘citizen’ 
under US law295.   Prince Nguyen Anh returns to Vietnam and 
many of his soldiers remain in Siam in the Siamese armed forces.  
Nguyen Huynh Duc arrives in Bangkok with 5,000 soldiers seeking 
to join forces with Prince Anh, but finds he has already returned to 
Vietnam.  He negotiates transport back to Vietnam, but two-thirds 
of his soldiers stay behind permanently in Siam.   
1787 - 1788 Bloody suppression of workers' revolt in Taiwan. 
1816 East India Company increases opium trade with China. 
1820 Death of Vietnamese Emperor Gia Long; Decline of Annam; Siam-
Annam conflict over Xieng Khouang (now part of Lao PDR). 
1820 - 1841 Reign of Emperor Minh Maung (Vietnam).  Catholics persecuted 
and many flee to establish communities in neighboring Siam.  
                                                 
295 (Plender, 1988, p.10). 
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Religious persecution provides French with justification for 
military involvement to protect Christians in Vietnam. 
1824 Chinese Revolt in Chantaburi (Siam). 
1824 - 1826 First Anglo-Burmese War. 
1826 - 1827 Ascendency of Chakri dynasty in Siam;   
Siam suppresses Lao rebellion led by Chao Anou and sack 
Vientiane for second time;296  Six thousand families removed from 
Laos to Siam as slaves.   
1839 Opium War between Britain and China. 
1842 Treaty of Nanking concluded between China and Britain Chinese 
mass-migration to Siam (and British colonies in Malaya and 
elsewhere) by sea.  Chinese Revolt in Siam at Nagor Chaisri against 
tax and working conditions.  Prussian Law of 1842 replaces terms 
‘subject’ and ‘allegiance'  with ‘national’ and ‘nationality’.297’ 
1843 Hong Kong ceded to Britain; Canton, Shanghai, Amoy, Foochow,  
and Ningpo opened to British opium imports. 
1844 Commencement of steam ship trade between Siam and China298. 
1845 Chinese Revolt in Langsuan (Siam). 
1848 Chinese Revolt at Chieng Sao (Siam). 
1850 Taiping Rebellion breaks out in eastern Kwangsi (China). 
1851 Beginning of King Mongkut's reign (r. 1851 - 1868). 
1852 Second Anglo-Burmese War. 
1853 Birth of Chulalongkorn (r. 1868-1873); Discovery of gold in 
Victoria; First Chinese settlers land in Victoria, Australia. 
1856 "Arrow" War, China in conflict with the West. 
1857 British and French troops occupy Canton. 
1858 French troops seize Saigon; China signs treaties with Britain, 
France, Russia, and the United States, extending foreign privileges. 
1860 Chinese renege on treaty terms; British and French troops occupy 
Peking; Convention of Peace between China and Great Britain; 
Chinese are free to migrate;  Thousands of Chinese labourers 
employed in mines and rubber plantations of British Malaya. 
1861 French Navy attacks Saigon (Cochinchina). 
1862 Saigon Treaty;  France takes control of Cochinchina. 
1863 Protectorate Treaty between France; Prince Norodom requires 
Khmer to hand over to France conduct of the country's foreign 
relations and prohibits the King from receiving foreign consuls 
without French authorization;  In return, France pledges to "protect" 
to the kingdom, maintain order, and guard against external attack. 
1864 Cambodia is proclaimed French Protectorate. 
                                                 
296 Jules Harmand interviewed survivors from the carnage and described the massacre as “la grande guerre” 
(Ngaosyvathn, 1998, p.60).  The surviving population of Vientiane was dispersed and members of towns on 
the east bank were displaced to the west bank of the Mekong to prevent further rebellion. 
297 (Parry, 1957, p. 4). 
298Two thousand Chinese ‘coolies’ could now travel on a single ship  as opposed to the small numbers that 
could previously travel on Junks (Landon, 1941, p. 198). 
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1868 End of King Mongkut’s reign (r. 1851-1868); Chulalongkorn 
becomes King of Siam at the age of 15 (r. 1868-1910); Siam 
abandons territorial claims over Cambodia but retains Battambang 
and Siem Riep; Commencement of Meiji Restoration in Japan; 
Founding of Tokyo (Edo) as capital city. 
1870 Conclusion of treaty between the United Kingdom and the United 
States to “regulate the citizenship of the British subjects who have 
emigrated … to the United States of America299. 
1871 King Chulalongkorn visits British colonies in Singapore and India, 
and Dutch colony in Java;  Chulalongkorn introduces court reforms;  
First announcement (Siam Repository July 1871) that Siam would 
abolish slavery (that)300;  (did not take effect until 1905). 
1872 First Chinese students go abroad. 
1877 Restrictions on Chinese access to goldfields in Australia. 
1878 China sends first ambassadors abroad. 
1884 Sino-French War; Annam (Vietnam) becomes a French 
protectorate.  French conquest of Tonkin. 
1885 Third Anglo-Burmese War;  Myanmar becomes part of British 
Empire; French Mission established to “protect the rights of the 
Court of Hue over Laos.”301 
1887 French Government establishes Vice-Consul at Luang Prabang;  
Vietnamese invade Luang Prabang under Deo Van Tri;  Cambodia 
and Vietnam (Cochinchina, Annam, and Tonkin) united under the 
Indochinese Union;  Laos is added six years later. 
1888 Franco-Siamese Agreement after a stand-off at Thaeng (Dien Bien 
Phu) establishes crude borders between Siam and Annam. 
1890 Treaty between the United States and China sets out terms on which 
the United States could restrict admission of Chinese labourers. 
China's early industrialization: Han-yang foundaries; Li Hung-
chang establishes China's first modern textile factory in Shanghai. 
1891 Institute of International Law at Hamburg (1891), Geneva (1892), 
and Lausanne (1898) indicated that the first of the restrictions of 
international law is that a state "cannot isolate itself from foreign 
states or their subjets.” 302 
1892 Anti-foreign writings prohibited by Peking; floods, famine in 
China; Sun Yat-sen founds China Resurrection Society 
1893 Treaty between France and Siam establishes French sovereignty 
over Laos after gunboat diplomacy at Paknam; Franco-Siamese 
treaty; Siam abandons claims to territory east of the Mekong;  Siam 
pays an indemnity of three million francs to France; China's first 
newspaper founded; Mao Tse-tung is born (26 December).  
1894 Tung-hak Rebellion in Korea unleashes Sino-Japanese War. 
                                                 
299 (Plender, 1988, p. 10). 
300 (Panananon, 1982, p. 197). 
301 (Gunn, 1988, p. 27). 
302 (Plender, 1988, p. 2). 
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1895 China defeated; Treaty of Shimonoseki; Japan obtains Taiwan, the  
Peng-hu Islands (Pescadores) and Lioatung Peninsula in 
Manchuria; China pays war damages to Japan. 
1896 Anglo-French agreement on Siam.  England recognizes France's 
1893 territorial gains; Both guarantee Siamese independence. 
1899 Boxer rebellion begins; John Hay proclaims "Open Door Policy"; 
French annex the Chan-chiang region in western Kwangtung. 
1900 Boxers occupy Peking and besiege foreign embassies;  
Boxer-led anti-foreign influence spreads; international expedition to 
Peking and declaration of war on China; allied nations occupy 
Peking; pace of industrial development in China increases. 
1901 Immigration Restriction Act (basis for White Australia Policy). 
1904 Franco-Siamese treaty on Cambodian frontier; Russo-Japanese War 
breaks out; fighting in Manchuria; Japanese are victorious. 
1905 Act on the Abolition of Slavery introduced by Rama V (King 
Chulalongkorn).  Introduction of Military Conscription in Siam303. 
1906 Franco-Siamese Commission established to demarcate Cambodian 
border; Constitutional government proclaimed in Peking. 
1907 Treaty between France and Siam establishes borders of present-day 
Laos and Cambodia; France relinquishes three Cambodian 
provinces - Battambang, Sisophon and Siem Reap - to Siam 
1910 End of Chulalongkorn's reign (1868 - 1910); Commencement of 
King Vajiravudh's (Rama VI) reign (r. 1910 - 1925); Chinese 
residents in Bangkok riot against new taxation law; evidence in 
census of larger numbers of female Chinese migrants in Siam raises 
concern; New Siamese taxation law introduces a capitation (head) 
tax on all residents, regardless of race304; Division of north-east 
China into Russian and Japanese spheres of influence. 
1911 Naturalization Law (No. 130) introduced in Siam (18 May 1911); 
Republican insurrection of Wu-chang (10 October 1911); Manchu 
Dynasty (1644-1911) overthrown in China;  
1912 Dr Sun Yat-sen inaugurates the Chinese Republic in Nanking (1 
January 1912); Sun Yat-sen soon yields power to General Yuan 
Shih-kai who transfers republican government to Peking. 
1913 First Nationality Laws passed in Siam (10 April 1913); Yuan Shih-
kai President of China; Sun Yat-sen flees to Japan. 
1914 - 1918 World War I. 
1914 King Rama VI publishes racist tome denouncing Chinese influence 
entitled “The Jews of The East” under nom de plume (Asavabahu). 
1915 Japan presents Twenty-one Demands to China; anti-Japanese  
demonstrations; Yuan Shih-kai proclaims himself Emperor. 
                                                 
303 Turton, 1980, p. 284, points out the importance of these two Acts being introduced in the same year. 
304 The Chinese were accustomed to paying a moderate tax once every three years, and were required to 
report to the nearest police station.  They received a receipt in the form of a wax seal, which they wore on 
their wrists to show Thai police, “who were extremely active for a few months, that the tax had been paid”  
Landon, 1941, p .32-33.   
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1916 Thousands of Cambodians march on Phnom Penh to protest taxes 
and forced labour imposed by French; 500 arrested and imprisoned. 
1917 Canton government declares war on Germany in World War I; 
China declares war on Germany; Russian Revolution begins. 
1919 Paris Peace Conference gives Japan former German possessions in 
China; violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China; Mao Tse-
tung organizes Hunan Students Union to direct strikes and boycott 
Japanese goods; Students protesting against civil war massacred in 
China; Census records 54,727 Chinese (born) women in Siam. 
1920 Chinese Communist Party founded in Shanghai. 
1921 Kuomintang revived; Sun Yat-Sen President of Kwangtung; Mao 
Tse-tung at First CCP Congress;  Comintern contacts Sun Yat-Sen. 
1923 Unification of Kuomintang and Communist Party under Dr Sun Yat 
Sen.  200 strikers massacred during general strike led by the 
Chinese Communist Party against Peking-Hankow railway.  
1925 End of King Vajiravudh's (Rama VI) reign (r. 1910-1925); 
Beginning of King Prajadhipok's (Rama VII) reign (1925 - 1935); 
Death of Sun Yat Sen.  General strikes in Shanghai spread to other 
cities; Protesting students massacred in China; Chiang Kai Shek's 
power grows with the assistance of Soviet advisor Borodin.  
1927 Introduction of Siam’s (first) Immigration Act and border controls; 
Split between Chinese Communist Party and Kuomintang; Chiang 
Kai-shek launches "White Terror" against Communists in 
Shanghai; Kuomintang-Wuhan government overthrown; Mao Tse-
tung leads insurrection in Hunan; Canton commune crushed; Mao 
Tse-tung establishes revolutionary base in Chingkang Mountains 
1929 Ho Chi Minh visits Siam as Comintern representative and 
establishes resistance against French.  Siamese Census records 
131,510 Chinese (born) women in Siam. 
1930 Chiang Kai-shek conducts "bandit extermination" campaigns 
against Communists. 
1931 Siamese Immigration Amendment Act significantly increases fees 
for residence certificates and establishes a literary test to discourage 
Chinese labour migration; Japanese forces take Manchuria; 
Nanking government prohibits anti-Japanese demonstrations; 
Chinese Republic formed in Kiangsi. 
1932 Abolition of absolute monarchy in Siam (November); 
Establishment of constitutional monarchy;305  National Assembly is 
created; New Constitution states: “the supreme power of the 
country belongs to the people;" Japanese take Shanghai; Japanese 
found 'Manchukou;' Communists declare war on Japan; 
Kuomintang sign armistice with Japan. 
1933 (and 1936) Siamese government closes Chinese schools; Japanese advance in 
northern China; Minister of Economy, People's Party member Pridi 
                                                 
305 Thailand, Official Yearbook, 1964, p.28. 
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Panomyong (1900 - 1983) presents a National Economic Policy 
based on a liberal "socialist" pattern and is accused of being a 
communist; Communist tendencies are punishable by 10 years 
imprisonment; resignation of cabinet members including Pridi 
Panomyong, who escapes into exile abroad. 
1934 King Rama VII. leaves for Europe; Pridi Panomyong is allowed to 
return to Bangkok and is cleared of charges of being a communist. 
1935 King Prajadhipok (r. 1925 - 1935) abdicates leaving no successor; 
National Assembly proclaims his nephew, Prince Ananda Mahidol, 
a boy of 10, as heir to the throne; As the new monarch (given the 
title of Rama VIII)  (r. 1935 - 1946) is underage and staying with 
his family in Switzerland where he attends school, the National 
Assembly appoints a Council of Regency to act on his behalf; 
Student demonstrations against Japanese occupation of China. 
1936 Massive anti-Japanese strikes in China lead to invasion by Japanese 
Marines in Tsingtao. 
1937 Siamese Immigration Act of 1937-38 increases fees to two hundred 
baht306; 188,534 Chinese (born) women in Siam; War breaks out in 
China; Chiang Kai-shek captured by Manchurian troops.  
1938 Pridi Panomyong, aided by the army group of Phibul Songkhram, a 
key military leader in the suppression of the attempted coup d'etat 
of 1933, oust Prime Minister Bahol; Phibul Songkhram is appointed 
Prime Minister by the Council of Regency; He concurrently takes 
the post of Minister of Defense; Pridi Panomyong becomes 
Minister of the Interior. ‘Siam’ renamed ‘Thailand;’ Combined 
impact of the new Immigration Act and the closing of Chinese 
schools prompts departure of 12,000 Chinese from Siam. 
1939 Amendment to the Alien Registration Act introduces an annual 
registration fee (replacing ‘head-tax’) and requires aliens to register 
every year with the authorities; World War II begins; Thailand 
declares neutrality, then signs a treaty and becomes ally of Japan. 
1940 Non-aggression pacts concluded by Siam with Britain and France; 
Thailand launches an offensive against French forces in Indochina.  
Thai Airforce bombs French troops in Vientiane, Pakse, 
Savannakhet, and Saravane. 
1941 Japan and Thailand sign an agreement that Tokyo will assist 
Bangkok to regain territories lost to Britain and France; Thailand 
undertakes to assist Japan in the war against the US and the United 
Kingdom; French Airforce reciprocates by bombing Ubon, Sakhone 
and Udon; Japan demands free passage to attack British forces; 
                                                 
306 This attempt at revenue raising was extremely profitable, delivering 2,931,875 baht into a total 
government revenue of 108,908,502 baht.  The new law also placed the responsibility for the entrance of 
the alien upon the carrier, making it a serious (and costly) offence to smuggle aliens into Siam.  Immigrants 
were required to provide evidence of an independent income or means of support.  These changes radically 
altered the movement of foreigners (especially Chinese) into Thailand and the number of new arrivals was 
for the first time less than the number of departures (Landon, 1941, p. 211). 
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Thai Navy is defeated by French (800 killed and fleet destroyed) in 
naval battle near Sichang island. (7 January 1941). 
1942 Phibul Songkhram takes control; Communist forces operating in 
Siam since 1927 found the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). 
1943 Pridi Panomyong organises resistance against the Japanese in co-
operation with the Free Thai Movement in the US, founded by the 
Siamese Ambassador to Washington, Seni Pramoj, who refused to 
deliver Prime Minister Phibul Songkhram's Declaration of War 
against the US to the US Government.  
1944 Phibul Songkhram's government is toppled by National Assembly; 
Khuang Aphaiwong (1902-1968) is appointed Prime Minister;  
restores titles of nobility; political prisoners are released. 
1945 Declaration of Lao independence under Japanese rule (8 April 
1945); Atomic bomb is dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; 
World War II ends; Siam's Declaration of War on the US and Great 
Britain is repudiated by Pridi Panomyong, Regent of Siam on 
behalf of King Mahidol (studying in Switzerland); Ho Chi Minh 
proclaims Democratic Republic of Vietnam (2 September 1945); 
Prime Minister Khuang resigns and founds Democrat Party; Seni 
Pramoj becomes Prime Minister; Founding of the United Nations 
1946 Diplomatic relations with US and Great Britain re-established; 
French recapture Laos; Royal Lao Government (RLG) is formed.  
Lao Issara Government flees to exile in Thailand.  Pridi Panomyong 
becomes Prime Minister and attempts to purchase Laos from France 
with US assistance for USD$50,000,000.  King Mahidol shot dead 
(9 June); His brother, Bhumiphol Adulyadej, is proclaimed King 
Rama IX;  Pridi Panomyong relieved as Prime Minister.  
1947 Sarit Thanarat (1908-1963) stages coup d'etat; Khuang Aphaiwong 
becomes Prime Minister; Phibul Songkhram becomes, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army; Laos is proclaimed an 
independent state within the French Union. 
1948 Khuang Aphaiwong forced to resign; Phibul Songkhram becomes 
Prime Minister again; Myanmar achieves independence from 
Britain (4 January 1948); Founding of the Union of Myanmar; 
Myanmar joins United Nations.  Communists go on the offensive in 
Manchuria, North, North-west, and Central China; anti-American 
student demonstrations; China's first National Assembly in 
Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek elected President, Nationalists abandon 
Manchuria; China Aid Act restores limited U.S. assistance to 
China; formation of a people's government in North China;        
1949  
  
Pridi Panomyong attempts a coup d'etat, but it is violently crushed 
by Phibul Songkhram's forces; Pridi flees to China;  Establishment 
of the People’s Republic of China (1 October 1949);  Movement of 
Nationalist Army (Kuomintang) into Northern Thailand; Start of 
Cold War.  Mao Tse-tung proposes eight-point peace plan to 
Nationalists; People's Republic of China proclaimed in Peking on 1 
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October; Nationalists establish government in Taiwan; Siam once 
again changes name to Thailand (Prathet Thai). 
1950 China and Soviet Union sign Treaty of Friendship; Korean War 
begins (1950-53); China enters Korean War; China invades Tibet. 
1951 Naval officers kidnap Phibul Songkhram; negotiations held on a 
new form of government; although crushed by government soldiers, 
this event impacts on Phibul's influence and power passes to (rivals) 
General Sarit Thanarat and General Pao Sriyanonda; the pair 
dissolve the National Assembly; The event is known as the "radio 
coup" as it is simply reported on the radio without further 
elabouration; The new leaders reinstate the 1932 constitution and 
rule rather from the background, keeping Marshall Phibul 
Songkhram as Prime Minister; Agrarian reform and re-distribution 
of land in China; San Fan (Three Anti) and Wu Fan (Five Anti) 
movements unleash violent campaigns in China affecting millions 
of people.  Communism is banned in Thailand.  
1953 - 1957 First Five Year Plan in China' Industrialisation, collectivisation of 
agriculture and political centralisation; First National People’s 
Congress.  Mao Tse Tung elected Chairman (1954). 
1954  
  
Thailand becomes a founding member of the Southeast Asian 
Treaty Organization (SEATO) along with the US, Great Britain, 
France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Pakistan; 
SEATO headquarters located in Bangkok; French troops surrender 
in Dien Bien Phu (7 May 1954); Yunnanese civilians resettled in 
villages on agricultural land in Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai.   
1955 US military advisors provide training to Lao Army. 
1957 Army chief Sarit Thanarat seizes power and ousts Phibul 
Songkhram and Pao Sriyanonda.  Phibul flees via Cambodia to 
Japan (where he dies in exile in 1964); Pao flees to Switzerland 
where he remains until his death a few years later; Pote Sarasin 
serves as caretaker Prime Minister. 
1958 Thanom Kittikachorn is elected Prime Minister of Thailand.  
Another coup d'etat by army chief Sarit Thanarat; Military Party 
proclaims a new constitution and forms a National Assembly which 
nominates Sarit Thanarat (1908-1963) as Prime Minister. 
1960 Sino-Burmese boundary Treaty. 
1961 Sarit Thanarat government announces first 6-Year Plan; the 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) is organised by Thailand, 
Malaysia and the Philippines; it will be enlarged and later becomes 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); The 
Communist Party of Thailand launches a "people's war"; Suspected 
Communists are arrested and executed. 
1962 United Kingdom imposes immigration controls on Commonwealth 
(Sri Lankan) citizens for the first time. 
1963 Sarit Thanarat dies of liver malfunction; Thanom Kittikachorn is 
appointed Prime Minister by King Bhumiphol; U.S. President 
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J.F.Kennedy and South Vietnamese Premier Diem assassinated.  
Lyndon Johnson becomes U.S. President. 
1964 China tests first atomic bomb. 
1965 Mao Tse Tung launches Cultural Revolution; Palace guard coup in 
Indonesia fails; Indonesian Communist Party is destroyed; 
1969 First official census of Thailand's highland population in 16 
provinces (1969-70); 120,000 people were listed, but did not obtain 
Thai citizenship; 90,000 sorties307 flown from Thai bases make 
Laos "most bombed country in history;"  Ho Chi Minh dies;  Nixon 
announces troop withdrawal from South Vietnam; Sino-Soviet 
military clashes over Chenpao island; mass anti-Soviet 
demonstrations in China; anti-China demonstrations in Moscow. 
1970 Cambodia (Lon Nol) coup; King Sihanouk establishes government 
in exile in Peking. 
1971 U.S. supported South Vietnam invasion of Laos; China warns of 
possible use nuclear weapons; Ping Pong Diplomacy (American 
Ping Pong Team visit); Kissinger visits China; Mao says Nixon is 
welcome to visit China; Nixon visit announced. 
1972 Nixon visits Peking; Detente in US-China relations. 
1973 October 14; A student “pro-democracy” rally leads to violent 
confrontation; more than 400 people are killed, thousands are 
wounded; King Bhumiphol persuades Prime Minister Thanom 
Kittikachorn and his two closest associates, Deputy Prime Minister 
Field Marshall Prapass Charusathiara and Colonel Narong 
Kittikachorn (Thanom's son), to leave the country; Thammasat 
Rector, Sanya Dhammasakdi, appointed Prime Minister. 
1974 A bloody 3-day riot begins in Bangkok's Chinatown when a Thai 
policeman issues a parking ticket to a Sino-Thai taxi driver; 30 
killed, hundreds injured; Myanmar is proclaimed a Socialist 
Republic. 
1975 End of Second Indochina (Vietnam) War; Khmer Rouge take 
Phnom Penh and declare “Year Zero” (17 April 1975).  NVA tanks 
enter Presidential Palace in Saigon.  Vietnam reunited under North 
Vietnamese flag (29 April 1975).  Lao Royalist government 
ministers and U.S. officials flee Laos.  Hmong leader Vang Pao is 
airlifted from Laos by C130 aircraft with 2,500 supporters.  
Beginning of exodus of Hmong refugees from Laos; Indochinese 
refugees arrive in Thailand en masse; 700,000 flee from Laos. 
1976 Death of Mao Tse Tung. 
1978 After economic reform, China promotes labour exports as means to 
earn foreign exchange and to ease unemployment; 130,000 to 
200,000 Chinese workers move abroad, mostly in Asia. 
1979 Vietnamese forces liberate Kampuchea from Pol Pot (January 
                                                 
307 Does not include bombing runs on Laos originating in Vietnam or from aircraft 
carriers (Ngaosyvathn, 1994, p. 67). 
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1979). Chinese forces launch ‘punitive’ invasion of Vietnam (16 
February 1979). 
1985 Second census of highland tribal people in 20 provinces (1985-88); 
Registration of 580,000 hill tribe people; many did not obtain 
citizenship; some already included in the first national census. 
1986 Lao refugees flee for Thailand as news breaks that UNHCR will 
‘screen out’ remaining refugees and close camps. 
1988 Abortive elections staged in Burma.  Massacre of civilian 
democracy protesters.  SLORC308 established. 
1989 'Burma' changes name to 'Myanmar.' 
1990 Thai Cabinet issues "residence cards" (known as blue cards) to 
allow 247,775 highland people to reside in the country (June). 
1991 Thailand, Laos and the UNHCR sign an agreement to repatriate 
Hmong refugees.  Soviet Union collapses and aid to Vietnam and 
Laos ceases. 
1992 Ban Vinai refugee camp, the largest in South East Asia, is closed by 
the UNHCR (17 December 1992).  About 55,000 refugees (mostly 
Hmong) passed through Ban Vinai.  60,000 Lao refugees remain in 
camps in Thailand, roughly half of which are Hmong. 
1993 Last Cambodian refugees repatriated to Cambodia by UNHCR; Bill 
Clinton elected U.S. President; 15,000 Hmong refugees escape Thai 
camps rather than face repatriation; 10,000 seek refuge in Thai 
Buddhist Temple Wat Tam Krabork.  
1994 The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, 
reports 200,000 migrant workers abroad.  Remittances to China 
generated an estimated USD$8 billion in China309. 
1995 UNHCR deadline for ‘phased repatriation’ of remaining Lao 
refugees in Thailand. 
1997 Asian economic crisis.  Decline of regional currencies against the 
US dollar.  Coup d’etat in Cambodia renews refugee movements to 
Thailand.  SLORC changes name to SPDC310. 
1999 Laos agrees to accept repatriation of remaining refugees in Thailand 
(1,346 Lao in Napho camp, Nakhon Phanom);  Thousands of 
highlanders staged violent protest in Chiang Mai to demand 
citizenship rights (April - May); Cabinet establishes "Highlanders 
Personal Status Committee" to review the issue of Thai nationality 
and registration of tribal people. State survey provides "red-
bordered green cards" to 186,929 tribal people; these do not carry 
automatic citizenship and each bearer has to prove eligibility. 
Highlanders born between December 13, 1972 to February 26, 1992 
and those who can prove they have been residing in the country for 
generations are eligible for citizenship. 
                                                 
308 State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). 
309 http://www.migrationint.com.au/news/feb_1995-18mn.html 
310 State Peace Development Council (SPDC). 
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2000 Thai Cabinet issues resolution to grant residence cards or 
certificates of alien registration, which constitutes permanent or 
temporary residence, to tribal people in Thailand; Authority to grant 
citizenship to highlanders in 20 provinces is devolved from 
provincial governors to district chiefs (from 1 June)311. 
2001 Increased violence signals the resurrection of the southern 
insurgency in Patani, Yala and Narathiwat Provinces. 
2002 Thirteen Burmese “illegal migrant labourers” found murdered, their 
bodies dumped at a waste disposal site312;  
A diplomatic row erupts between Thailand and Taiwan over the 
signing of the first ever labour agreement with Taiwan; The row 
threatens the livelihood of 140,000 Thai workers returning 50 
billion Baht a year in remittances; The agreement planned to cut 
brokerage fees by supplying workers through state-to-state 
contracts or contracts between the Thai government and companies 
in Taiwan to prohibit unscrupulous brokers from cashing-in on job 
seekers; The Taiwanese Labour Minister is refused a Thai visa after 
initially receiving an invitation to attend a signing ceremony; The 
Thai Foreign Minister issues a banal statement denying pressure 
from China, but confirming that “under the one-China policy,” 
contact with Taiwan is “limited to economic matters only” hence 
the need to “reconsider the level of people needed to sign or witness 
the agreement”…”We do not recognise Taiwan as a country 
because of the one-China policy”… “We have no political 
connection with Taiwan”… “If a Taiwanese Minister is coming for 
economic matters we have no objection”… “We have to weigh that 
up against labour issues and international relations;”   
The Taiwanese Minister for Labour issues a sparse counter-
statement regretting Thailand's “uncertain and volatile attitude” 
(and pointing out that she was invited by Thailand to attend the 
signing ceremony in the first place); The Taiwanese Labour 
Ministry threatens to “readjust bilateral relations313.”  
2004 28 April – Krue Se Mosque Massacre. 100 militants attack 10 
police stations in Patani and retreat to the Krue Se mosque.  After a 
seven hour stand-off, government forces attack the mosque, killing 
all militants.  Some militants were executed by the military after the 
attack.  The circumstances around the event and its aftermath 
                                                 
311 Bangkok Post, 29 August 2002. 
312 Bangkok Post, 6 March 2002, 13 Murdered Burmese Found at Dump Site. 




resulted in deep rifts within the Thai military establishment and 
provoked a dramatic escalation in the southern insurgency. 
25 October – Tak Bai Incident.  Following protests at police 
stations after the arrest of six men for allegedly providing weapons 
to insurgents, Thai authorities assaulted and detained protesters.  In 
the process at least 85 people, mostly youths, were killed, either 
shot, beaten to death, or died from suffocation after being placed in 
trucks and moved to a military base in Patani.  The Thai Prime 
Minister at the time, Thaksin Shinawatra, insensitively suggested 
that the deaths took place because the men were ‘already weak’ 
from fasting during Ramadan. 
December 26 - Indian Ocean Tsunami resulting in the deaths of 
hundreds of undocumented workers from Myanmar in Southern 
Thailand.  Efforts by Thai officials to liaise with Myanmar on 
identification and repatriation of deceased remains prove fruitless 
and hundreds of unidentified remains are interred at Ban Maruan 
cemetery in Takua Pa.  The researcher visited there several times in 
resolving the forensic identification of tsunami victims. 
2008 April 2008.  54 Burmese migrant workers hoping to find work as 
day labourers are suffocated in a container in Southern Thailand as 
they are attempting to enter Thailand.  The survivors are detained 
and returned to Myanmar as they are considered economic migrants 
rather than trafficked persons.  
2009 December 2009.  Amidst diplomatic protest from countries that had 
accepted some people as refugees, the Thai Government forcibly 
repatriates 4,000 Hmong to the Lao PDR, several hundred of which, 
including mostly women and children, were detained for one year 
in the immigration office on the border at Nong Khai.  Thailand is 
accused of refoulement (returning persons of concern to face 
persecution in an unsafe environment), but as Thailand is not a 
signatory to the UN Convention on Refugees, no action is taken.  
 
